US embassy cable - 05ABUDHABI1680

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001680 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2015 
TAGS: PREL, ECON, IZ, IR, TC 
SUBJECT: AMB. JONES CONSULTS WITH SHEIKH HAMDAN ON IRAQ 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) Summary: Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq 
Policy Ambassador Richard Jones consulted with Deputy Prime 
Minister/Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan 
bin Zayed on April 12 on Iraq developments.  Ambassador 
Jones, who had been in Iraq three days earlier, briefed 
Sheikh Hamdan on the formation of a new government, and 
outlined key U.S. and Iraqi priorities, chief among them, 
defeating the insurgency and completing the political 
process.  Sheikh Hamdan expressed concern over Iranian 
interference in the Iraqi political process and pledged 
continued UAE support to the Iraqi people.  Ambassador Jones 
also briefed ambassadors and charges from G-8 and coalition 
country embassies.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) On April 12, Deputy Prime Minister and de facto 
Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamdan discussed Iraq with Ambassador 
Richard Jones, Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq 
Policy.  Sheikh Hamdan was accompanied by his office 
director, Sultan Al Romeithi; MFA Under Secretary Abdullah 
Rashid Al Noaimi; MFA GCC Director Abdullah Al Mazrouie; and 
the UAE Charge in Baghdad, Ali Al Ka'abi.  Ambassador Jones 
was accompanied by the Ambassador; Larry McDonald, Director 
of the Department of Treasury Office of Reconstruction; Col. 
Philip Smith, Chief, Coalition Strategy Branch, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff; Executive Assistant Matthew Fuller; and Pol Chief 
(notetaker). 
 
Concerns About Iran 
------------------- 
 
3. (C) Ambassador Jones thanked the UAE for close cooperation 
with the U.S. on Iraq.  Sheikh Hamdan noted that the UAE and 
the U.S. have common interests in Iraq and urged 
collaboration in the run-up to the December 2005 elections. 
He criticized the U.S. and its allies for being too focused 
on the security and military aspects of Iraq when, in his 
view, we should have been addressing Iran's spreading 
influence in Iraq more forcefully.  Iran has very clear 
objectives regarding Iraq.  Sheikh Hamdan expressed concern 
regarding Iran's nuclear program.  He expressed particular 
concern that if the Interior Minister post went to someone 
close to Iranian intelligence, there could be assassinations 
of Sunnis and liberal-minded Sunnis.  While the U.S. shares 
the UAE's concerns about Iran's influence in Iraq, Ambassador 
Jones said there was no evidence that Iran was behind the 
current violence.  He added that we would learn from our 
mistakes, and that one of his duties as Coordinator for Iraq 
Policy was to adjust policies to make them more effective. 
 
Overview of Key Priorities 
-------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Noting that he had met with all members of the 
Presidency Council and other senior Iraqi officials during 
his latest visit, Ambassador Jones stressed that there was 
agreement that the key priorities were to defeat the 
insurgency, and to complete the political process on 
schedule.  The new constitution must be drafted by August 15 
and ratified in a referendum by October 15, and a new 
government must be elected by December 15 and take office by 
December 31.  While the Transitional Administrative Law 
allows for a six-month slippage, the U.S. is encouraging Iraq 
to adhere to the timetable and continuing to appeal to all 
Iraqis to participate in the process.  Other priorities 
include strengthening the rule of law through capable law 
enforcement, judiciary, and correctional systems; providing 
essential services such as electricity, water and fuel; and 
promoting economic security through job creation, debt 
forgiveness, implementation of IMF agreements, and 
restoration of the agricultural sector. 
 
5. (C) Sheikh Hamdan acknowledged that the task ahead was a 
very difficult one and he wished the U.S. every success.  He 
added that it was critical to restore stability and security 
in Iraq as that would encourage Iraq,s neighbors to help 
out.  Sheikh Hamdan agreed that the political process should 
not be delayed, and offered to cooperate by tapping the UAE's 
network of contacts inside and outside Iraq.  He said Iyad 
Allawi was a friend of his and of his brother, Abu Dhabi 
Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed, and opined that Allawi had not 
done well in the January elections because members of his own 
group had let him down.  Ambassador Jones said Allawi's group 
could still play a role in government, particularly if it is 
able to claim Allawi's objectives of either the Defense or 
Interior portfolio, the energy portfolio, and two essential 
"service" portfolios (such as electricity).  Sheikh Hamdan 
commented that Allawi could have more influence by working 
inside the power structure.  He said that Allawi would be 
visiting him in the coming days. 
 
Security Update 
--------------- 
6. (C) Ambassador Jones briefed Sheikh Hamdan on Coalition 
efforts to rebuild the Iraqi security forces.  He thanked the 
UAE for offering its police and military training facilities 
to the Iraqis being trained by Germany, and for supplying 
surveillance aircraft, Armored Personnel Carriers, and ships 
to the Iraqis.  The UAE has assisted with military and police 
training as well (the latter with Germany).  Sheikh Hamdan 
said the majority of Iraqis in uniform are soldiers and 
police officers who served their country and want to take 
care of their families.  He applauded the new direction the 
Coalition is taking, including plans to have trained and 
equipped 270,000 security personnel by summer 2006 and to 
transfer eight regional commands to Iraqis.  Sheikh Hamdan 
said that the UAE Charge in Baghdad had informed him that the 
situation in Fallujah remained difficult, and that most of 
the 300,000 residents forced to leave the city had still not 
returned.  Ambassador Jones acknowledged that the situation 
was bad, but was improving, and that about 90,000 of the 
city's 300,000 residents had returned home.  He said U.S. 
Marines were working hard to restore basic infrastructure, 
and that the U.S. was committing $70 million on 
reconstruction projects. 
 
Debt Relief 
----------- 
 
7. (C) Ambassador Jones described existing Iraqi debt and the 
terms of the Paris Club agreement, and urged the UAEG to 
offer terms at least as generous as those of the Paris Club. 
He noted that, given the estimated $50 billion that Iraq owed 
the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, announcements on this 
issue by the UAEG and its sister governments would be more 
significant than the Paris Club decision.  Ambassador Jones 
also described a proposed June U.S. and EU-sponsored 
conference on Iraq.  Sheikh Hamdan wanted to know if the 
Saudis and Kuwaitis had made firm commitments to reduce Iraqi 
debt, and whether a public statement would be preferable 
before or during the conference.  Ambassador Jones replied 
that Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah 
had told him April 9 that Kuwait would be "generous" and that 
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah had said that debt relief was 
important to Iraq's stability.  A UAE public commitment to 
cancel Iraq's debt would be welcome at any time, although 
issuing a statement before the conference could encourage 
other countries to come forward with support of their own, 
Ambassador Jones said.  Sheikh Hamdan noted that Special 
Envoy Baker had discussed this issue with then-Abu Dhabi 
Crown Prince Khalifa bin Zayed in January 2004. 
 
8. (C) Sheikh Hamdan told Ambassador Jones that the Siemens 
generators that the UAE had pledged as part of its $215 
pledge at the Madrid Conference were still being warehoused 
in UAE because of "complications" on the Iraqi side. 
Ambassador Jones said the generators should be a welcome 
addition because Iraq still has significant challenges in 
meeting the demand for electricity.  Sheikh Hamdan thanked 
Ambassador Jones for trying to help resolve the issue. 
(Note: We understand that the UAEG had requested support from 
the Germans and possibly other donors to pay for the shipment 
and installation of the generators.  We are seeking further 
details on the size and specifications of the generators to 
convey to Ambassador Jones.) 
 
9. (C) Prior to meeting Sheikh Hamdan, Ambassador Jones 
briefed G-8 and coalition country Ambassadors/charges.  They 
sought clarification about the upcoming conference, GCC 
countries' positions on debt relief, and Iran.  In response 
to a question about growing Iranian involvement in Iraq, 
Ambassador Jones stated that as its Iraqi allies gain power 
in their government, they would be less likely to take 
instructions from Iran.  The French Charge inquired whether 
the U.S. was concerned about Moqtada Al Sadr's influence, and 
whether we talk with him.  Ambassador Jones said the press 
has exaggerated Moqtada's influence, and that this was mostly 
an intra-Iraqi affair between Iraq's prominent Shi'a families 
- Al Sadr and Al Hakim.  The USG talks to Moqtada's aides, 
but not to Moqtada himself because he is the subject of an 
arrest warrant issued by an Iraqi judge in connection with 
the murder of moderate Shi'a leader, Abdul Majid al Khoel, in 
April 2003. 
 
10. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
11. (U) This message was cleared by Ambassador Jones. 
SISON