US embassy cable - 05VIENNA1224

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 VIENNA 001224 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/PGI - BUCKNEBERG AND EUR/AGS - VIKMANIS-KELLER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, AU 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT:  POST FEEDBACK:  VIENNA 
 
REF: STATE 60796 
 
Classified By: Ambassador W.L. Lyons Brown.  Reasons:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S) Summary:  Austria contributes constructively to the 
fight against terrorism.  Austria is training and equipping 
Iraqi police, it has been an ally against terrorist 
financing, and it leads major programs to strengthen border 
policing in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  Austria is 
currently considering a military deployment to support Afghan 
elections.  Nevertheless, the situation in Austria presents 
significant challenges.  The most important is a propensity 
to pursue what Austrians call "constructive engagement" with 
countries of concern to the U.S.  We can meet these 
challenges on four levels:  first, we should base our 
inititives on as broad an international consensus as 
possible.  Practically speaking, a UN mandate is the minimum 
necessary to obtain Austrian participation in military 
operations.  Second, we must provide precise information to 
support policy requests to Austria.  Third, we should engage 
Austria in the process of strategy development.  Finally, an 
investment of time -- in meetings with Austrian officials and 
high-level visits to Austria -- can win practical 
cooperation.  End Summary. 
 
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AUSTRIA AS A CONTRIBUTOR 
------------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) Austria has made important contributions to the 
fight against terrorism.  Some notable successes: 
 
-- (SBU) Support to Iraq:  Four Austrian trainers have served 
at the Iraqi Police Academy in Jordan since November 2003. 
The Austrians were the third contingent (after the American 
and British) to arrive.  Their numbers are small, but they 
are comparable to contingents from similarly-sized countries. 
 In addition, the Austrians provided in-kind assistance of 
police uniforms, helmets and shields with a value of 
approximately $10 million.  More broadly, Austria pleged a 
total of 16.4 million Euros in credit guarantees (some 10.2 
million Euros) and humanitarian assistance at the October 
2003 Madrid Donors Conference for Iraq.  Austria has also 
written off approximately $1.8 billion in Iraqi debt. 
 
-- (C) Military Support in Afghanistan:  Austria has 
maintained an almost continuous participation in ISAF.  It 
was among the first ISAF contributors, with approximately 70 
troops in Afghanistan for the initial deployment period. 
Since the summer of 2003, it has kept limited numbers of 
specialists in the country.  There are now three Austrian 
staff officers at ISAF headquarters in Kabul under a 
parliamentary authorization for up to 10 such officers.  In 
addition, parliament has authorized up to three Austrian 
officers to participate in the UN Assistance Missions 
Afghanistan (UNAMA).  The Austrian government is currently 
considering a military deployment to support the elections in 
Afghanistan in the Fall of 2005 with approximately 70 troops 
for three months. 
 
-- (SBU) Military Support to Peacekeeping Missions:  With 
more peacekeepers deployed now than ever, Austria plays an 
important role in maintaining stability.  Some 850 Austrian 
soldiers are in Kosovo and Bosnia, and approximately 370 are 
in the Golan Heights.  In addition, Austria maintains 
military missions of one to five soldiers in UN, OSCE and EU 
operations in Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, 
Albania, Georgia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Western 
Sahara.  Austria plans a small deployment to support 
peacekeeping efforts in Sudan. 
 
--  (SBU) Support to U.S. Military Movements:  Since 
mid-2003, Austria has approved all requests for U.S. military 
ground transits and overflights.  These total some 10,000 
each year, and the operations tempo continues at that rate. 
 
-- (SBU) Regional Security in Central Asia:  Austria is the 
lead country in two programs providing training and equipment 
to Central Asian countries:  the Central Asian Border 
Security Initiative (CABSI) and the Vienna Central Asia 
Initiative (VICA).  These multi-year, multi-million dollar 
programs coordinate EU, UN and other international programs 
to provide planning, training, equipment and funding for 
border security in Central Asia. 
 
--  (SBU) Regional Security in Europe:  Austria initiated and 
manages a cooperative arrangement among Interior Ministries 
of the new EU countries to its east.  This group, the 
"Salzburg Forum," meets at ministerial level each year and at 
expert levels throughout the year.  This has the important 
effect of laying the groundwork for the extension of the EU's 
external ("Schengen") border to the frontiers of the new 
members. 
 
-- (C) Terrorist Financing:  Austria has firmly supported 
listing Hizballah in its entirety as a terrorist 
organization.  Domestically, Austria passed and implemented 
new legislation in the past year to intensify controls over 
the movement of funds from illegal sources.  The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has reported that Austria's 
legal and institutional framework against money laundering 
and terrorist financing is comprehensive. 
 
-- (SBU) Judicial Cooperation:  The U.S. and Austria have 
signed follow-up protocols to the bilateral extradition and 
mutual legal assistance treaties to reflect developments in 
U.S.-EU cooperation.  The EU-wide arrest warrant is effective 
in Austria.  Austria has ratified all 12 international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. 
 
-- (SBU) Law Enforcement and Intelligence Cooperation: 
Austria regularly exchanges information with, and supports 
the law enforcement efforts of, the U.S. and European 
countries.  This takes place both through bilateral exchanges 
and through groups such as the Club of Bern and Europol, and 
via use of the Capriccio network.  Austria monitors suspected 
Islamic extremists attempting to enter Austria as asylum 
seekers, documenting the finger prints of asylum seekers in 
EURODAC for sharing with its EU partners.  In response to 
requests from other European countries for investigations of 
individuals in Austria suspected of participating in an 
Islamic extremist cell, in 2004, the Austrian Federal Agency 
for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT) undertook a 
broad, nine-month investigation of 65 individuals.  In the 
past year, Austria passed legislation which allows police 
video surveillance of public spaces and establishes the 
parameters for law enforcement use of this surveillance. 
 
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CHALLENGES 
---------- 
 
3.  (S) Despite this record of action against terrorism, 
Austrian policy presents real challenges.  Most 
significantly, Austria continues to maintain close political 
and commercial ties to countries of concern to the U.S., 
including some which we have designated as state sponsors of 
terrorism.  Politically, many Austrians seek a "bridge 
building" role as a continuing legacy of Austria's Cold War 
neutrality.  This provides a context in which commercial 
deals -- which the lack of American and other competitors 
facilitates -- form part of a policy of "constructive 
engagement."  While the search for business does not 
necessarily cause Austrians to turn soft on terrorism, 
Austria's approach makes it prone to take a benign view of 
activities which give us pause.  Examples of this include 
contacts with Iranian entities seeking technological 
cooperation, especially in the biological sciences field, and 
approval of the sale of high-powered sniper rifles to Iran. 
(We convinced the Austrian government not to proceed with a 
formal agreement on technological cooperation, to block a 
continuation of rifle shipments, and to support the arrest of 
Iranians seeking to procure night vision goggles.  In such 
cases, Austrian officials demand hard data supporting our 
contention that these activities are problematical. 
 
4.  (S) There have been media charges that Austrian 
authorities turn a blind eye toward the presence of 
terrorists in the country, as long as the terrorists 
undertake no activity in the country.  Austrian authorities 
have countered publicly that they keep all suspected 
terrorists under close watch, and that they will take action 
against anyone for whom there is an arrest warrant. 
Privately, Austrian authorities assure us that their 
surveillance activities are helping to develop information on 
the activities of suspected terrorists, that they are fully 
aware of who is in the country, and that they are able to 
foil any operational plot before it reaches fruition. 
Budgetary, staffing and political constraints on Austrian 
authorities make these assertions suspect.  Austrian federal 
deficits have resulted in restricted budgets for law 
enforcement authorities, staffing shortages have limited 
surveillance of suspected extremists, and ongoing 
reorganizations of the BVT have had some detrimental 
consequences on the BVT's effectiveness.  In addition, many 
Austrian politicians appear to believe that in the absence of 
clear evidence of terrorist activity, Austria serves its best 
interests by not undertaking actions which could result in 
Austria becoming a target for terrorists. 
 
5.  (C) In the field of terrorist financing, Austria, like 
many EU member countries, has not been able to respond 
quickly to our requests to list front organizations posing as 
charities.  Austria cites a need for information with which 
it could defend such actions in court. 
 
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A WAY FORWARD 
------------- 
6.  (S) Austria has contributed to common anti-terrorism 
efforts, but it has not delivered as much as it could.  For 
one thing, although Austria's policy of "constructive 
engagement" with countries of concern could offer real levers 
for influencing those countries, Austria does not use them. 
More broadly, we find ourselves reacting to policy directions 
which are often incongruent with ours.  While we have had 
some success in persuading the Austrians to back off or limit 
bad policy choices, we would prefer that those choices were 
never made. 
 
7.  (S)  We see four levels on which to address the 
challenges we face. 
 
--  (S) First, we have the best chance of gaining Austria's 
military capabilities and using its geostrategic location in 
support of military activities if there is a broad 
international consensus for those activities.  Practically, 
the Austrians are unlikely to engage in military operations 
which do not have a formal UN mandate.  Such a mandate is not 
a guarantee of Austrian participation.  At the same time, we 
need to make realistic requests on the basis of thorough 
consultations involving the Austrians. 
 
--  (S) Second, if we want the Austrians to stop activities 
with countries of concern to us, or to undertake positive 
initiatives, we must be prepared to provide precise 
information.  Austrian officials will not block a commercial 
deal, freeze a front charity's assets, or support a 
diplomatic initiative on our say-so alone.  They need to be 
convinced, and it takes timely, clear information to do this. 
 
--  (S) Third, more broadly, if we want the Austrians to 
think like we do and work along similar policy lines, we 
should make the effort to build our strategies in fora which 
include the Austrians.  Such fora include consultations with 
partners in the NATO context and discussions at the EU level 
on ESDP.  However, they must also include bilateral 
discussions with Austrian officials, staff-level military 
talks, and engagement with Austrian think-tanks.  These 
bilateral discussions will help shape the opinions of those 
who contribute to the decision-making process.  The Austrians 
are far more likely to buy into a policy direction in whose 
formulation they played a role. 
 
--  (S) Finally, with the Austrians, as with many Europeans, 
we need to offer deliverables in order to generate practical 
cooperation.  The type of deliverables necessary are often 
intangible, coming at the level of show and protocol. 
High-level attention in Washington, and especially high-level 
participation in Austrian events, can have significant 
returns.  As Austria takes over the EU presidency in January, 
our opportunities for this kind of positive reinforcement 
will increase.  We should use them. 
Brown