US embassy cable - 05CARACAS1038

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CHAVEZ DECREES FORMATION OF MILITARY RESERVES

Identifier: 05CARACAS1038
Wikileaks: View 05CARACAS1038 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Caracas
Created: 2005-04-11 18:52:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV MARR VE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

111852Z Apr 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001038 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, VE 
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ DECREES FORMATION OF MILITARY RESERVES 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ABELARDO A. ARIAS FOR 1.4 (D) 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C)   Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez made official his 
plans to increase military reserves and call up a civilian 
militia with two decrees published April 4.  On his "Alo 
Presidente" program April 3, Chavez said the new military 
reserves will number more than 1.5 million and the rest of 
the population will be recruited to help defend the country 
in guerrilla warfare.  Both groups will answer to him through 
the command of Maj. Gen. Julio Quintero Viloria.  Referring 
to Venezuela's defense restructuring, National Land Institute 
director and former intelligence chief Eliecer Otaiza told a 
reporter that Venezuelans need to learn to "hate gringos" in 
preparation for war, a comment rejected by the Foreign 
Ministry.  Most opposition groups have focused their 
criticism on the alleged undemocratic and illegal nature of 
the reserves, issues that have little resonance with the 
public. 
 
--------------------- 
Clearing Up the Facts 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (U)  Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez issued two decrees 
published in the national gazette April 4 confirming he 
(Chavez) would command Venezuela's planned military reserves 
and direct the mobilization of civilians to help defend the 
country.  He designated Maj. Gen. Julio Quintero Viloria to 
oversee both projects for him.  The decree called for 
Quintero's participation in national security planning and 
gave him a voice--but not a vote--in meetings of the Defense 
Ministry and the unified command.  According to the decree, a 
change in a line item of the presidency's budget will finance 
the reserves after additional credit is authorized.  Chavez 
also outlined his plans for reserves and for "asymmetric" 
(that is, guerrilla) warfare during his "Alo Presidente" 
program broadcast from the site of the revolutionary Battle 
of Las Queseras in Apure State on its 186th anniversary April 
3.  Chavez quoted extensively from the description of the 
battle written by hero Gen. Jose Antonio Paez to show how 
civilians were essential to the war effort. 
 
3.  (U)  Questioned about the asymmetric doctrine, National 
Land Institute director and former intelligence chief Eliecer 
Otaiza told a reporter it was necessary to start "hating 
gringos," since US citizens would be on the front lines of 
the "asymmetric war."  Otaiza added that he did not agree 
with the thesis that Venezuela must confront the US President 
but not the American people.  (Note:  Chavez has often 
expressed that he has no quarrel with the American people.) 
Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez disavowed Otaiza's comments 
April 6, saying only he, as the President's foreign relations 
representative, can authoritatively speak about such affairs. 
 Countering Otaiza, the Ambassador expressed regret about the 
talk of hatred while the United States was seeking to improve 
bilateral relations.  Offering to resign if necessary, Otaiza 
then told the press he was only expressing his personal 
opinion, not endorsing hatred.  He brushed off further 
questions, saying everyone just needed to get the "Mickey 
Mouse stuff" out of their heads because it was time to talk 
ideology. 
 
4.  (U)  Defense Council chief Maj. Gen. Melvin Lopez 
Hidalgo, for his part, tap-danced further on the issue of 
whether civilians would be supplied weapons.  After attending 
a meeting Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel had called with 
senior officers March 29, Lopez told reporters that not all 
reservists would be armed.  Denying both the militarization 
of the civilian population and the politicization of the 
military, Lopez said that "there were different ways of 
defending the country."  Lopez explained the purchase of 
100,000 assault rifles from Russia by maintaining that the 
replacement of the military's current Belgian FAL rifles was 
years overdue. 
 
-------------------------------- 
How Many Reserves Will There Be? 
-------------------------------- 
 
5.  (U)  Chavez announced on "Alo Presidente" that the ranks 
of military reserves would be increased to "1.5 or 2 million" 
people, and that all 25 million Venezuelan citizens would be 
mobilized to defend the country.  At the end of the program, 
Gen. Quintero told Chavez he currently had only 80,000 
"passive reserves."  (Note:  "Passive reserves" probably 
refers to military personnel who have left the armed forces 
within the last five years.  These soldiers are legally 
obligated to return to active duty if called.)  Quintero said 
he had asked mayors to help raise the number to 1.4 million 
by recruiting ten percent of the population.  Without 
elaborating further, Quintero also alluded to the possibility 
of signing up 2,225,000 people. 
 
6.  (C)  The current number of military reserves on the rolls 
is unclear, but those who are mission ready are a small 
fraction of the 80,000 cited by Quintero.  According to a DAO 
source, as of 2003 the reserve force was no larger than 
5,000.  On the March 20 Alo Presidente program, Chavez 
questioned a reserve battalion commander in Barinas who said 
that of 3,025 registered reserves under his command, he only 
assembled about 700 for drills.  An active duty colonel told 
polcouns March 30 that if the military could not keep regular 
troops trained, it would seem unlikely that it would be able 
to prepare millions of reserves for combat. 
 
------------- 
Why Reserves? 
------------- 
 
7.  (U)  The opposition has criticized the proposed reserves 
primarily by questioning their purpose.  A retired military 
officer and legislators from both sides of the aisle debated 
the issue on an April 5 broadcast of the GOV-sponsored 
television station.  (The GOV is pulling out the stops to 
publicize the reserves, including by running color newspaper 
advertisements.)  In an email advocating Chavez's overthrow, 
a group calling itself the "national allied forces" described 
three "threats" the GOV planned to face with reserves:  the 
United States, Colombia, and internal dissidents.  Former 
Defense Minister Fernando Ochoa Antich likened the planned 
reserve force to Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega's 
"dignity battalions," which quickly disintegrated after 
experiencing thousands of casualties.  He posited that Chavez 
was beefing up reserves to create an alternate force that 
would follow him blindly, especially in the event of another 
military coup.  Doubting that Chavez really fears a US 
invasion, an editorial in an opposition-leaning newspaper 
commented that the reserves would be used to counter 
potential uprisings of civilian masses and military units. 
 
8.  (C)  With the exception of Primero Justicia (PJ), 
opposition political parties have argued against reserves by 
warning of creeping authoritarianism.  Christian democratic 
(COPEI) secretary general Cesar Perez Vivas said the GOV 
aimed to frighten the people and smother internal dissidence 
with the popular reserves, according to March 29 press 
reports.  Movement to Socialism (MAS) secretary general 
Leopoldo Puchi warned that a militia would "completely 
distort democratic life."  PJ officials, however, stuck to 
themes more poignant to Venezuelan voters such unemployment, 
poverty, and security.  One PJ spokesman listed social 
spending plans that could improve the living standards of 
millions of people if the GOV were to redirect what it 
allegedly spent on weapons. 
 
------------------------ 
The Legality of Reserves 
------------------------ 
 
9.  (U)  The opposition's objections have also focused on the 
alleged illegality of creating a civilian militia.  Because 
the organization of the reserves must be defined by organic 
law, the opposition has argued that any changes to the force 
would require a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly, as 
stipulated in the constitution.  According to press reports, 
the National Assembly's defense committee may submit a draft 
of the organic law of the armed forces, which will call for 
the mobilization of all willing citizens between the ages of 
18 and 50 who are mentally and physically capable, to the 
plenary chamber in mid-April.  (Note:  Pro-Chavez forces do 
not have the two-thirds vote in the assembly to pass an 
organic law on the military.  When faced with a similar 
 
situation regarding the judiciary, they simply did not label 
the law "organic," passed a law tailored to Chavez's needs, 
and packed the Supreme Court.) 
 
10.  (U)  Although the constitution does not specifically 
mention reserves, the opposition has also declared the 
militias themselves unconstitutional.  On the other hand, the 
Chavez administration maintains that its initiative is in 
keeping with constitutional principles.  Pro-Chavez chairman 
of the National Assembly's defense committee Edis Rios 
pointed out that the constitution holds "all natives and 
corporate bodies" in Venezuela responsible for the national 
defense. 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (U)  The purported threats from the United States, from 
popular uprisings, and from plotters within the military 
probably all have influenced Chavez to increase the reserves 
and make them accountable to him.  He also probably plans to 
use recruiting as a tool to stir up nationalistic support for 
his presidency in the manner that he employed the Electoral 
Battle Units so successfully before the recall referendum in 
August 2004.  (He is keeping the same acronym.)  The 
administration will not be able to train millions for combat, 
but this does not mean that Chavez will not be able to 
construct a corps for his "revolution."  The case of Otaiza's 
"hate" comments shows that whenever Chavez changes his 
message towards the United States, GOV spokesmen will 
inevitably take time to catch up.  We will continue to 
exploit the ensuing confusion. 
Brownfield 
 
 
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      2005CARACA01038 - CONFIDENTIAL 

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