US embassy cable - 02ABUJA1636

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001636 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: 1.6X5, 1.6X6 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PBTS, EPET, CM, NI, ICJ 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: BAKASSI MAY LEAD TO CONFLICT 
 
 
REF:  IIR 7 800 0261 02 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER; REASONS 
1.6X5 and 1.6X6. 
 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: Tensions between Nigeria and Cameroon 
are rising in anticipation of the ICJ's ruling on the 
Bakassi dispute. Many observers expect a ruling before 
the Court's summer recess begins in July. The Nigerian 
public is not ready to hear that Bakassi belongs to 
Cameroon. Elections loom. Should the ruling favor 
Cameroon, Nigeria could decide to fight. The USG 
should not speak out on this potential crisis yet. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
================= 
WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN 
================= 
 
 
2. (S) Should Nigeria lose the case over the disputed 
Bakassi peninsula presently before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), the GON may simply refuse to 
give up its positions, arguing that actual 
implementation of the decision should be "negotiated." 
The GON has a tradition of entering into long, drawn- 
out negotiations to avoid unpleasant outcomes. 
Conversely, Nigerian-initiated operations that claim 
to be repulsing a Cameroonian "attack" are also 
conceivable.  The Nigerian military has, we 
understand, been building up its forces and equipment 
in the disputed region. 
 
 
3. (S) Prior to execution of Operation Focus Relief, 
Chief of Army Staff LTG Alexander Ogomudia initially 
said the 20 Battalion, based in Serti (near the 
Cameroon border) could not participate in the program. 
Although he changed his mind, he explained that it was 
no secret that Nigeria had some concerns regarding the 
intentions of "our neighbor to the south" (Also see 
reftel).  Similarly, PolMilOff was told by a senior 
MOD official in early May that, while Cameroon 
believed Nigeria's military was weak, and was correct 
to a degree, the Nigerian military could hold its own 
in a military contest with Cameroon.  It would be a 
mistake for Cameroon to act militarily, should the 
court rule against Yaounde's claim, he stated. 
Moreover, when asked what Nigeria would do should the 
ICJ's decision favor Cameroon, he shrugged and said, 
"We will fight."  Finally, the Ambassador heard 
recently from a very senior and usually highly 
circumspect Nigerian official that Nigerian compliance 
with a negative decision was most unlikely.  The 
official could not rule out Nigeria going to war but 
noted that the constitutional requirements for a 
declaration of war might hamper such an endeavor. 
 
 
4. (S) Most Nigerians believe that Cameroon does not 
have a case before the ICJ, and would be shocked by a 
ruling in Cameroon's favor.  In fact, it is not 
uncommon to hear individuals argue that while Head of 
State Gowon agreed to cede the peninsula to Cameroon, 
the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) at that time 
rejected the agreement, and therefore, it never became 
national law or imposed any international obligations 
on Nigeria. 
 
 
=================== 
FACTORS TO CONSIDER 
=================== 
 
 
5. (S) COMMENT: We cannot determine whether the PRC 
ever reached a decision on the Bakassi issue. 
Unfortunately, the GON has never prepared the Nigerian 
public for the possibility that the Bakassi might in 
fact belong to Cameroon. Since Nigerian troops moved 
into the disputed territory in 1993 (to protect the 
overwhelmingly Nigerian populace from "abuse" by 
Cameroonian authorities, asserted by the GON at the 
time), few, if any, of Nigeria's media have even 
hinted that Cameroon might have a case.  It is an 
article of faith here that Nigeria is on the winning 
side; in fact, given the historical boundaries, 
Nigeria may lose.  The GON obviously understands this 
is possible but continues its silence vis-a-vis the 
Nigerian public -- one more hint that it may not 
respect an eventual negative ICJ ruling. 
 
 
6.  (S) In the Nigerian context, there are several 
factors that could play into the decision-making 
process.  First and foremost, 2002/2003 is an election 
year for Nigeria.  While aggression might provoke 
international opprobrium, a strong government 
protecting "the national patrimony" and the 
territorial integrity of the nation could play very 
well domestically.  The Obasanjo Administration is 
deeply unpopular in several parts of the country; it 
is hurting even in the oil-producing South-South, a 
bastion of support in 1999. Obasanjo's critics claim 
he is too interested in international issues and 
insufficiently concerned about the plight of the 
average Nigerian. Public works projects are not as 
numerous as many citizens expected, corruption has not 
disappeared, and inflation is pernicious. If he does 
not "defend Nigeria's territorial integrity," 
Obasanjo's adversaries will have yet another brickbat 
to toss.  Incumbency is powerful in Nigeria, but it 
does not confer omnipotence. The politics of an 
election year alone could make compliance with a 
negative ruling unlikely. 
 
 
7. (S) Second, the land border between Cameroon and 
Nigeria potentially affects the maritime boundary and, 
with it, the size of Nigeria's exclusive economic 
zone. Nigeria has engaged with Equatorial Guinea and 
Sao Tome and Principe on maritime boundary/economic 
zone demarcation. To the best of our knowledge, 
Cameroon has not been involved and is not a party to 
these arrangements. The disputed territory is often 
called "the oil rich Bakassi," and perhaps it does 
have significant hydrocarbon reserves beneath its 
surface. 
 
 
8. (S) It has been noted in another context (political 
battles over scheduling elections) that the 
President's tenure in office may be extended in six- 
month increments if the national territory is 
threatened.  We do not view this constitutional 
provision as a likely trigger for Nigerian military 
action in Bakassi, but, if hostilities should break 
out, some sycophant will doubtless suggest invoking 
this clause and extending the President's tenure. We 
point out, however, that this is purely speculative; 
we have no way of knowing how the GON will react in 
the face of an adverse ICJ decision. 
 
 
======================== 
WHAT SHOULD WE DO/NOT DO 
======================== 
 
 
9. (S) There is a major downside to saying anything 
now about the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over Bakassi. 
Assuming the decision goes against Nigeria, the USG 
subsequently will be accused of malevolent 
foreknowledge and "plotting" against Nigeria. The 
impact of commentary on the issue after the decision 
will be only slightly less negative, but our failure 
to say something at that juncture could be seen by 
some (in Abuja and beyond) as giving Nigeria the green 
light to attack. 
ANDREWS