US embassy cable - 05SANAA917

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AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES TERRORIST THREAT, SAADA WITH FM QIRBI

Identifier: 05SANAA917
Wikileaks: View 05SANAA917 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2005-04-12 13:16:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PTER MASS YM COUNTER TERRORISM DOMESTIC POLITICS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000917 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, MASS, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM, DOMESTIC POLITICS 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES TERRORIST THREAT, SAADA WITH 
FM QIRBI 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Ambassador and Foreign Minister Qirbi met on 
April 9 to discuss the current threat environment for 
Americans in Sanaa as well as the situation in Saada. 
Following up on Ambassador's meeting with President Saleh 
earlier the same day, the FM listed needed USG assistance in 
combating the renewed al-Houthi insurgency in the northern 
Saada region.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Ansar as-Sunna Threat 
--------------------- 
 
2. (S) Qirbi asked Ambassador for his assessment of terrorist 
activities in the region.  Ambassador said there were many 
regional concerns, but that he was specifically concerned 
about the Jihadist pipeline along with the return home of 
Yemeni Jihadists from Iraq.  Yemenis are coming back with new 
operational experience, he said, and they are looking for 
targets and  establishing new cells.  "They are being 
arrested and interrogated upon their return, Yes?" asked 
Qirbi.  Not all of them, Ambassador replied.  Qirbi inquired 
on the quality of Political Security Organization (PSO) and 
National Security Board (NSB), cooperation on the Ansar 
al-Sunna threat.  Ambassador told FM that the we enjoy a 
good, cooperative relationship with both NSB and MOI, and 
that on the most urgent issue wrapping up the Kanaan cell, 
the PSO was being very responsive as well.  Although we are 
indeed concerned with spread of Saada-related violence to 
Sanaa, the current high alert and Authorized Departure 
status, explained Ambassador was related to the very 
dangerous and specific threat raised by Kanaan (Note: Saada 
related grenade attacks on military leaders in downtown Sanaa 
covered septel.   End Note). 
 
-------------------- 
How Did He get Here? 
-------------------- 
 
3. (S) "How did Kanaan get back here?" Qirbi asked 
Ambassador, "where was the failure?"  Ambassador pointed to 
problems in Yemen border security and the lack of 
coordination between countries in the region.  He noted that 
in his journey back to Yemen from Iraq, Kanaan raised the 
attention of both Jordanian and Saudi security services, but 
had managed to allude them.  Better coordination between 
regional players, suggested Ambassador, was required. 
Document integrity is another problem, continued Ambassador. 
(Note:  To improve the situation, Post has proposed USG 
assistance to MOI border guard forces and MOI CT 
investigators, as well as advocated for greater information 
sharing and security assistance to Yemen from its Gulf 
neighbors.  End Note). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
We Need USG Support and Assistance in Saada 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (S) Qirbi asked Ambassador for staunch USG support for the 
ROYG-side of the al-Houthi battle.  On the political level, 
Qirbi said, "there is no doubt" that the Believing Youth are 
a terrorist organization -- "they used terrorist tactics and 
they have outside financial support (re: Iran and Lebanese 
Hisbollah)."  Qirbi said that although al-Houthi's movement 
started as a Zaidi, Yemeni sect, it had evolved into a more 
militant organization and Shia unrest could expand to Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait.  (Comment: while the Believing 
Youth may indeed have outside links, this is not the first 
time that Qirbi has show traditional Gulf mistrust of 
Shiites.  End Comment). 
 
5. (S) Turning to military needs, the FM reiterated Saleh's 
request for U.S. military and logistical support for ROYG 
forces fighting in Saada, namely M113 APCs and HMWWVS. 
Ambassador assured Qirbi we would do all we could to could to 
speed up delivery of equipment, but, in the meantime stood 
ready to assist the ROYG more immediately should we receive a 
request for intelligence sharing.  Qirbi thanked Ambassador 
and stressed the need for the USG to stengthen military and 
political support for the ROYG in this fight quickly, before 
"others take advantage of the fact that our security forces 
are overstretched in Saada."  Qirbi also asked for U.S. 
terrorist-financing assistance to isolate the source and stop 
the flow of funds to al-Houthi followers from abroad. 
Ambassador mentioned ongoing USG efforts to provide training 
for the CSF-CTU, as well as the presence of a U.S. military 
advisor located in the CSF operations center. 
 
-------------------------- 
Qirbi Visit to Washington? 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (C) On the FM's intentions to visit Washington in the 
Spring, Qirbi said he would prefer to wait until a decision 
was made on Saleh's potential visit to the White House next 
Fall before preceding with plans for his own trip. 
Krajeski 

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