US embassy cable - 05MADRID1477

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 001477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM, WHA/AND, WHA/BSC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, SP, NATO 
SUBJECT: SPANISH CONGRESS' FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIR 
ON U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick, 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) Rafael Estrella, Socialist spokesperson on Congress's 
Foreign Affairs Committee (committee chairman equivalent) 
told us that he believes relations have "completely 
normalized" between the U.S. and Spain.  According to 
Estrella, Spain's engagement with Venezuela should not pose 
an obstacle to improving U.S.-Spain relations because Spain 
and the U.S. share the same goals on Venezuela, and differ 
only in strategy.  On NATO caveats, Estrella believed it 
would be much easier for Spain to dispense with NATO command 
structure billet caveats than with caveats on its troops' 
participation in ISAF.  Estrella thought upcoming high-level 
meetings between U.S. and Spanish officials would be very 
helpful for countries' relations, but was disappointed 
Foreign Minister Moratinos could not meet with National 
Security Advisor Hadley, because direct communication between 
the Zapatero government and the White House was key.  End 
summary. 
 
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"Normalized" Relations? 
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2.  (C) After remarking that he felt relations between the 
U.S. and Spain had normalized, Estrella said he was 
personally very happy that President Zapatero met with Deputy 
Secretary Zoellick for nearly two hours in Madrid April 2. 
 
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Estrella stated that by meeting for so long, Zapatero was 
sending a message that he believes relations with the U.S are 
very important.  Poloff cautioned Estrella that while 
U.S.-Spain relations had certainly improved, obstacles to 
further improvement remained, such as Spain's plans to sell 
military ships and planes to Venezuela. 
 
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Spain's Engagement with Venezuela 
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3.  (C) On the Venezuela sale, Estrella said the Chavez 
government has assured Madrid that it will not use the 
hardware offensively.  He added that none of the ships or 
planes will be outfitted with large guns or other armaments 
that would be typical for offensive operations.  The Zapatero 
government's goal in Venezuela is to engage Chavez to give 
him a sense of security and "international belonging" that 
will deter him from adventures in the region.  When asked why 
insecurity would cause Chavez to launch adventures in the 
region, Estrella said Chavez might feel the need to "keep the 
U.S. busy" with "little conflicts and problems all over Latin 
America," thus deflecting the U.S.'s focus from Venezuela to 
other areas in the region. 
 
4.  (C) Estrella emphasized that Spain, like the U.S., does 
not want Chavez to spread his populist ideology around Latin 
America.  He believes Brazil's Lula wants to engage Chavez 
for the very same reason:  Although Lula has a populist 
message, he doesn't have the Chavez government's oil money 
with which to ply the masses, and thus is concerned that 
Chavez' ideas and message may strike a chord in Brazil. 
Estrella also commented that Spain knows well that although 
Chavez claims he is a populist democrat now, if oil prices 
drop significantly, he could quickly turn into a "populist 
totalitarian."  Nonetheless, the Zapatero government believes 
the U.S. and Spain share common goals in Venezuela and differ 
only in strategy.  Spain believes Chavez can be contained 
best through engagement. 
 
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NATO Caveats 
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5.  (C) On the question of NATO caveats, Estrella said that 
for Spain, NATO command structure caveats will be much easier 
to eliminate than caveats on ISAF participation in 
Afghanistan.  The ISAF caveats allow the Spanish government 
to maintain operational control over its troops and 
equipment, and it will be difficult, if not impossible for 
the government to relinquish operational control to a local 
commander.  Estrella said he understood the problems 
presented by this arrangement for local commanders and unit 
agility and flexibility but said as a political question, the 
Zapatero government will have an extremely hard time giving 
up command of Spanish troops and equipment.  On the other 
hand, Estrella said that he and many other Spanish government 
officials, including the military leadership, believe Spain 
and other NATO allies need to give up their caveats on NATO 
command structure billets.  Although doing this for Iraq will 
be difficult, he believes Spain will eventually let go of 
NATO command structure caveats in general because the 
Zapatero government understands that NATO cannot function 
with an uncertain command structure mission to mission. 
 
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High-level Meetings 
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6.  (C) Estrella believed meetings between Foreign Minister 
Moratinos and Secretary Rice, and Defense Minister Bono and 
Secretary Rumsfeld were key to continuing to improve 
 
SIPDIS 
relations between the U.S. and Spain, but was disappointed 
Moratinos would not be able to meet with National Security 
Advisor Hadley.  Estrella said direct contact between the 
Zapatero government and the White House was very important. 
 
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Comment 
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7.  (C) Estrella, a good Embassy contact, is one of the 
Socialists' more pro-U.S., pro-transatlantic relations 
officials, which partially explains his overly optimistic 
view that relations had "completely normalized."  His remarks 
on Venezuela and the reasons for Spanish engagement there 
echoed what we have heard from numerous officials in the 
Zapatero administration.  His disappointment that Moratinos 
could not meet with NSA Hadley is also something we have 
heard from other Socialists who, like Estrella, believe Spain 
has made enough positive gestures to warrant high-level 
meetings not just at the State and Defense Departments, but 
also at the White House. 
 
 
MANZANARES