US embassy cable - 05SANAA955

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000955 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ 
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015 
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, PREL, PTER, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005 
 
REF: A. SANAA 912 
     B. SANAA 896 
     C. SANAA 895 
     D. SANAA 891 
     E. SANAA 883 
     F. SANAA 882 
     G. SANAA 876 
     H. SANAA 875 
     I. SANAA 863 
     J. SANAA 860 
     K. SANAA 836 
 
Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
1.    (S/NF) Begin Summary:  The Ambassador convened an EAC 
meeting on April 13, 2005, to review the current threat, 
ongoing security measures and approve reverse trip wires. 
President Saleh informed the Ambassador that Kanaan had been 
captured along with several of his top associates and Yemen 
forces have made significant progress in the fighting in the 
Saada area.  The EAC agreed that, although current threat 
indicators point to a relatively safer environment,  embassy 
employees and the greater American community should continue 
security measures recommended previously to avoid the large 
crowds, tourist areas and downtown Sanaa. Key offices and 
personnel represented at the meeting included: AMB, DCM, 
DATT, FPD, IPC, MO, LEGATT, POLE, RMAS,OMC, RSO, CONS, PD and 
USAID. End Summary. 
 
2.    (C/NF) Per Department guidance , the EAC discussed and 
adopted the following &Reverse Trip-Wires8 as a tool to 
gauge future recommendations for cessation or continuation of 
&Authorized Departure8: 
 
            a.  Decrease in terrorist threats against 
Americans in Yemen, combined with security environment 
characterized by no credible, specific information or 
non-counterable terrorist threats or plans for attack against 
Americans or other Western citizens or interests, to include 
international schools. 
 
            b.  Host nation responsiveness, resources and 
capabilities are assessed as adequate to protect American 
personel and assets from terrorist threats and political 
violence. 
 
            c.  EAC, RSO, and MOI concur that travel within 
Sanaa and designated areas of Yemen, including selected major 
cities, is safer under the restrictions and guidelines in 
place prior to the approval of authorized departure status. 
 
            d.  EAC agreement that acts of violence resulting 
from spillover from the Saada fighting or any other 
transnational or indigenous group does not pose a significant 
risk for the American community in Sanaa, or major Yemen 
cities that are authorized for Embassy travel by post 
management. 
 
3.    (S/NF) The Ambassador advised the EAC that President 
Saleh had called on the evening of April 12 to inform him 
that Kanaan, the person believed to have been planning an 
attack against American and Jewish leaders (reported in 
reftels), and some of his close associates had been captured. 
President Saleh assured the Ambassador of Yemen,s continuing 
efforts to capture any and all other associates of Kanaan. 
President Saleh also asserted that the Al-Hoothi fighters in 
Saada have been significantly reduced and are on the run. 
 
4.    (S/NF) RMAS had nothing to add. 
 
5.    (SBU) The Management Officer briefed the EAC on how 
authorized departure status had affected the embassy staff. 
The Management Officer praised the support Post has received 
from Washington.  He specifically mentioned the 
responsiveness of Post,s contacts in obtaining clearances on 
all of the documents needed to assist Post,s dependents. 
Initially only one person requested orders to depart; 
however, two others have since indicated that they wished to 
depart under authorized departure. A cable went out yesterday 
requesting permission to use Israel and Ethiopia as alternate 
safe havens.  The officers and the spouses were advised of 
the possibility of not being able to return to post until AD 
is lifted. The Management Officer advised that at large posts 
the EAC decides each request for authorized departure.  The 
EAC agreed that the front office was in a better position to 
decide on those requests. 
 
6.    (S/NF) The EAC discussed whether or not to continue the 
security measures currently in place. The Ambassador pointed 
out that even though the arrest of Kanaan, who represented 
the most serious and immediate threat against the embassy, 
has been reduced, the political violence in Saada which 
spilled over into Sanaa in the form of several grenade 
attacks and the threat of violence from other groups could 
affect our security. The EAC discussed the viability of the 
security measures and how closely people were following them. 
 The Management Officer advised that the shuttle schedule had 
been expanded to encompass more varied times for entry and 
egress; however, the result was that almost no one chose to 
ride the shuttle. The concept of a four-hour window for 
employees to come and go from the embassy also caused some 
difficulties for employees to comply with. The EAC agreed to 
continue the security measures of restricting travel to the 
downtown area, avoiding large clusters of officers and/or 
foreigners and to continue to vary times and routines, not 
just travel but all other activities. The EAC agreed to meet 
on Sunday to discuss whether or not to change that posture. 
The EAC agreed to allow each office supervisor to monitor the 
arrival and departure times of their employees. The EAC 
agreed to discuss at its next meeting whether or not to send 
out a warden message to the American community and what to 
advise them. 
 
7.    (SBU) The Management Officer was directed to send a 
Management Notice reiterating to Embassy staff the 
restrictions on travel and to continue varying times and 
routes. The Shuttle schedule, however, will return to its 
previous variations of six different routes and times. 
 
8.    (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene immediately 
following the Country Team Meeting at 1430 hours on Sunday, 
April 17, 2005, to review the security situation and discuss 
need for updating Warden messages.. 
Krajeski