US embassy cable - 05HARARE580

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 000580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF FOR DAS T. WOODS 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
OVP FOR NULAND 
NSC FOR DNSA ABRAMS, SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, EAID, PREL, PHUM, ZI, March 05 Elections 
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM ZIMBABWE,S 2005 PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) The lessons to be learned from Zimbabwe,s tainted 
March 31 parliamentary elections fall into four categories, 
lessons for: (a) the opposition; (b) civil society; (c) 
regional outreach; and, (d) the US government.  Some of these 
lessons are not new but build on or refine lessons from 
previous elections.  For the MDC, or whatever democratic 
alternative might replace it, our key finding is that while 
it almost certainly &won8 the election campaign, it lost 
the vote due to its poor organization, especially on election 
day.  It must do more in the future to counteract ZANU-PF,s 
control of government resources and traditional chiefs and 
the ruling party's ability to steal elections.  In 
particular, it needs to be prepared to issue a timely 
parallel vote count. 
 
2. (C) For civil society and other democratic forces, there 
is a need to better coordinate among themselves and with the 
MDC, especially in exploiting wedge issues sooner and more 
aggressively.  Regionally, the key lesson is that the SAG and 
President Mbeki cannot be relied on to play a neutral role 
and put real pressure on President Mugabe ) we must look 
elsewhere in Africa for regional leadership and should do 
more to involve regional NGOs as a counterweight to official 
views on Zimbabwe.  For the USG, the key finding is that we 
need to provide sufficient and sustained resources to the 
democratic forces in Zimbabwe to achieve meaningful change. 
End Summary. 
 
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Lessons for the Opposition 
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3. (C) With technical assistance from NDI, IRI, and others 
the MDC ran a strong campaign that raised genuine issues of 
concern for Zimbabweans suffering from the country,s severe 
economic decline and repressive political environment.  From 
the Mission,s observations around the country, the MDC,s 
campaign resonated with the population at large.  The MDC 
also pushed hard, and with some modest success, on the issue 
of election reform, eliminating some of the earlier, cruder 
forms of vote rigging.  In the words of one American 
consultant, the GOZ has reached the end point in its ability 
to steal elections, and there are no further new tricks out 
there. 
 
3. (C) Nonetheless, although the party made important 
progress in key areas since the 2000 and 2002 election, it is 
clear that the MDC was still too disorganized and failed with 
regard to several critical elements.  The party did not 
sufficiently press the issue of voter registration, letting 
their conditional suspension from participation in the 
elections prevent them from ensuring that their supporters 
were registered, while the ruling ZANU-PF was furiously 
registering its supporters in surgical voter drives (and 
ensuring that potential MDC supporters such as the young and 
urban voters would have difficulties).  More importantly, 
despite brave talk, the party also failed abysmally to put 
out a parallel vote count.  Even now, two weeks after the 
election, they have been unable to pull together and release 
the data from their polling agents.  The timely dissemination 
of a parallel count could have done much to undermine the 
credibility of the election with African observers and could 
have stoked public outrage at another fraudulent election. 
 
4. (C) The lessons for the MDC to learn are that it needs to: 
(a) substantially improve the party,s communications 
directorate which, while much improved during the campaign, 
fell into disarray during the immediate post-election period; 
(b) improve its understanding of the entire electoral 
process, and put systems in place well in advance to conduct 
parallel vote tabulation; (c) be more targeted and strategic 
in reaching out to other key democratic forces in Zimbabwe 
and the region; (d) review and strengthen party structures to 
improve its grassroots outreach; (e) find ways to counteract 
the GOZ,s influence with traditional leaders; and (f) convey 
leadership, both domestically and internationally, in the 
face of ZANU-PF,s constant assaults and in spite of 
significant set backs.  Several of these needs had been 
identified after past elections and while there has been 
improvement, more is needed. 
 
5. (C) The MDC may very well splinter, change leaders, or 
morph into another party in the aftermath of this election. 
However, there will surely be a democratic alternative to 
ZANU-PF, and that party will need to find a way forward that 
will rally disaffected Zimbabweans, put pressure on the GOZ, 
and prepare the ground for local elections in 2006 and the 
presidential election in 2008. 
 
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Lessons for Other Democratic Forces 
----------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) In important respects, the other democratic forces in 
Zimbabwe have emerged from the 2005 election at least as 
battered as the MDC.  Organized labor, which was effectively 
absent during the campaign, is under assault from the 
government and its allies on one side, and on the other side 
from the more progressive elements of the labor movement who 
want a more confrontational approach towards government. 
Likewise, the church effectively remains divided and 
fragmented, without any clear consensus about the country,s 
predicament, despite the pivotal role religion plays in 
Zimbabwean society, nor effective mechanisms for coordinating 
among themselves.  Finally, and most importantly, while civil 
society remains generally united internally and also allied 
with the MDC in their analysis and goals, NGOs are deeply 
frustrated with the party for its lack of outreach to them 
during the campaign and for its decision not to pursue any 
form of civil disobedience following the announcement of the 
election results. 
 
7. (C) Civil society,s alienation and frustration with the 
MDC is most acute with the more activist and visible members 
of civil society ) such as the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA) and Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WoZA).  It is 
primarily an argument over tactics, but is also driven by 
individual agendas.  Much of civil society, but especially 
the more activist elements, feel that the MDC has tried to 
&control8 their activities too much.  There is some truth 
in this charge and the MDC needs to learn to manage this 
relationship with more tact, allowing civil society NGOs more 
room for independent action. 
 
8. (C) While not fatal, this visible split among the 
democratic forces is debilitating.  The democratic opposition 
spends a distressing amount of time criticizing one another 
over tactics rather than working together on a common agenda. 
 The lesson for civil society, ZCTU, and progressive elements 
in the churches to draw from the election is that they must 
support whichever democratic political party is leading the 
fight and give it their unstinting backing, even while 
accepting that there will be diversity among their objectives 
and methods.  The civil society NGOs also need to do what the 
MDC did late in the past election campaign and focus their 
message on the bread and butter concerns of average 
Zimbabweans rather than more esoteric issues. 
 
9. (C) One particular NGO bears special mention, the Zimbabwe 
Election Support Network (ZESN).  ZESN has played an 
important role in the election aftermath.  As a non-partisan 
domestic observer group, its commentary on the election has 
carried added weight.  In particular, its calls for the 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to answer questions and 
release data have resonated publicly.  Nonetheless, the 
election also revealed that ZESN still lacks the capacity to 
challenge electoral authorities effectively and ensure a free 
and fair election.  Like the MDC, ZESN was too disorganized 
to pull together and publicize parallel counts in the 
immediate aftermath of the election.  The lesson for ZESN to 
learn is that monitoring elections is a full-time business. 
It cannot be effectively ginned up a month or two before an 
election and expected to get the job done. 
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Lessons Regarding Regional Support 
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10. (C) The regional focus for the democratic opposition and 
us has been on South Africa, and largely on the South African 
Government (SAG).  This focus has had some limited successes. 
 A broad range of forces, spanning the political spectrum 
from the Democratic Alliance to COSATU and the South African 
Communist Party, now recognize and say publicly that 
democracy is being thwarted in Zimbabwe.  South African media 
is also supportive of Zimbabwe,s democratic forces and we 
had great success convincing the South African Council of 
Churches (SACC) to play a constructive role and speak out 
with regard to the election.  However, SAG and the ANC have 
not generally played constructive roles.  Although they did 
pressure ZANU-PF to reduce election violence, their focus was 
always on ensuring that the election was &blessable8 rather 
than truly free and fair.  As one wag quipped, the SAG 
statement on the election was written so long ago it could 
have been drafted in Afrikaans. 
 
11. (C) The lesson to be learned from this election, which 
the MDC has already internalised, is that the SAG and the ANC 
cannot be relied on to be non-partisan and to pressure Mugabe 
and his government and party to play by the rules ) even 
SADC,s own rules.  Thabo Mbeki will remain a potentially 
pivotal player, however, and a targeted effort at the office 
of the President and senior ANC leadership is still needed , 
including especially through key players from South African 
civil society.  At the same time, we will also need to look 
elsewhere for regional leadership and build on the more 
progressive positions taken by Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria and 
Mauritius and Southern African civil society groups with 
respect to the election. 
 
12. (C) None of these countries and organizations alone 
carries the same weight that South Africa has, nor do they 
have the same degree of economic influence.  Nonetheless, 
collectively, they can begin to chip away at Mugabe,s status 
within Africa and can put pressure on South Africa to be more 
neutral in the run-up to 2008.  Similarly, we hope that our 
Embassies in the SADC region will be urged to spend less time 
on fruitless demarches to host governments and more time 
discussing Zimbabwe,s crisis with civil society groups.  A 
mechanism needs to be established, either with the RCSA in 
Botswana or thru bilateral missions, to channel resources to 
NGOs willing to get involved on the Zimbabwe question. 
 
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Lessons for the US Government 
----------------------------- 
 
13. (C) The overwhelming lesson we should learn from these 
elections is that democracy programs require more resources, 
allocated consistently over a sustained period.  Our ability 
to mobilize resources in a timely manner, and at a scale to 
have a measurable impact, was severely hampered by budget 
cuts in FY04.  Zimbabwe is now looking at nationwide local 
government elections in 2006 and a Presidential Election in 
2008.  This is the appropriate time to review the policy 
environment to determine funding needs for democratic support 
during the FY05 through FY08 period.  Continued cuts, or even 
a levelling off of resources, followed by a large increase in 
FY08 just prior to the Presidential elections, would be 
counterproductive as it would reduce the effectiveness of the 
democratic forces in the short to medium term.  The Mugabe 
regime remains extremely brittle and we believe that funding 
in the range of approximately $13 million per annum for three 
years will have a dramatic effect on the political landscape. 
 
14. (C) Another lesson we should take away from this election 
is that we need to take a more active role in fostering 
coordination among the democratic forces, using our leverage 
as the key donor.  The &middle ground8 in Zimbabwe remains 
extremely thin and if elements of the church or organized 
labor again choose to sit on the fence, additional USG 
support to them should be curtailed.  Instead, support should 
flow to enlightened, committed, non-violent, but activist, 
civil society groups, key regional partners, the more 
progressive elements in organized religion and labor.  Above 
all, the MDC still requires large amounts of technical advice 
and support in devising effective strategies to counter the 
regime,s authoritarian tendencies.  In effect, support needs 
to be focused and concentrated on institutions and 
organizations that are committed to democratic change of 
which the MDC remains the strongest for the moment. 
 
15. (C) In relation to our partners, the USG needs to trust 
but verify.  We discussed preparations about election 
observation with both the MDC and ZESN and were painted a 
much rosier picture of their capabilities than their actual 
preparatory work justified.  In the future, we should prompt 
local partners more rigorously to investigate key issues 
thoroughly and have sufficient technical expertise available. 
 For this election we essentially provided one part-time 
advisor.  He did an excellent job, but one person could not 
do it all.  We also need to press them harder to seriously 
consider contingency plans and be prepared for any 
eventuality.  For instance, when we discussed with the MDC 
what their response would be to an election defeat, they 
vaguely deflected our inquiries and were unable to indicate 
that they had devoted any sort of meaningful planning to this 
scenario. 
 
16. (C) Finally, there are two seemingly paradoxical lessons 
to be remembered, if not (re) learned about Robert Mugabe and 
ZANU-PF.  The first is don,t underestimate him, his wiliness 
and his willingness to go to any length to hold on to power. 
Moreover, he will not willingly abandon his long-term game 
plan, including constitutional reform to consolidate his grip 
and, we believe, the ideal of a one-party state.  As long as 
he is on the scene, any ZANU-PF inspired &reform8 will be 
on Mugabe,s terms and will be anti-democratic.  But at the 
same time, these elections showed just how narrow his base of 
support is.  ZANU-PF, supposedly a mass-based movement, 
relies on a shrinking base of voters, repression by the 
security forces and others -- including a whole series of 
measures, documented elsewhere, to ensure low-voter turnout 
by non-ZANU-PF voters ) and control of the state machinery 
to engineer the outcome it wants.  Just as with authoritarian 
regimes elsewhere, this is a formula that makes Mugabe and 
Mugabe-ism vulnerable to a broad-based democratic movement. 
It will not be an easy or brief struggle, but it is certain 
that with sufficient effort and support it can be done. 
Dell