US embassy cable - 05QUITO795

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000795 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, ASEC, EC 
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: DIALOGUE OVER; TIME TO STRIKE 
 
REF: QUITO 781 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney.  Reason 1.4 (b&d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Congress tried but failed to pass 
legislation to resolve the Supreme Court issue on April 12. 
Quito opposition leaders will therefore try to close down the 
capital in protest, starting early on April 13.  How long the 
"general strike" will last is not clear.  The private sector 
in the capital is divided, some favoring an indefinite 
strike, others fretting over costs.  With Guayaquil deferring 
its own protests until later this month, the Quito strike no 
longer has any pretensions of national scope.  Most here 
believe the government can weather the protests, and thus far 
the government has not over-reacted.  We will monitor and 
report strike developments closely.  End Summary. 
 
Dialogue Broken Off 
------------------- 
 
2.  (C) After Minister of Government Oscar Ayerve had raised 
hopes that the government and opposition were nearing 
agreement on a formula to resolve the festering controversy 
over the current Supreme Court, the opposition abruptly broke 
off dialogue during the evening of April 11.  Congressmen 
Andres Paez (ID) and Luis Fernando Torres (PSC) blamed Ayerve 
for the rupture, citing the government's resistance to the 
opposition's proposed formula for a selection committee to 
select new Supreme Court justices.  Government and opposition 
had agreed to vacate the current Supreme Court immediately, 
and hold a referendum to ratify the formula to select new 
judges.  On the selection committee issue, however, they 
differed.  President Gutierrez issued a national call on 
Congress to act on April 12 to terminate the Supreme Court. 
Opposition members blamed the government in advance for the 
failure of Congress to act. 
 
Congress: No Action 
------------------- 
 
3.  (C) On April 12, Congress went into session to debate 
competing proposals over how to terminate the current Supreme 
Court.  The session concluded inconclusively however, after 
the opposition proposal supported by the PSC, ID, Socialists, 
DP and Pachakutik fell one vote short of success. 
Independent deputies introduced a new bill on the court 
issue, with government approval, which would require new 
debate, called for April 13.  Torres told us he felt tricked 
by the government's "triple-discourse," and accused the 
government of using bribes to defeat the opposition proposal. 
 He speculated that the government's maneuvers in Congress 
could turn even the reluctant Guayaquil-based opposition into 
the streets. 
 
Strike to Start April 13 
------------------------ 
 
4.  (U) Assembly of Quito and Pichincha province leaders 
announced on April 12 that a long-threatened indefinite 
strike would shut down the capital and surrounding province, 
as well as Azuay, Chimborazo and Imbabura provinces, from 
midnight April 12.  Indigenous groups have announced 
"parallel" anti-government protests.  Strike organizers said 
they would close access roads into the capital, demonstrate 
at nine "strategic locations," and likely will convoke a 
protest march during the day.  Military authorities assured 
the Ambassador on April 11 that the Quito international 
airport would remain open.  A mayor from the Amazon region 
threatened to turn off the capital's water supply as a form 
of protest against the strike and in support of the 
government.  The Education Ministry declared all schools 
closed for April 13.  President of Congress Omar Quintana 
told the press that counter-marches would be organized in 
support of the government. 
 
Guayaquil Hedges 
---------------- 
 
5.  (U) Guayaquil Mayor Jaime Nebot convoked an ad-hoc 
Assembly of Guayaquil meeting on April 11 where he announced 
that Guayaquil will coordinate with other coastal 
municipalities to organize a protest march in favor of local 
autonomy concerns.  He did not set a date for the protest, 
saying only that it should be "sooner rather than later" and 
sometime during April.  Guayaquil-based business groups had 
strongly objected to any protest intended to stop work, 
causing Nebot to choose a march over a strike. 
 
Presidential Advisor Pessimistic 
-------------------------------- 
6.  (C) Presidential Secretary Carlos Polit told the 
Ambassador early on April 12 that a strike was inevitable. 
Polit blamed the failure of dialogue squarely on Ayerve, "the 
wrong man for the job."  He described a call he had received 
from ID congressman Andres Paez complaining about being 
photographed with Ayerve, a man with "heavy political 
baggage."  Ayerve's bad political judgment included his 
support for ex-president Bucaram's offer to turn his 
supporters into the streets in support of the government 
simultaneously with anti-government protests in Guayaquil. 
This was a recipe for violence, he said, which could in a 
worst-case scenario galvanize further anti-government 
protests.  Polit said he planned to recommend that President 
Gutierrez deflate the protests by announcing a Cabinet 
shake-up, including replacing Government Minister Ayerve with 
Labor Minister Izurieta. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) The conditions for real dialogue dissipated with the 
approach of the opposition's threatened strike action, and 
eventually talks reached an impasse.  Congressional 
non-action reflected worse on the government, since it 
blocked the opposition's attempt to pass legislation to 
resolve the issue.  Some in the opposition were clearly 
wedded to more confrontational tactics, especially the more 
radical members of the Assembly of Quito. 
 
8.  (C) Squabbles for power and justice here are prone to 
brinkmanship, but generally remain non-violent.  General 
strikes are particularly high-risk, given recent history 
here.  Two presidents have been deposed in the past eight 
years after general strikes or mobilizations brought 
opponents into the streets.  But this strike, at least 
initially, is not national in scope.  In addition, no 
destabilization attempt has succeeded in recent times without 
indigenous mobilization and military support.  By most 
accounts Gutierrez retains firm control of the military, and 
has effectively neutralized the indigenous.  Until these 
conditions change, street protests are not likely to shake 
this government. 
KENNEY