US embassy cable - 05HARARE563

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR B. NEULING 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVILLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2010 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, ZI, March 05 Elections 
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE'S FLAWED ELECTION - WHAT THE NUMBERS SAY 
 
REF: (A) HARARE 508 (B) HARARE 502 (C) HARARE 501 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Inexplicably high voting totals, high 
voter turn-away rates, and manipulation of voter registration 
rolls appear to have been used in combination by the ruling 
ZANU-PF party in a large number of constituencies to ensure 
its &victory8 in Zimbabwe,s March 31 parliamentary 
elections.  The discrepancies in vote totals released by the 
Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC) early Friday morning and 
the &final8 results remain unexplained.  ZEC has suggested 
that the announced totals were &preliminary8 but has yet to 
provide hard data, such as tallies for polling stations, that 
could put suspicions of rigging to rest.  Preliminary figures 
developed by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) 
suggest an additional tactic -- that accredited observers 
were systematically excluded from certain polling stations 
that then returned results heavily skewed in ZANU-PF,s favor 
and that were enough to swing highly contested 
constituencies.  The MDC has, however, so far has failed to 
produce any semblance of a parallel vote count, undercutting 
its claims of fraud.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Discrepancies in Announced Vote Counts 
-------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Public charges by the MDC and others of GOZ 
vote-rigging revolve in part around gross discrepancies 
between figures released by ZEC at about 2 a.m. April 1 for 
the total number of ballots cast in constituencies from six 
out of Zimbabwe's ten provinces and the subsequently released 
final results for all constituencies.  As noted in ref B, the 
first red-flag went up when ZEC inexplicably failed to 
announce total ballots cast for the four remaining provinces 
in its 2 a.m. announcement.  Then, when total vote tallies 
for the candidates were released later in the next two days, 
the totals differed drastically from those first released. 
 
3.   (U) Some discrepancies in a national election might be 
expected, but the pattern in this election, which heavily 
favors the ruling party, as well as the high percentages 
involved, suggests rigging.  Of the 19 constituencies where 
the discrepancy exceeded 5,000, 18 were won by ZANU-PF. 
ZANU-PF won 15 of the 17 constituencies where the discrepancy 
alone exceeded the winning candidate's margin.  All but two 
of the constituencies in which the discrepancy exceeded 
either 5,000 or the margin were regarded by the MDC before 
the election as seats that were safely theirs or closely 
contested.  The fact that ZEC never released the total vote 
counts for the other four provinces and never explained why 
the announcement abruptly stopped has fueled additional 
suspicion. 
 
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Turn-Aways 
---------- 
 
4.  (U) The high rate of voter turn-away in other key 
constituencies is another likely indicator of ruling party 
manipulation.  The national turn-away rate was about 10 
percent, alarmingly high compared with typical figures of 2-3 
percent in other developing country nations.  In all more 
than 100,000 voters appear to have been turned away. 
Moreover, as reported in ref B, the figures varied 
significantly by constituency, tending to be higher in more 
contested areas.  Our embassy observers, for example, noted 
that turn-aways in the safe ZANU-PF constituency of Gokwe 
Central never exceeded ten at any polling station; in 
contested Gokwe South, some polling stations turned away more 
than 100. 
 
5.  (U) ZEC has yet to release a final tally of turn-aways at 
49 constituencies, including the Gokwe constituencies. 
However, at the constituencies for which ZEC has released 
turn-away figures, turn-away totals exceeded the candidate's 
margin of victory in five constituencies, three of which were 
won by the ruling party.  More telling is that the turn-away 
figures combined with the discrepancies in ZEC's announced 
tallies exceed the candidates' margin of victory in 24 
constituencies ) 20 of them won by ZANU-PF. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Vote Totals Indicate Imported Voters 
------------------------------------ 
 
6.  (SBU) Voter turnout across the country generally was 
lower than in the 2000 parliamentary elections.  The few 
constituencies that saw an increase in ballots cast were 
typically heavily contested rural seats, all taken by 
ZANU-PF.  In each of the two urban Manicaland constituencies 
retained by the MDC, for example, vote totals declined since 
2000 (despite reports of net urban inflow from drought-ridden 
rural areas).  By contrast, vote counts increased in all 
three of the rural seats in the region that shifted to 
ZANU-PF control, highlighting the importance of "new voters" 
in the ruling party victory. 
 
7.  (SBU) By way of illustration, Chimanimani had 19,842 
ballots cast in 2000 with a 3338 MDC margin of victory.  In 
2005, 26,848 ballots were cast (or 23,896 per ZEC's 2 a.m. 
announcement) in the constituency with a 4,786 margin in 
ZANU-PF's favor.  Principally responsible for the anomalous 
increase and shift to the ruling party was the reported 
resettling of thousands of soldiers, police, war veterans, 
and ruling party supporters in the constituency over the past 
year, much of it associated with the violent seizure of MDC 
MP Roy Bennett's large farm there. 
 
8.  (SBU) Harare South presents an urban example.  In 2000, 
the MDC won the seat by a margin of 7,700 votes with a total 
of 17,160 votes cast.  This year, the total jumped to 22,261 
(22,403 per ZEC's early announcement) and yielded the seat to 
the ruling party by a margin of just 829 votes.  Largely 
responsible for the boost in totals and the shift in control 
was a gerrymandering that reportedly brought police barracks 
and recently resettled populations ) all largely pro-ZANU-PF 
- into the constituency. 
 
----------------------------- 
ZEC: The Dog That Didn't Bark 
----------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) At a press conference April 7, ZEC Chairperson 
Justice George Chiweshe asserted that the initially announced 
figures were preliminary and not authoritative (not something 
mentioned when the figures were originally released), but did 
not explain why they differed so significantly from final 
figures or why figures were not originally announced for four 
of Zimbabwe's ten provinces.  He said the ZEC had remained 
silent on the issue for so long because it had not received 
any formal complaint until the MDC filed its complaint on 
April 6.  ZEC has also continued to withhold the polling 
station-by-polling station results necessary to analyze the 
integrity of the polling station and constituency-wide 
tabulations and has given no indication it ever intends to 
release the data. 
 
------------------------- 
Preliminary ZESN Figures 
------------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Preliminary data collected by ZESN is still being 
collated and analyzed.  ZESN observers numbered more than 
6,000 and covered most polling stations in the country. 
Nonetheless, they were barred from selected polling stations, 
which suggests that the ruling party may have had a number of 
polling stations to which it controlled access and therefore 
the results.  Indeed, figures for polling stations ZESN 
observed sometimes yielded anomalous results suggestive of 
ruling party control of voters for that station, if not the 
results.  For example, in Chipinge North, a seat ZANU-PF took 
from an MDC incumbent, most polling stations reportedly went 
for the MDC by fairly close margins, with ZANU-PF winning the 
few polling stations it took by margins as high as six to 
one. 
 
11.  (SBU) ZESN data for at least one constituency also tips 
possible rigging at the constituency tabulation level.  Nine 
out of ten representative polling stations it reported 
results for in Mutasa South, another heavily contested rural 
constituency reclaimed by ZANU-PF, went for the MDC often by 
wide margins.  Only one small polling station went for 
ZANU-PF, suggesting that the aggregate figure that gave a 
narrow election to the ZANU-PF candidate was fabricated at 
the constituency tabulating level. 
 
-------------------- 
Waiting for MDC Data 
-------------------- 
 
12.  (C) The MDC has put out several press releases 
highlighting doubts raised by discrepancies in ZEC's 
conflicting reports but has yet to release its own polling 
data for any constituency.  MDC contacts tell us they are 
getting close to releasing data.  However, some have confided 
to us that the quality of MDC polling agents has been a 
considerable handicap and it remains unclear when the party 
will be able to release comprehensive data for any 
constituency.  Meanwhile every day that passes lessens the 
impact when and if MDC ever does release a parallel count. 
 
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Distorting Pre-Election Flaws 
----------------------------- 
 
13.  (SBU) The reported numbers suggest rigging at both the 
polling center and constituency center tabulations.  However, 
myriad fundamental flaws in Zimbabwe's pre-election 
environment also contributed to the skewed results and may 
have played a direct role in ZANU-PF's ability to generate 
the numbers it needed to win contested seats.  For example, 
the GOZ undertook vigorous voter registration drives 
targeting likely ruling party supporters in the months before 
voter registration closed, while much of the country remained 
a no-go area for opposition until after registration closed. 
The GOZ's flagrantly partisan disbursement of food and other 
largesse to perpetuate public dependence on the ruling party 
further bolstered "support" for ZANU-PF, especially in rural 
areas.  Subtle and not-so-subtle intimidation and the 
influence of co-opted chiefs further explain the high 
turn-out for ZANU-PF in key polling stations.  By contrast, a 
legacy of fear and apathy built on the experience of two 
previous elections may have suppressed opposition turn-out, 
notwithstanding the encouraging attendance at campaign 
rallies in the final weeks.  Emigration has also decimated 
urban, educated, and professional population segments that 
figure largely in the MDC's base. 
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Comment 
------- 
 
14.  (C) None of this yet amounts to definitive "proof" of 
massive fraud, but the preponderance of evidence shows a 
clear pattern.  ZEC's continuing refusal to release polling 
station data lends credence to those who assume the worst -- 
that the most suspicious numbers and discrepancies indicate 
electoral fraud on the part of the GOZ.  However, until the 
MDC and ZESN tally up and release their own data to 
contradict ZEC's announced results it will be difficult to 
fully determine now how and how much the GOZ rigged this 
election.  The inability to prove fraud in a court of law is 
one issued, but the failure of ZESN and MDC to make strong 
public cases demonstrating detectable patterns is hurting 
their ability to make the case in the only venue that really 
counts: the court of public opinion. 
 
15.  (C) If there is a silver lining in Zimbabwe's clouded 
election results, it is that international and domestic 
pressure have pushed the ruling party to more remote redoubts 
of cheating.  This may make it easier to help the MDC and 
others prepare to counter the cheating in the next election, 
but that will require international, and most importantly, 
regional pressure on the GOZ and ZANU-PF to shine more light 
on the deliberately opaque vote-counting process. 
 
 
Dell