US embassy cable - 05CARACAS1045

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
HQ USSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, VE 
SUBJECT: SENATOR COLEMAN'S MEETING WITH VENEZUELAN CIVIL 
SOCIETY LEADERS 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 
REASON 1.4 D 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) During Senator Norm Coleman's (R-MN) visit to 
Venezuela April 1-3, he met with leading Venezuelan civil 
society figures at a dinner hosted by the Charge.  The guests 
told the Senator of their deep concerns for the future of 
democratic institutions in the country. They also expressed 
their worries about the militarization of the civilian 
bureaucracy and the plan by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez 
to create a two million person military reserve.  Finally, 
they encouraged the U.S. to work with together with other 
countries to put pressure on the Chavez regime and to change 
the discourse from a U.S. versus Chavez debate to a 
multinational expression of concern for democracy and rule of 
law in Venezuela.  Senator Coleman underscored the USG's 
support for democracy and encouraged civil society to reach 
out to counterparts in Europe and Latin America.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Venezuelan Civil Society 
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2. (C) Coordinadora Democratica's Alberto Quiroz, Sumate's 
Alejandro Plaz, former Minister of Agriculture Hiram Gaviria, 
and Assistant Political Editor of El Universal newspaper 
Ernesto Ecarri Hung, at a dinner hosted by the Charge on 
April 2, told the Senator they were concerned about 
democratic institutions in Venezuela, the creation of 
civilian reserves and control over the military, and what 
they perceived as Chavez's unwillingness to cede or lose 
power democratically.  They advocated the U.S. form 
international alliances, especially with Brazil, Spain, 
Argentina and France, to influence Chavez's troubling 
behavior in Venezuela and the region 
 
3. (C) Plaz told the Senator that Chavez had accelerated his 
attack on fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms 
since the referendum.  Sumate, Plaz said, was working to 
prevent the further deterioration of democratic institutions. 
Keeping democratic spaces open was also the most important 
role the international community could play, he asserted. 
 
4. (C) Quiroz highlighted concern about the planned creation 
of a military reserve corps of some two million people headed 
by a General who would report directly to Chavez.  He also 
noted the high number of military in civilian government 
jobs.  Plaz added that 6 of 22 Ministers and 9 of 23 
governors were ex-military as well. 
 
5. (C) Plaz asserted that the GOV was using preferential oil 
agreements to forge alliances and neutralize enemies. 
Likewise, he said, Chavez was using the threat of supporting 
the radical left against governments in fragile democracies 
like Bolivia.  Quiroz noted that while previous governments 
had automatically renewed the San Jose treaty of 1980 that 
gave Caribbean and Central American countries beneficial 
terms for petroleum, Chavez threatened to suspend the treaty 
if he considered governments to be "unfriendly" (as he did 
with the Dominican Republic and threatened to do with 
Panama).  Chavez also gives Cuba special petroleum terms, 
Quiroz said, which it had not received under the treaty. 
 
6. (C) Plaz pointed out the significance of the 15 Caribbean 
votes in the OAS.  He observed that Chile had made a 
180-degree turn on Chavez, referring to Venezuela's support 
of Chile's Minister of Interior Insulza to be OAS Secretary 
General. 
 
7. (C) To control the GOV and neutralize its efforts, the 
U.S. should forge alliances and turn the argument into the 
international community vs. Chavez, not the U.S. vs. Chavez, 
Plaz said.  Quiroz agreed saying the USG should play the role 
of champion of democracy with others, not alone.  Quiroz also 
quoted leftist politician Pompeo Marquez, "The U.S. cannot 
allow Chavez to be the champion of the poor" to suggest that 
the USG should continue its efforts to improve the lives of 
the poor while searching for international alliances against 
Chavez.  Plaz said that after Castro, the presidents of 
Brazil, Spain, and then Argentina were most influential. 
Recalling his experience as Ambassador to France, Gaviria 
 
also mentioned France as another possible ally, saying Chavez 
respected French President Jacques Chirac.  Senator Coleman 
agreed that the USG by itself would be less effective in 
promoting democracy.  He was encouraged by the recent 
statements by the presidents of Brazil and Spain with regard 
to Venezuela, and he thought that the USG should engage with 
these two nations. 
 
8. (C) Plaz lamented the international community's 
willingness to be fooled by Chavez's democratic facade and 
unwillingness to act unless there was a large number of 
deaths, large numbers of political prisoners, or a picture of 
a high-level Venezuelan official giving weapons to the FARC. 
Plaz said during his discussions with a UN official, he was 
told there would be no action from them and he might have 
more luck with the OAS.  Plaz said he thought other countries 
were willing to let Chavez continue as long as they thought 
it was contained to Venezuela and they agreed with the 
Senator's evaluation that for the international community, 
Chavez had not crossed any lines yet.  That said, Plaz also 
noted the new Latin American left realized they could be 
discredited if Chavez went the way of Castro, so there was 
hope.  Quiroz disagreed saying Lula had trouble with this 
extreme left and would be friendly with Chavez to neutralize 
criticisms in Brazil. 
 
9. (C) On oil, Quiroz, a former oil executive, said the lack 
of investment in the sector would have an effect, but only in 
the long term.  Chavez would benefit from high prices for a 
while, but quantity could be a problem in the future.  He 
said that PDVSA itself was producing only half what it did in 
1998 and depending on foreign production to fill the gap. 
The GOV, according to Quiroz, would never be able to reach 
the stated production goal of 5 million barrels in 6 years 
time; it would take over 10 years if Chavez started investing 
now. 
 
10. (U) This cable was not reviewed by Senator Coleman or his 
staff. 
 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2005CARACA01045 - CONFIDENTIAL