US embassy cable - 05QUITO835

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000835 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, EC 
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: PUBLIC DISGUSTED WITH POLITICIANS 
 
REF: A. QUITO 781 
     B. QUITO 805 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney.  Reason 1.4 (b&d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  President Gutierrez missed an opportunity 
for conciliation after the opposition failed to turn great 
crowds out for the protest strike on April 13.   His recent 
intemperate statements led the opposition to court (and 
nearly attract) PRIAN support for a new, blatantly partisan 
proposal.  Ultimately, the PRIAN backed out, after Gutierrez 
threatened to fight any such resolution "to the death."  In 
disgust, thousands spontaneously joined night protests 
against the government, and more are expected tonight.  We 
are starting to hear disconcerting noises of divisions within 
the Armed Forces.  With the situation very fluid here, and 
given Gutierrez' current tone deafness to dialogue, we will 
make clear to him our concern that any move to dissolve 
Congress would have grave consequences, and look for 
opportunities to renew our call on both sides to set aside 
partisan interests and re-engage in dialogue.  End Summary. 
 
Taking the Low Road 
------------------- 
 
2.  (C) As protest strike actions were petering out on April 
13, President Gutierrez inflamed a frustrated opposition with 
intemperate public remarks.  The strike had proven most 
Ecuadorians were more interested in work than protest, he 
said in a national address, and the government would not cede 
to a small minority of troublemakers.  Minister of Government 
Oscar Ayerve, the GoE's point man for dialogue,  had earlier 
been quoted calling the Quito strike a "total failure." 
These statements had the predictable effect of prolonging 
street protest action late April 13 and fueled spontaneous 
overnight protests (police estimate around 4,000 people) 
again April 14.  More (and bigger) night protests are 
expected April 15. 
 
Opposition Tries (Again) to Capitalize 
------------------------------ 
 
3.  (C) The government tried and failed to win any opposition 
votes (it mustered only 35 in favor) for its "go slow" 
proposal to terminate the current Supreme Court and select a 
new one when Congress re-opened on April 14.  After Congress 
adjourned, the opposition reopened the session and made a 
play for the votes of banana magnate Alvaro Noboa's PRIAN. 
On offer was a commitment to permit the Supreme Electoral 
Tribunal (TSE) to select new Supreme Court justices, after 
re-divvying up the membership of the TSE and Constitutional 
Court among the opposition and PRIAN.  The PRIAN flirted with 
the idea all afternoon, generating frantic media attention, 
until finally imposing deal-breaking conditions (that the 
Congress vote on new supreme court justices) at 10:00 PM.  At 
that time, middle class citizens of Quito spontaneously 
turned out in the thousands to peacefully express frustration 
and disgust with the government, banging pots and pans while 
chanting "Fuera Lucio."  When radical Quito councilor (ID) 
Antonio Ricaurte attempted to join the throng, he was booed 
and left.  No other opposition politicians attended. 
 
Dissenters in the Military? 
--------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The Quito strike was led by mayor Paco Moncayo, a 
former high commander of the Armed Forces.  Prior to the 
strike, Moncayo had called publicly on the Armed Forces to 
cease supporting the Gutierrez government and respect the 
right of protest (Ref A).  On April 14, however, an 
uncharacteristically agitated Joint Chief VADM Victor Rosero 
told MLGRP Commander that the Army had become politicized and 
expressed worry about the unresolved debate in Congress.  The 
ex-military leaders lining up with Moncayo had influence over 
some active-duty officers, he said.  DATT subsequently called 
Army Chief Luis Aguas to express concern, and was told the 
Army would respect constitutional order.  Later in the day, 
Defense Minister Herrera publicly reaffirmed the military's 
loyalty to constitutional order.   SOUTHCOM Commander Gen. 
Craddock also called Adm. Rosero on April 14 to urge the 
military to exercise restraint and professionalism. 
 
Comment and Embassy Action Plan 
------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) President Gutierrez missed an opportunity for 
conciliation in the wake of the unimpressive April 13 strike 
action (Ref B).  Rather than focusing on how to move toward 
resolution of the court issue, Gutierrez went again with his 
gut instinct for taking the offensive.  We are concerned that 
in doing so, he could prove all too ready to overstep 
constitutional bounds, for example by dissolving an 
uncooperative Congress, if need be.  Thankfully, that 
decision point was avoided after the PRIAN flinched last 
night, but without a change in strategy, that point could 
come again.  Meanwhile, the nightly protests appear to 
reflect a new element of citizen outrage, and the military 
appears to be getting uncomfortable.  The indigenous, on the 
other hand, remain largely absent from protests, at least in 
the capital. 
 
6.  (C) With the situation still fluid and evolving, we see 
an important role for U.S. Mission activism and opportunities 
to advance US interests in stability and democratic values in 
the days ahead.  The Ambassador has a breakfast meeting with 
President Gutierrez on April 18.  To the president, she will 
signal that dissolution of congress and declaring a state of 
emergency are USG redlines.  Having let ex-president Bucaram 
return, Gutierrez should not permit the PRE to make the 
situation worse.  Instead, the GoE must urgently address the 
court issue, and deprive the opposition of a rallying point. 
That would require real dialogue with the opposition and 
firmness with the PRE.  She will also inquire about the 
status of a rumored Cabinet shakeup, urging he consider a 
Cabinet more open to dialogue. 
 
7.  (C) Separately, the Ambassador plans to call Defense 
Minister Herrera to build on Gen. Craddock's helpful message, 
and will call on VADM Rosero early next week.  Another 
opportunity to influence Gutierrez is indirect, through the 
visit of President Lagos of Chile, April 19-20.  We will also 
suggest to Chile's Ambassador that Lagos counsel Gutierrez 
against any rash actions. 
 
8.  (C) Other Embassy elements have a role to play as well. 
CG Guayaquil will reach out to opposition contacts there to 
monitor temperatures and preach conciliation on the coast. 
MILGRP and DAO will reach out to mid and brigade-level 
contacts to monitor military views and deployment.  RSO is in 
constant contact with national police to monitor 
ever-shifting protests.  POL will reach out to the opposition 
in Congress to gauge prospects for renewed dialogue (or 
confrontation), and counsel moderation to presidency 
contacts.  ECON will emphasize the economic costs of 
political instability.  PD will tap the pulse of the media, 
and seek opportunities to reiterate our call for non-partisan 
dialogue. 
 
9.  (C) A/S Noriega and other Department officials made 
democracy points to GOE Ministry of the Presidency on April 
15 in Washington.  Based on intel we gather and protest 
actions this weekend, we will offer thoughts on additional 
ways Department principals could interact with the GOE to 
reinforce the democracy and stability message. 
KENNEY