US embassy cable - 05BUCHAREST913

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INITIAL ROMANIAN RESPONSE TO ISAF CAVEATS DEMARCHE

Identifier: 05BUCHAREST913
Wikileaks: View 05BUCHAREST913 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bucharest
Created: 2005-04-13 06:46:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MARR AF RO NATO Riot Control
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000913 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, AF, RO, NATO, Riot Control 
SUBJECT: INITIAL ROMANIAN RESPONSE TO ISAF CAVEATS DEMARCHE 
 
REF: STATE 60862 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF ROBERT GILCHRIST FOR REASONS 1.4 
 B AND D 
 
1.  (C) PolMilOff discussed Romanian "national caveats" on 
Romanian forces participating in NATO's International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan April 11 with 
Mihaela Matei, Director of the MOD's Strategic Affairs 
Directorate (Ref).  Pursuant to Reftel instructions, 
PolMilOff addressed the Romanian caveats providing that 
Romanian military police cannot be used for riot control 
missions and providing that military police cannot be used 
outside their area of responsibility.  Matei promised to 
share our concerns with senior MOD officials. She also 
promised to raise these matters with appropriate MFA 
interlocutors, stressing, however, that the MOD will be the 
principal decision maker within the GOR on national caveats 
issues. 
 
2.  (C) Addressing first the "geographical caveat," Matei 
insisted that this is not a Romanian caveat, per se, but a 
decision of the commander in the area of operations.  She 
continued that, in any event, "some (Romanian) troops do not 
necessarily have the means to operate outside of area." 
Turning next to the use of military police for riot control 
missions, Matei underscored that "this is an old issue" 
linked to "sufficient training and proper weapons."  She 
opined that using military police for riot control, absent 
adequate training and equipment designed for riot control, 
could have disastrous consequences.  In broader terms, Matei 
observed that the Romanian armed forces are institutionally 
"very reluctant to do riot control given the events of 1989," 
when some troops used unnecessary deadly force to suppress 
demonstrations aimed at the communist-era Romanian 
government. 
DELARE 

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