US embassy cable - 05QUITO836

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000836 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, EC 
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: PRESIDENT DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY IN 
QUITO 
 
REF: QUITO 794 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney.  Reason 1.4 (b&d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  President Lucio Gutierrez declared an 
indefinite state of emergency in a national televised address 
at 21:30 local on April 15.  Embassy personnel are accounted 
for and safe.  Military units have not yet appeared in the 
streets, where spontaneous demonstrations sprang up to 
protest the action.  No violence has been reported.  Shortly 
after the announcement, the Ambassador telephoned Gutierrez 
to urge him to reconsider his move; the president replied he 
would not, but promised Ecuador's security forces would act 
with restraint and not target opposition leaders.  End 
Summary. 
 
Details on the Decree 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (U) The emergency applies to the capital, which has been 
declared a special security zone, and surrounding Pichincha 
province, and includes the suspension of certain civil 
liberties, including freedom of assembly, movement, 
expression, communication and protection from searches. 
Military units have been called to the capital to enforce 
order in the streets.  The President's decree also terminated 
the Supreme Court.  Gutierrez justified the action by citing 
Congress' refusal to deal with the court controversy, and 
said the state of emergency would be in effect until Congress 
dealt with pending court reforms. 
 
Early Embassy Actions 
--------------------- 
 
3.  (C) Upon hearing from Embassy sources that a state of 
emergency decision was imminent, the Ambassador spoke with 
Carlos Larrea, the president's legal advisor and confidant, 
to urge the GOE to reconsider its decision and express 
concern.   Larrea said the decision had been made, and was 
irreversible.  The Ambassador urged that the GOE respect 
civil rights and avoid politically motivated attacks on 
opposition figures. 
 
4.  (C) An hour after Gutierrez took to the airwaves to 
announce the emergency measures, the Ambassador telephoned 
him.  In their conversation, the Ambassador urged him to 
ensure the security forces acted with restraint.  Freedom of 
expression must be protected, she underscored, and the GoE 
must not target the opposition.  Gutierrez hoped he could 
lift the emergency by April 18 or 19.  The police and army 
would conduct no witch hunts, he promised, but instead would 
deploy to ensure the public's safety. 
 
Motives 
------- 
 
4.  (C) Separately, Larrea told Polchief the state of 
emergency had a dual purpose:  to prevent further protests 
targeting the home of the President's and high command's 
families, and to prevent Supreme Court President Guillermo 
Castro from moving against the Bank of Pichincha directors 
and annulling charges pending against notorious fugitive 
Ecuadorian bankers living in Miami (Septel). 
 
5.  (C) The Embassy canvassed contacts at the Ministry of 
Finance to follow up on the bank run explanation for the 
state of emergency declaration.  Vice FinMin Ramiro Galarza 
was unaware of such financial intrigue.  His explanation? 
That the Administration had learned that Congress was on the 
cusp of passing a resolution to terminate the Court and 
"divide the spoils" among opposition political parties. 
 
Subsequent Embassy Actions 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The Country Team assembled in the Chancery to reach 
out to contacts and urge calm.  Highlights include: 
 
-- Milgroup contacting Joint Forces, Army commanders, plus 
Army 1st Division commander; 
-- DAO briefing DOD, Southcom operations centers, Manta CSL; 
-- PAS drafting press guidance; 
-- RSO, MSG activating phone tree to counsel Embassy staff to 
limit movements; 
-- POL canvassing Presidency, opposition contacts, preaching 
restraint and dialog; 
-- DCM engaging pro-democracy NGO's director, Cesar Montufar; 
-- CONS preparing a warden message for resident Amcits; 
-- DCM briefing CG Guayaquil, requesting the Consulate to 
reach out to Coastal party leaders; 
 
Situation on the Streets 
------------------------ 
 
7.  (U) As of midnight April 16, large demonstrations were 
occurring throughout Quito, but mostly in its more prosperous 
north.  The epicenter is Avenida Shyris, a parade ground-like 
street two miles north of the Embassy but only two hundred 
yards west of the Marine House.  Police have reported no 
serious violence, and overall, the protesters' moods seem 
jubilant.  Embassy police contacts say their operational 
flexibility has been greatly restrained by the emergency 
order, the "men in blue" now being placed under Armed Forces 
command. 
Opposition Responses 
-------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Opponents of Gutierrez's decision quickly took to 
the airwaves, their message no surprise.  Both the PSC's Leon 
Febres-Cordero and PRIAN leader Alvaro Noboa were outraged by 
the president's "unconstitutional" acts, which were further 
proof of his dictatorial bent.  A dismissed Supreme Court 
judge claimed only the Congress was empowered to remove 
sitting judges.  And PSC Congressman Carlos Torres told 
Poloff that Congress would reconvene to revoke the emergency 
decree, as the Constitution's Article 182 allows it to do, 
but likely not before the legislature returns to session 
April 19.  Quito Mayor Paco Moncayo, a key figure in the 
opposition movement, has publicly called for demonstrators to 
remain in Quito's streets indefinitely and has requested 
Congress to reconvene immediately to revoke Gutierrez's 
emergency decree.  The municipal council too is searching for 
a method to revoke the emergency state (it has recently 
invoked habeas corpus laws to free protesters arrested by 
security forces). 
 
Embassy Next Steps 
------------------ 
 
9.  (C) Mission staff, especially the RSO team, remain at the 
Chancery as of 0100 hrs April 16 monitoring demonstration 
activity.  Personnel will reconvene by 1000 and take on the 
following tasks: 
 
-- Continue outreach to government and opposition alike, 
pushing dialog and restraint; 
-- Search for media opportunities to announce our concerns 
and demands for a negotiated solution; 
-- Issue a warden message to resident Amcits; 
-- Canvass police and military contacts and keep Mission 
community informed of areas to avoid; 
-- Brief USG operations centers as needed; 
KENNEY