US embassy cable - 05AMMAN2973

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002973 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2010 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, ECON, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: OPPONENTS OF REFORM ALREADY BALKING AT JORDAN'S 
NEW CABINET 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 2890 
 
     B. AMMAN 2851 
 
Classified By: Charge David Hale, Reasons, 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Public opposition to the new cabinet from 
southern tribesmen in parliament comes as no surprise ) they 
loathe the Palestinian reformists who are the stars in the 
new government ) but has rattled PM Badran and some of the 
targets of this attack.  The cabinet brings together an 
exceptionally strong economic team, much needed to accelerate 
Jordan's economic reform effort.  Badran stressed to Charge 
his commitment to significant political reform in the year 
ahead, but is seeking safety nets and deliverables to 
insulate some sectors of society from economic shocks coming 
from reform.  On the foreign policy front, FM Qasrawi has 
shifted from his predecessor's strident tone, extending olive 
branches to Arab neighbors.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) The King's hand-picked reform cabinet reached the 
three-day mark on April 12.  Significant ) but predictable 
) resistance from southern tribesmen in parliament has 
rattled the cabinet team.  Prime Minister Badran and four key 
economic ministers ) water, industry and trade, planning, 
and finance ) all expressed to Charge in the last twenty 
four hours their concern about the public stand of these 35 
traditionalist MPs against the new government.  Finance 
Minister Awadallah privately accused GID Chief Saad Khayr of 
stoking the opposition fires against a reform government that 
is not to his liking.  The southerners' complaints focus on 
the lack of consultation on formation of the government, the 
absence of any significant southerner in the cabinet, and 
their impression that the economic team is "out of touch" 
with the average Jordanian.  Cabinet members privately retort 
that part of the reform process is a move away from 
cumbersome geographic balance in the cabinet in favor of 
decentralization-to-come.  As for the economic team, they are 
exceptionally dynamic private sector leaders, and 
predominantly Palestinian ) anathema on both counts to East 
Bank tribesmen.  The fact that opposition in parliament comes 
from the loyal parliamentary backbone of the outgoing Fayez 
cabinet (and not the Islamic Action Front) would confirm that 
the Badran government (and the King by extension) is seen as 
firmly committed to a path of reform that will remove the 
political tools which keep these backward anti-reformists in 
place. 
 
3.  (C) The cabinet team is debating internally how to 
respond.  The King convened a representative sample of 
parliamentary leaders on April 12 to emphasize his commitment 
to reform and expectation of support.  (He had planned this 
move weeks earlier.)   According to Awadallah, PM Badran 
wants to stick to their initial plan of calling the recessed 
parliament into emergency session in June, for a confidence 
vote and continued work on pending legislation.  But Badran, 
adding up potential opposition of 35 southerners and 20 
Islamists, told Charge he needs "deliverables" by then to win 
support.  Awadallah argues it would be better to convene 
parliament now and get a quick confirmation derived from MPs' 
loyalty to the King, rather than risk facing the House with 
meager results to show in a few months' time.  As he will 
advocate in an upcoming visit to Washington, the government 
will put in place a comprehensive three year plan for pension 
reform, ending subsidies, reducing debt service burdens, and 
accelerating privatization (septel).  Judging from Charge's 
initial meetings with the economic team, the will and 
executive capacity exists to accomplish these goals, perhaps 
for the first time in Jordan.  Less evident are the political 
skills which will be needed to handle parliamanent.  Deputy 
Prime Minister el-Tal will be the point man for dealing with 
the House, but alone he may lack the necessary heft. 
Jordanian officials will continue to seek foreign assistance 
as "insulation" to meet unfounded capital expenditure needs, 
a phasing out of fuel subsidies, and a possible modest 
increase in low-end wages. 
 
4.  (C) Most ministers we have met so far remain optimistic 
about the team they have joined, describing the initial 
cabinet session as showing the members' sense of cohesion and 
focus on reform.  PM Badran reiterated to Charge that 
significant political reforms would be carried out in the 
year ahead.  However, of the seven ministerial committees 
formed, none is exclusively given the mandate to work on 
democratization. 
 
5.  (C) On the foreign policy front, new Foreign Minister 
Qasrawi has begun to work on Jordan's Arab relations, damaged 
by his strident predecessor.  In press interviews, he has 
discussed his plans to travel to Baghdad soon to work on that 
relationship (Mulki had also intended to visit Iraq upon 
formation of a transitional government) and made conciliatory 
statements about other neighbors.  Badran also announced he 
would travel soon to Arab states "to clear the atmosphere." 
 
6.  (C) Comment:  East Banker resistance to the 
Palestinian-flavored, reform-oriented cabinet came as no 
surprise, as socio-economic and political reforms threaten to 
dilute their power and deprive them of their traditional 
tools to exercise control.  More surprising has been 
criticism from liberals, some of whom have openly challenged 
the way the cabinet was formed behind closed palace doors. 
The ongoing debate highlights some of the dilemmas this 
reformist king faces:  on the one hand, reforms undermine his 
loyal base of support before any organized reform 
constituency exists to replace it as a bulwark against 
extremists; on the other hand, the absence of a truly 
representative parliament and a strong grassroots 
democratization movement compels the King to continue to 
direct the reform process from above, a situation he readily 
acknowledges privately is incapable of sustaining true 
reform.  However, if the national agenda and decentralization 
commissions deliver, the regime has a credible plan to a) 
obtain "buy in" to comprehensive reforms from a broad 
spectrum of society and b) initiate more "bottom up" reforms. 
 As Jordan maneuvers through this difficult process, at a 
time of regional turmoil, its leaders deserve our continued 
encouragement and support.  Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
 
HALE