US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA646

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THE WAY FORWARD ON FDLR REPATRIATION

Identifier: 05KINSHASA646
Wikileaks: View 05KINSHASA646 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kinshasa
Created: 2005-04-15 11:46:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: MARR MOPS PGOV PREF PREL KPKO KAWC CG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000646 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2015 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PGOV, PREF, PREL, KPKO, KAWC, CG 
SUBJECT: THE WAY FORWARD ON FDLR REPATRIATION 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 66187 
 
     B. (B) KIGALI 405 
 
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d. 
 
1. (C)  Embassy Kinshasa shares view expressed ref a that it 
would be a tragedy to miss the opportunity provided by the 
Sant' Egidio process to energize the voluntary return of a 
large number of non-genocidaire FDLR elements and their 
dependents.  This initiative offers the best chance in over 
ten years to begin to address a neuralgic problem which has 
contributed significantly to regional instability and 
particularly to continuing mistrust and conflict between the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.  We appreciate 
being given the opportunity to share our thoughts. 
 
2. (C)  As requested, Embassy will explore with GDRC (Antoine 
Ghonda is the point person on the issue but has been 
traveling virtually constantly since the conclusion of the 
Rome talks and the Pope's funeral) their thinking on the 
proposed "comite de suivi."  What we know at the moment is 
that Ghonda's initial explanation was that this international 
commission would serve as a confidence-building measure to 
encourage the FDLR to proceed with disarmament, and 
specifically would address FDLR concerns that they would 
return to Rwanda, unarmed, and either be imprisoned or harmed 
in some manner.  When PolCouns asked whether the commission 
would also somehow be responsible for developing (or forcing) 
"political space" in Rwanda for the returnees, Ghonda said 
that the Congolese had categorically rejected any such role. 
(Comment:  This commission potentially could be a useful way 
to defuse a potential roadblock to progress.  We and the U.K. 
-- which has informally been asked to chair the group -- will 
be well-positioned to help shape its mission and structure in 
our talks with the Congolese.  Assuming that we can reach a 
satisfactory conclusion on these issues, we should be 
prepared to support and take part in the commission.  End 
Comment.) 
 
3. (C) Ref b recounting of the Monuc briefing provided to 
Embassy Kigali generally captures well Monuc's preparations 
to expeditiously facilitate the process.  We spoke to Peter 
Swarbrick, head of DDR/DDRRR for Monuc in Kinshasa, who was 
in Rome for the logistical negotiations, and to Monuc's 
DDR/DDRRR chief in Bukavu, Tim Reed.  Swarbrick said that in 
his opinion, Rwandan Foreign Minister Murigande's public 
statement on March 31 had substantially altered the dynamic 
of the Rome negotiations and had had the effect of causing 
the FDLR to pull back from their initial readiness to commit 
to a logistical process and timetable (elements which were to 
have been announced on April 2).  As originally envisioned, 
the process should have officially begun April 15 and would 
have run for 90 days.  Instead, the program launch is now on 
hold, pending further discussions to "reassure" the FDLR that 
they can safely return.  Swarbrick hopes that the process now 
could begin on/about the first week of May and end in the 
first week of August.  He emphasized that Monuc's education 
campaign, working through Radio Okapi broadcasts and leaflets 
dropped near known FDLR sites by Monuc helicopters, is 
on-track and, beginning April 15, will be augmented by FDLR 
"sensitizers" who have arrived in both Kivus and are 
coordinating with Monuc liaison offices there. 
 
4. (C) In South Kivu, the Bukavu Monuc office is planning to 
build three major disarmament camps -- in Hombo, 
Kaziba/Burhinyi, and Kamanyola, all three of which can be 
completed in about one week once work begins.  In addition, 
smaller "collection points" will be established in Sange 
(Ruzizi plain), Uvira and Adikivu (near the Bukavu airport). 
Responding to a GDRC request for assistance, some NGOs, as 
well as UNHCR, are also preparing support sites for the 
Rwandan refugee repatriation program, which will be located 
in the same areas as the Monuc sites.  In addition to the 
actual camps, NGOs will also establish "food and water 
stations" along the routes which the FDLR will travel to 
reach the processing zones, to ensure that all arrive in 
adequate health. 
 
5. (C)  Neither we, Monuc nor the Congolese, however, have 
any illusions.  Even if the Sant' Egidio process is one 
hundred percent successful, there still will be a need for 
action of some sort to address the problem of the remaining 
hard-core elements in eastern Congo.  The real genocidaires, 
together with the Rastas (a savage criminalized element of 
the FDLR) have no intention of going anywhere voluntarily. 
Rather, they prefer to remain and prey on the Congolese and 
disrupt regional stability.  This group, which Monuc 
estimates could comprise 3,000-5,000 combatants, will need to 
be confronted.  The Congolese, with Angolan assistance, are 
working to train a small group of Congolese military who 
could cooperate with Monuc in attacking this problem, with or 
without accompanying AU forces. 
 
What More Can We Do? 
-------------------- 
 
6. (C)  The above is what we know about what already is 
underway, but that begs the key question of ref a, what more 
can we propose (creatively) doing? 
 
-- we can and should pass a clear message to the GOR that now 
is the time to honor the pledge it has repeatedly made for 
the last ten years that it will welcome the return of 
non-genocidaire FDLR members.  Unfortunately, Foreign 
Minister Murigande's statement -- and other, more recent 
statements, such as the one in which Rwanda deplores the UN 
and the international community for "sitting at the same 
table with" the FDLR (to negotiate their return to Rwanda) -- 
strongly suggest that confronted with the real possibility of 
such a return, Rwanda has mixed feelings. 
 
-- likewise, working through the GDRC and our European 
Embassies and our EU confreres, we need to keep reiterating a 
clear and simple message to the FDLR, it is time to go home 
or face the consequences. 
 
-- we should encourage the AU and the EU to continue to 
explore the possibility of AU military assistance to the 
Monuc-Congolese effort, while keeping in mind that given the 
significant military obligations already undertaken by the AU 
it may not be able to compose a force quickly enough to be of 
assistance. 
 
-- we have an opportunity, through the Tripartite Agreement, 
to ensure that Rwanda and the DRC continue to talk directly 
to each other about the FDLR process.  (Ghonda and Kaputo 
visited Kigali at least twice during the negotiations to 
speak directly to President Kagame.) We should adhere to the 
Tripartite meeting schedule which we ourselves outlined, to 
keep open these channels of communication.  We should ensure 
that the FDLR question is the central issue on the agenda of 
the April 21-22 Tripartite meeting in Lubumbashi. 
 
-- likewise, we should move ahead as expeditiously as 
possible in establishing the fusion cell.  If functional 
within the next three months it could provide a useful tool 
for any post-August military operation against remaining 
genocidaire elements. 
 
-- we are considering a Congolese request to provide 
brigade-level command training to the element which would 
combat the FDLR.  We should move expeditiously on that 
request, and also look seriously for any communications 
equipment which might be available for this discrete element, 
possibly through the excess defense articles program. 
 
Seizing the Moment 
------------------ 
 
7. (C)  In short, we have an unprecedented opportunity to 
significantly reduce, if not eliminate, one of the largest 
and thorniest of the regional security flashpoints.  Doing so 
will be a major step as well in our efforts to encourage 
Rwanda and the DRC to resume diplomatic relations at the 
proper moment. Finally, but far from insignificantly, the 
return of the FDLR to Rwanda could greatly diminish the 
degree of human suffering which currently characterizes the 
life of average Congolese in the two Kivus, who are 
victimized daily by the FDLR elements.  We need to do 
everything we can to ensure that this process is not stalled, 
but rather moves quickly ahead. 
MEECE 

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