US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1750

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001750 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: KMT VICE CHAIR CHIANG PROVIDES READOUT OF BEIJING 
VISIT 
 
REF: TAIPEI 1724 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: KMT Vice Chairman P.K. Chiang provided the 
AIT Director a readout April 11 of his late March visit to 
the Mainland.  Chiang said that he was not involved in the 
planning for the visit and only learned about arrangements 
for senior level meetings with PRC officials in Beijing just 
days before his departure.  Chiang revealed that he had 
considered postponing his visit in response to a request from 
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairman Joseph Wu, but said 
that KMT HQ insisted on proceeding, citing a plurality in 
support of the visit.  Chiang disputed charges that he had 
signed any agreement with PRC officials in Beijing.  In 
addition to the "Ten Points" reported in the press, Chiang 
said that he pressed PRC leaders to facilitate Taiwan's 
participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) and not 
block Taipei's Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with 
third countries.  Chiang also told his interlocutors that the 
PRC's enactment of the Anti-Secession Law antagonized the 
Taiwan public and urged them to consider how their policies 
look from Taiwan's perspective.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) KMT Vice Chairman P.K. Chiang provided the AIT 
Director a readout April 11 of his late March visit to the 
PRC (Reftel reports on Chiang's views of the domestic fallout 
from his trip).  Chiang said that he was asked to travel to 
the Mainland by KMT Chairman Lien Chan on February 27, but 
intentionally left the details of his visit to KMT party 
staff.  Chiang said that he was told that he would be going 
in either early or late March, depending on the atmospherics 
on each side.  Chiang said that the details of the visit were 
not entirely clear to him even after the trip got underway. 
Chiang told the AIT Director that when he was originally 
asked to travel to the Mainland, the plan was only to visit 
Guangzhou, Nanjing, and Shanghai to pay homage at key 
historical memorials and to call on Association for Relations 
Across the Strait (ARATS) Chairman Wang Daohan.  He was only 
informed of the planned travel to Beijing and meetings with 
senior PRC leaders within a week of his departure. 
 
3. (C) Chiang said he did ask the KMT to reconsider the 
timing of the visit after MAC Chairman Joseph Wu asked him on 
March 21 to postpone his trip in order not to undermine 
Taiwan's response to the Anti-Secession Law.  Chiang added 
that he received similar advice from other people.  However, 
Chiang said that KMT HQ insisted on proceeding with the 
visit, citing a public opinion poll showing 44 percent of the 
public supported going ahead with the visit, versus only 31 
percent against. 
 
Chiang Visit: Trade and Taiwan's International Space 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
4. (C) Chiang said that he was provided with a ten-point set 
of talking points by KMT Mainland Affairs Director Chang 
Jung-kong shortly before arriving in Beijing.  Noting that he 
was familiar with the initiatives on the list, Chiang said he 
decided to present the items to his main PRC host, Taiwan 
Affairs Office (TAO) Director Chen Yunlin, grouped into three 
parts -- those related to facilitating Taiwan business 
activities on the Mainland, those dealing with 
social/cultural exchanges, and those that would require 
government-led agreements.  Chiang said that it was clear the 
PRC side was confused by his decision to reorganize his 
presentation, having apparently been informed ahead of time 
of both the contents of his points and their order.  Chiang 
added that the delegation's PRC interlocutors were also taken 
aback by the aggressive questioning by the dozen legislators 
on Chiang's delegation, each of whom raised their own pet 
issues with the PRC.  Chiang dismissed accusations that he 
violated Taiwan law by signing an accord with the PRC 
government, noting that the two sides did not initial any 
document during the visit.  Chiang said the "Ten Points 
Agreement" talked about in the media only represented a set 
of "preliminary conclusions" (chubu jielun) based on the 
PRC's responses to questions raised by the Taiwan side. 
 
5. (C) In addition to the economic issues raised following 
his March 30 dinner with Chen Yunlin, Chiang said he used his 
meetings to raise several political issues.  During his 
meetings with PRC leaders Jia Qinglin and Tang Jiaxuan, 
Chiang said he emphasized that Taiwan's people were deeply 
upset by the PRC's Anti-Secession Law, pointing to the large 
turnout at the March 26 rally in Taipei as a manifestation of 
this sentiment.  Chiang urged his interlocutors to think 
about cross-Strait relations through the lens of Taipei, not 
Beijing.  "I told them that they may have tried to target 20 
percent of the Taiwan public through their new law," Chiang 
stated, "but they ended up upsetting the other 80 percent as 
well."  Chiang said he also pressed PRC leaders to find a 
formula for Taiwan observership in the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and for Taiwan to negotiate Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) with other countries.  While Tang Jiaxuan 
said Beijing was working with the WHO Secretariat on a 
formula to allow Taiwan to take part in WHO activities, 
Chiang said his interlocutors ignored his points on FTAs. 
Chiang said that none of his PRC interlocutors responded to 
his statement that the KMT would never compromise on the 
existence of the "Republic of China." 
 
PRC Not Excluding Soong 
----------------------- 
 
6. (C) Chiang said that Chen Yunlin carefully chose his words 
when he said that Beijing would welcome visits by "any person 
or party who acknowledged the '1992 consensus' and opposed 
Taiwan independence."  Chiang said this formula was clearly 
intended to include People First Party (PFP) Chairman James 
Soong, disputing reports (put out by the KMT) that Beijing 
has rejected Soong as an interlocutor because of his recent 
contacts with President Chen Shui-bian.  Chiang said that the 
invitation he conveyed to Lien Chan to visit the Mainland 
later in the year contained no details.  Chiang said he was 
not privy to KMT's current plans for the Lien visit nor has 
he taken part in any subsequent meetings within the KMT over 
the party's ongoing contacts with its PRC counterpart. 
 
Comment: Amateur Hour at the KMT 
-------------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Despite his role as head of the KMT delegation, Chiang 
appeared to be simply along for the ride.  While KMT 
officials have told AIT that staff-level prep work for recent 
contacts began nearly a year ago, Chiang said he still had 
not been informed of the content and background for the KMT's 
outreach when he departed for the Mainland.  Despite KMT 
boasts over the extensive groundwork laid out for the visit, 
its handling of the trip appears to have been shoddy.  Rather 
than calling on its extensive network of former cross-Strait 
officials, the KMT appears to be relying on a small group of 
partisan political operators to run its outreach to Beijing. 
This has likely made it easier for Beijing to manipulate the 
process to achieve its own ends.  While Chiang told AIT that 
he intended to press Lien to do a better job of preparing for 
his proposed visit, Lien and his advisors do not appear to be 
actively soliciting Chiang's advice. 
PAAL