US embassy cable - 05ROME1270

S E C R E T  ROME 001270 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR P AND EUR/BRADTKE 
 
REQUEST STATE OPS PASS TO EMBASSY BAGHDAD, DOD/OSD/ISP 
BRZEZINSKI, MNF-I GENERAL CASEY, CENTCOM GENERAL ABIZAID AND 
POLAD, AND NSC SCHAKE 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  04/14/15 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IT, IZ, IRAQI FREEDOM 
SUBJECT:  CALIPARI:  ITALY PROPOSES SPLITTING JOINT REPORT FROM 
NJF-I AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION 
 
Classified By:  Ambassador Sembler for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  Italian government officials tell us they will refuse 
signature or endorsement as a "joint report" of any MNF-I AR 15-6 inves 
contains the unqualified conclusion that personal responsibility for th 
cannot be assigned and U.S. forces did not violate their ROE.  They say 
a political backlash that could lead to withdrawal of Italian forces fr 
however, agree to a binational "joint report" restricted to findings of 
AR 15-6 investigation, with conclusions and follow-up actions to be rep 
to U.S. and Italian national authorities by their respective investigat 
via submission of the AR 15-6 report to the appointing authority).  END 
 
2. (S) Late on April 13 Undersecretary in the Prime Minister's Office G 
SISMI (External Intelligence Service) Chief General Pollari discussed w 
and DCM the reluctance of Italian investigators in Baghdad to agree wit 
counterparts on concluding language of a joint investigative report int 
SISMI officer Calipari in Iraq.  Repeating arguments he and Berlusconi 
President Bush during the President's recent visit to Rome, Letta said 
politically impossible for the Government of Italy to sign on to a repo 
conclusion that personal responsibility for the Calipari killing could 
that ROE had not been violated by U.S. forces, as desired by U.S. inves 
would be interpreted as a whitewash by the opposition and the political 
eventually force the withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq (a point Le 
repeating later in the conversation). 
 
3. (S) Ambassador and DCM repeated to Letta and Pollari a point the Ita 
many times previously:  MNF-I was carrying out an investigation under p 
spelled out in Army Regulation 15-6, and no U.S. official outside the i 
interfere in this independent inquiry.  The Italians took the point but 
what they described as management of the political implications of the 
investigation.  That investigation had been endorsed by President Bush 
by an exchange of letters between Letta and the Embassy.  Letta and Pol 
Italian and U.S. investigators had reached broad agreement on the fact- 
the AR 15-6 report, and expressed understanding for the requirement of 
investigators to reach a clear-cut conclusion based on those facts.  Th 
that if the language to which they objected appeared in the conclusion 
would be more politically palatable for the Italian side to decline to 
the report as a whole. 
 
4. (S) After extensive discussion, Letta and Pollari proposed that a wa 
impasse might be to break out the binational report from the USA AR 15- 
confine this separate "joint report" solely to the fact-finding portion 
The explanation would be that both countries had agreed on the facts su 
Calipari's death to the extent they were ascertainable, the investigato 
their agreed findings to their respective national authorities in a joi 
both sides, and it was now up to those national authorities to draw the 
conclusions, including about any follow-up actions.  The vehicle for th 
investigators to report to higher authorities would be the AR 15-6 repo 
document separate from the "joint report" could contain conclusions or 
that had not necessarily been agreed to by the Italian government.  The 
be made publicly that this was consistent with the original terms of re 
investigations, which called for both countries to "ascertain the dynam 
through "investigative fact-finding" but which made no mention of drawi 
or making recommendations. 
 
5. (S) While this was not an ideal outcome, Letta and Pollari believed 
approach under the circumstances.  Pollari said it might be advisable f 
to keep their conclusions confidential, but Ambassador and DCM cautione 
investigating officers conducting an AR 15-6 investigation had a respon 
recommendations to the appointing authority, that appointing authority 
if further action was required, and it would be impractical to do all t 
Letta and Pollari did not challenge this approach, as long as it was cl 
being done as part of the "national" AR 15-6 process, as distinct from 
"binational" fact-finding investigation.  Ambassador and DCM advised th 
Government of Italy wished to pursue its idea of separating the "joint" 
investigation reports, that idea should be presented by the Italian par 
investigation to their USA counterparts in Baghdad. 
 
6. (S) Regarding the rollout strategy for whatever joint investigative 
issued, in response to Ambassador's request Letta confirmed that Italia 
Ragaglini and Campregher would be asked to stay in Baghdad until report 
He would not commit, however, to having them appear together with U.S. 
public announcement of the report Q that would depend on what was to be 
announcement.  If there was full agreement ahead of time on a joint rep 
to be said at the rollout, then it would be good for officials from bot 
present.  If not, however, it would be better to keep the U.S. and Ital 
separate.  Otherwise the media would press the American and Italian off 
together to disagree publicly on some detail, and that would become the 
of subsequent domestic political pressure on the Italian government.  P 
personal opinion that the best date for a rollout would be Tuesday or W 
week. 
 
7. (S) Letta rebuffed the Ambassador's request that he designate Italia 
other officials to begin working now with Embassy Rome press and politi 
contingency press guidance and Q's and A's.  He insisted that we first 
agreement on a joint report, so that we knew what it was we would be co 
Only after this was achieved would it make sense to start working on sh 
and guidance. 
 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2005ROME01270 - Classification: SECRET