US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI2788

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002788 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, MASS, IN, PK, NSSP 
SUBJECT: INDIAN LEFT REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO US SOUTH 
ASIA INITIATIVE 
 
REF: NEW DELHI 2348 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Most Indian strategic commentators have 
endorsed the Administration's March 25 South Asia Initiative, 
and there is an emerging consensus within the GOI that India 
should capitalize on this opportunity to ensure close ties to 
the US.  India's Communist parties remain adamantly opposed, 
however, and are trying to convince the Congress Party to 
reject it.  Some leaders from the Congress' left wing agree 
with the Communists that India should reject the military 
components of the Initiative.  Until the party arrives at a 
workable consensus, party leaders like FonMin Natwar Singh 
and DefMin Pranab Mukherjee will move cautiously, looking for 
political cover to support their moves ahead with the US. 
Some observers speculate that Natwar will use his influence 
within the Left to weaken its opposition to closer bilateral 
relations.  Some within Congress but outside decision-making 
circles have suggested that India reject American fighter 
aircraft purchases to win Left Front (LF) approval for other 
aspects of the initiative.  The LF cannot compel Congress to 
reject the Initiative outright, as it does not control 
foreign policy.  It places a higher priority on its domestic 
agenda, and will not risk bringing down the government on 
this issue.  However, their inherent nuisance value could 
become more of a problem if we have difficulty translating 
the Secretary's Initiative from rhetoric to reality.  End 
Summary. 
 
Communists Speak Out 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Predictably, India's Communists rejected the 
administration's South Asia Initiative almost immediately 
after it was announced on March 25.  On March 28, the 
Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) called on the GOI 
to "outright reject the proposal to join the infamous 
national missile defense system," noting that "it suits the 
US to fuel an arms race between India and Pakistan with the 
sale of sophisticated weapons to both countries," and "it 
provides a good market for its arms manufacturers."  On March 
29, the Communist Party of India (CPI) General Secretary AB 
Bardhan warned the GOI not to accept the US offer of fighter 
aircraft, maintaining that the US "wants to start an arms 
race in the region.  They don't want peace.  They don't want 
the region to become economically stable." 
 
And Stick to their Guns 
----------------------- 
 
3.  (C) In a series of recent meetings with Poloff, Communist 
leaders and leftist journalists insisted that the US 
initiative was "unacceptable," that the Left was determined 
to stop it, and would not change its position.  They were 
also confident that they had enough support within Congress 
to oppose the Indian purchase of US fighter aircraft.  On 
Apri 5, Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, Deputy Editor of the leftist 
fortnightly "Frontline," claimed that while the Communists 
want good India/US relations, they find the South Asia 
initiative too high a price to pay, and are looking for a way 
to scuttle it.  Ramakrishnan asserted that the Congress left 
wing agrees with the Communists that India should reject 
closer strategic ties with the US, and would Convince the GOI 
to adopt a "wait and see" position, using various stratagems 
to delay a decision on defense cooperation as long as 
possible. 
 
4.  (C) Leaders of three LF parties insisted to Poloff that 
they would not relent on GOI purchase of US fighter aircraft. 
 All-India Forward Bloc General Secretary G. Devarajan 
emphasized on April 4 that the LF has told PM Singh that GOI 
acceptance of the American arms package would be an 
"impediment" to its India-Pakistan peace initiative, and that 
it should reject the American offer and let Pakistan acquire 
F-16's to "placate" Pakistan and "prevent an India/Pakistan 
arms race."  He insisted that the GOI should reject the 
entire US Initiative and not separate the defense and 
civilian cooperation components. 
Defense Minister Mukherjee in the Spotlight 
------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) General Secretary 
Abani Roy reiterated to Poloff that the LF was angered by the 
US initiative, which it views as "patronizing."  Roy claimed 
that the Pakistan F-16 sale was dropped on India as a "fait 
accompli," despite repeated Indian objections, and that the 
USG was using it to "browbeat" India into accepting a 
relationship with the US on American terms.  Roy described 
the offer of multi-role combat aircraft to India as a "waste 
of money" and "dumping" of American products.  He claimed 
that the LF has told DefMin Mukherjee not to accept US 
attempts to lock India into expensive arms packages. 
Instead, the GOI should scale back defense purchases and 
channel more money into social spending.  Mukherjee 
purportedly responded that since the US initiative was "a 
question of national security," he could "not take a decision 
lightly." 
 
6.  (C) According to Roy, the LF leadership is worried that 
Mukherjee is not fully with them.  Noting that "Mukherjee 
can't behave one way when he is in West Bengal and another 
way in New Delhi," Roy maintained that the Defense Minister 
is "pursuing a two-faced policy," trying to placate the 
Communists while at the same time working with Congress 
moderates who favor closer relations with the US.  Roy 
claimed that the LF is confident that India will never 
purchase US fighter aircraft.  Alleging that Congress leaders 
are only interested in large "commissions" from military 
sales, he predicted that the GOI would reject the F-16 or 
F-18 in favor of a European aircraft, as "there is money in 
it for them."  Roy insisted that American aircraft purchases 
were "non-negotiable," but conceded that the Communists might 
be willing to look at the civilian components of the US 
Initiative if they "meet India's needs." 
 
7.  (C) CPI Secretary D. Rajan also confirmed to Poloff on 
April 6 that the Communists "will not compromise" on the 
military aspects of the American initiative.  While he would 
not comment on the civil components, Rajan was confident that 
India would never purchase American combat aircraft.  He 
claimed that not only are many within Congress opposed, but 
many senior Indian military officers (who have long-standing 
ties to Russian suppliers) see no value to the US offer and 
would recommend that the GOI reject it. 
 
Congress's Detractors 
--------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Poloff spoke with two Congress leaders with access to 
the party leadership and journalists who follow Congress 
party internal developments.  They confirmed that some within 
the Congress hierarchy remain opposed to the defense 
components of the administration's strategic initiative. 
 
9.  (C) In an April 1 meeting, Congress MP Rashid Alvi 
pointed out that the Communists are pressuring Congress, that 
the party is divided, and has not yet decided how to respond. 
 Alvi advised that DefMin Mukherjee will play a key role in 
the GOI's decision and has not yet come out in favor of the 
US fighter offer.  He noted that Mukherjee is from West 
Bengal, wants to become Prime Minister one day with Communist 
support, owes his political position in his home state to the 
Communists, and cannot afford to openly defy them.  Alvi 
claimed that the Left is in no mood to compromise and wants 
Mukherjee to use his influence to convince the GOI to reject 
the purchase of F-16 or F-18 aircraft.  Noting that the US 
military partnership was "no go," for the Communists, Alvi 
claimed there was some leeway regarding nuclear energy and 
space. 
 
10.  (C) On March 31, Congress insider NK Sharma insisted to 
Poloff that despite strong support for the US Initiative from 
New Delhi's strategic elite, the USG should not take GOI 
acceptance for granted, as Congress grassroots cadres remain 
deeply suspicious of the United States and have not bought 
into the logic of the US partnership.  According to Sharma, 
elements within the Congress leadership still believe the US 
favors the BJP, and does not want Congress to gain enough 
strength to remain in power for a full five year term. 
Sharma maintained that the announcement of F-16 sales to 
Pakistan compounded the considerable "anger" within Congress 
regarding US handling of AQ Khan, and perceived US objections 
to the Indo-Iran pipeline.  Sharma maintained that DefMin 
Mukherjee was so dependent on the Communists that he had to 
oppose the F-16 offer. 
 
11.  (C) "Hindu" political editor Harish Khare noted to 
Poloff that there was "no enthusiasm" for the US arms offer 
among his Congress contacts, and asserted that Congress is 
looking at the possibility of satisfying both the US and the 
LF by separating the military and civilian components, and 
declining the arms offer.  It could also tell the USG that 
Congress "must seek a political consensus" and then drag out 
the process for many years.  Khare confirmed that the 
advanced fighter offer to India did not placate the universal 
anger in Congress ranks regarding the offer of F-16's to 
Pakistan. 
 
12.  (C) Former "India Today" editor Zafar Agha told Poloff 
on April 8 that his Congress contacts believe that India will 
become a world power, but some want India to ally with the US 
"for now," while others believe it is not necessary.  He was 
confident that if Congress decides to accept the US offer, it 
would bring the Communists along by reminding them of the 
need for "secular unity" to meet the "BJP threat." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  (C) As in the past, the Communists are determined to 
oppose the forging of closer US-India strategic ties, as they 
think they are in a position to veto the GOI purchase of US 
fighter aircraft.  There has always been some ideological 
overlap between the left wing of Congress and the Communists 
when it comes to relations with the US, and the LF remains 
confident that Congress proponents will fail to convince 
skeptics in their own party to accept the initiative that 
Washington has proposed.  In their leftist view the fighter 
sale is a "non-starter" as it is a "high visibility" 
component, which is widely opposed by a cross-section of 
Indians, including some within the military, who would prefer 
to stick with existing suppliers.  These left leaders are 
eager to claim credit for stopping what they see as a program 
doomed to failure.  For now, these leftist critics are a 
nuisance factor in GOI decision-making.  They could become a 
much bigger problem, however, if Washington is perceived as 
failing to deliver on the bold rhetoric of the March 25 
presentation and the soaring vision of US-India partnership 
that the Secretary presented in Delhi. 
MULFORD