US embassy cable - 05SANAA912

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000912 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ 
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015 
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, PREL, PTER, EAC 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/11/2005 
 
REF: A. SANAA 896 
 
     B. SANAA 895 
     C. SANAA 891 
     D. SANAA 883 
     E. SANAA 882 
     F. SANAA 876 
     G. SANAA 875 
     H. SANAA 863 
     I. SANAA 860 
     J. SANAA 836 
 
Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
1.    (S/NF) Begin Summary:  Ambassador convened an EAC 
meeting on April 11, 2005, to review the current threat, 
ongoing security measures and to discuss reverse trip wires. 
The EAC agreed that current threat indicators continue to 
point to a mid to long term threat for the community.  The 
Ambassador noted that the Embassy re-opened today, Monday 11 
April 2005, with no incidents per request REFTEL A.  EAC 
members agreed to continue security measures recommended 
during previous EAC meetings to include restrictions on 
non-essential travel throughout Yemen with emphasis on 
avoiding downtown Sanaa.  Key offices and personnel 
represented at the meeting included:  DCM, DAT, FPD, IPC, MO, 
LEGATT, POLE, RMAS, OMC, RSO, PD, and USAID. End Summary. 
 
2.  (C/NF) Per Department guidance, the EAC discussed 
"Reverse Trip-Wires" as a tool to gauge any future 
recommendation for cessation of "Authorized Departure."  The 
EAC agreed to meet again on April 13, 2005, to approve 
changes to the Reverse Trip-Wires" recommended by the EAC. 
For now EAC members agreed that it was prudent to continue 
with measures delineated in REFTELS B and C, including the 
need for supervisors to actively manage their staffs' work 
schedules thereby ensuring prudent changes in arrival and 
departure times. 
 
3.  (SBU)  The EAC was also briefed by the Management Officer 
regarding particulars of the current Authorized Departure 
(AD), and the Ambassador re-emphasized the necessity of 
following AD policies closely regarding the return or arrival 
of personnel out of country or traveling on a TDY basis. 
 
4.  (SBU)  The Ambassador advised the EAC that he had met 
with the Director of the Political Security Office and had 
requested the Director's support in getting permission to 
bring in and set-up transmitters to enhance our Emergency and 
Evacuation radio network as well as the local guard force 
network.  EAC members noted that it is difficult to determine 
if the PSO Director will support and move this important 
project forward after years of preventing progress on radio 
upgrades. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  RMAS had no new threat information for review by 
the EAC. 
 
6. (C/NF)  The RSO briefed EAC members that no indications of 
pre-attack planning were detected by RSO surveillance 
detection teams or guard force assets.  However, the EAC was 
informed about a phone call threat to the Yemen American 
Language Institute (YALI) at 1325 hours, 11 April 2005, when 
an unidentified male stated in Arabic that YALI should "Watch 
out after 1300 hours."   The YALI director chose not to 
evacuate his facility but instead coordinated additional 
security with MOI through the RSO, alerted his neighbors to 
the potential threat while assisting Embassy guards in 
conducting an inspection for suspicious packages.  The YALI 
Director speculated that someone aware of YALI's closure the 
previous two days was making crank calls.  RSO reported no 
additional information regarding the source of the threat and 
recommended to the YALI director an ID Caller system to 
assist in future investigations of phone threats. 
 
7.  (SBU)  The EAC was briefed by the RSO about a report that 
another grenade attack took place in Sanaa, against a 
military vehicle near the Ministry of Fisheries in Hadda. 
Additionally, the RSO advised that a second report was sent 
to him regarding a grenade that was reported to have been 
thrown at an unspecified target, near the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  RSO notes that this may be circular reporting and 
as of this report is unable to confirm either attack. 
 
8.  (S/NF) The DATT informed EAC members that contacts within 
the Ministry of Defense (MOD) stated that the fighting in 
Saada had lessened and that the situation was now under 
control. 
 
9.  (U)  The Public Diplomacy Officer was directed by the 
Ambassador to provide press guidance on the insurrection in 
Saada and the closing of the Embassy on April 9 and 10, as 
well as the Embassy's re-opening on April 11th. 
10.  (U)  The Ambassador announced that a Town Hall meeting 
would be held for the Embassy community at 0900 a.m., 12 
April, on the patio of the EMR. 
 
11.  (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene at 1430 hours on 
Wednesday, 13 April 2005, to review updates on Embassy 
security and decide on reverse trip-wires. 
Krajeski