US embassy cable - 05ANKARA2076

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 ANKARA 002076 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, ECON, MARR, PHUM, TU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR TURKISH MFA U/S TUYGAN'S VISIT TO 
WASHINGTON 
 
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons, 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Turkish MFA U/S Tuygan comes to Washington 
with the GOT continuing to talk about a strategic partnership 
but with bilateral relations troubled by an absence of 
clarity on Turkish direction and intent.  Ruling AKP 
officials publicly deny any bilateral problems or blame them 
on U.S. policies.  Aside from the Turkish General Staff 
leadership, few Turkish officials publicly defend the 
relationship with vigor or consistency, and rivalry between 
PM Erdogan and FM Gul, and their distance from State 
institutions, hampers our ability to get our points across or 
elicit a coherent, timely response.  Nevertheless, Turkey 
remains important to many U.S. initiatives.  Tuygan needs to 
hear clearly what Turkey should do to help relations grow 
instead of falter. 
 
2.  (C) The GOT is now working more in parallel with U.S. 
interests in Iraq, but serious tensions remain, particularly 
over the PKK.  The Turks must decide how to continue their 
valuable help in Afghanistan.  Turkey's objections to Cyprus' 
participation in NATO/EU consultations absent fulfillment of 
EU commitments to Turkish Cypriots blocks progress on NATO/EU 
cooperation.  Turkey's EU drive has lost momentum and the 
Religious Affairs Directorate's anti-missionary campaign has 
raised the profile of religious tolerance issues.  The GOT 
continues to resist our efforts to break the stalemate in 
Turkish/Armenian relations.  The Turks are partners in BMENAI 
but have been unhelpful on Lebanon/Syria.  Both we and the 
Turks want to continue high-level economic contacts and to 
work out serious bilateral trade problems.  While 
anti-terrorism cooperation remains active, Ankara needs to 
move more on blocking terrorist finances and preventing human 
trafficking.  End Summary. 
 
Turkey's Drift 
-------------- 
 
3. (C) Tuygan's visit comes as the AKP government, although 
still widely popular and without a viable political 
alternative, is showing itself incapable of sustaining good 
governance or domestic reform.  The government seems 
unwilling to confront a resurgence of intolerant nationalist 
sentiments.  In foreign policy, although Erdogan and Gul 
claim to seek good ties with the U.S. and membership in the 
EU, they don't seem to know how to get there. 
 
4. (C) Clinging to a narrow circle of ill-informed advisors, 
Erdogan continues to base his governing style on (by now 
formulaic) charisma and constant foreign travel rather than 
on ensuring effective coordination between his Cabinet and 
parliamentary group.  Moreover, he has not built working 
relations with core institutions of the State (armed forces, 
National Intelligence Organization, judiciary, bureaucracy), 
which -- despite a lower public profile -- remain highly 
influential and highly wary of AKP.  He appears to understand 
that Gul is working to undermine him, but hasn't chosen to 
take Gul on in either domestic or foreign policy arenas. 
 
US-Turkey Relations 
------------------- 
 
5. (C) Successful elections in Iraq and Secretary Rice's 
early February visit slowed growth of anti-Americanism in 
Turkey.  The MFA appears to favor energizing the relationship 
but has come forward with little beyond suggesting more 
frequent high level visits.  Moreover, the MFA's influence on 
Erdogan and Gul is held in check owing to Erdogan's distrust 
of the bureaucracy and Gul's apparent metering of the flow of 
information from the MFA to the Prime Minister.  Although 
Erdogan (grudgingly) and Gul (unevenly) have spoken up in 
support of the relationship from time to time, the GOT must 
do much more to help restore public confidence in bilateral 
relations.  The reminder that alliances between democracies 
require public support has been useful in getting the GOT to 
start weighing in with public opinion, but the GOT needs to 
do much more to give political impetus to the relationship. 
 
Dealing with the PKK 
-------------------- 
 
6. (S) Turkish government and military leaders understand 
that responsibility for dealing with terrorists within Iraq's 
borders will increasingly pass to the Iraqis.  In hosting the 
January 2005 trilateral PKK talks, the Turks signaled their 
willingness to work together with the Iraqis on this shared 
problem.  Still, they, and the public at large, remain bitter 
over their perception that the U.S. has taken no steps in 
Iraq to fulfill our consistent pledge that that country will 
no longer be a base for terrorist operations against Turkey 
and they expect the U.S. to remain engaged in the effort. 
Some Turks, including some in the military, harbor the belief 
that the U.S. acquiesces to (or supports) the PKK's presence 
in Iraq and they continually cite unsubstantiated reports of 
U.S./PKK meetings.  Public attention may re-focus on the PKK 
in the wake of a recently-begun Turkish operation aimed at a 
reported 1500 PKK militants in southeastern Turkey's Cudi 
Mountain.  The Turks believe PKK operatives there are 
preparing for a major Spring offensive.  In an April 7 speech 
to the War Academies President Sezer reiterated that it is 
time for the U.S. to take action. 
 
7. (C) The trilateral talks remain a focus, with the U.S. 
role more one of facilitator.  The Turks and Iraqis should 
outline concrete steps to pave the way for actions against 
the PKK, including establishing an intelligence-sharing 
mechanism, and holding a legal experts, meeting after the ITG 
is in place, discussing issues related to closure of PKK 
front offices and media outlets in northern Iraq and handling 
of known PKK terrorists who are arrested.  MNF-I is in the 
process of disseminating a list of PKK leaders to units in 
the field that will allow them to detain those individuals 
when they come into our custody. This is a small but an 
important step by MNF-I and, once executed, should be 
appreciated by the Turks.  However, the Turks will not be 
satisfied if we defer more to the Iraqis, and will pocket 
measures taken and ask for more. 
 
Incirlik Cargo Hub 
------------------ 
 
8. (S) U.S. Transportation Command Commander GEN Handy was in 
Ankara on April 11.  Although Handy did not see Tuygan, DCHOD 
GEN Basbug raised our long-standing request for a logistics 
hub at Incirlik to support OEF and OIF and said TGS supports 
our request.  We understand TGS and MFA have been working 
with ministers on this proposal recently.  For the past 
several months we have refrained from talking about the hub 
request in order not to feed existent and very misplaced 
expectations in some parts of the Turkish government and 
bureaucracy that Turkey can get something from us in 
exchange.  Fed misleading views by some in the GOT, Turkish 
media have asserted the U.S. administration is using the 
threat of a Congressional Armenian genocide resolution to 
force a positive Turkish answer on the hub request. 
 
EU Accession and Reform Efforts 
------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Despite GOT denials, Turkey,s EU drive has lost 
momentum since the EU in December set a date to open 
accession talks.  PM Erdogan has yet to name a lead EU 
negotiator and, contrary to Gul's and others' assertions, the 
GOT has made little progress in organizing the bureaucracy to 
prepare for the process of adopting the 80,000-page EU aquis. 
 The EU, for its part, has also delayed certain steps related 
to Turkey's candidacy, largely to avoid influencing the 
upcoming French referendum on the EU constitution. 
 
10. (C) EU Troika representatives were disappointed to 
discover during their March visit to Turkey that the GOT has 
developed no plans for further human rights reforms.  The 
Troika visit was overshadowed by the violent March 6 police 
crackdown on International Women's Day demonstrators in 
Istanbul.  PM Erdogan and other GOT leaders disgusted the EU 
by reacting aggressively and in an anti-foreign mode when 
asked about the Istanbul incident, with repeated public 
statements implying that police were not to blame. 
 
11. (C) The GOT's Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) 
recently launched a campaign to counter the "threat" of 
missionaries in Turkey.  The Diyanet wrote and distributed a 
sermon delivered in mosques across the country March 11 
equating missionaries in Turkey today with the Crusaders of 
centuries past.  State Minister Aydin, who oversees the 
Diyanet, and Interior Minister Aksu responded recently issued 
written statements with even worse language.  Aydin called 
missionary activities "separatist and destructive" and 
implied they are part of a campaign by foreign governments to 
create divisions in Turkish society.  We have seen a recent 
up-tick in threats and harassment of Christians in Turkey. 
 
12. (C) The Turkish Parliament voted March 31 to delay 
implementation of the new Penal Code until June 1 -- the 
legislation was scheduled to take effect April 1 -- to allow 
time to make amendments, especially concerning press freedom. 
 MPs have not yet prepared the list of proposed amendments. 
The delay also provides an opportunity for Parliament to 
eliminate controversial language in the "reasoning" attached 
to Article 305, which states that persons could be convicted 
for accepting payment from foreign sources for the purpose of 
conducting propaganda in favor of withdrawing troops from 
Cyprus or "saying that Armenians were subject to a genocide 
at the end of World War I." 
 
Greece/Aegean 
------------- 
 
13. (C) Turkish military flights over the Aegean have 
returned to 2003 levels.  The Turks flew significantly fewer 
sorties than normal in 2004 due to the Cyprus negotiations, 
the Athens Olympics, and the runup to the December EU Summit. 
 Tuygan will likely express annoyance at public Greek 
complaints and recite the (correct) Turkish arguments that 
Greek complaints about "FIR infringements" are baseless, 
since ICAO rules exempt national flights from any 
notification requirement; that Athens never reciprocated the 
steps Turkey took in 2003 (reducing flights and reducing the 
weapons their planes carry when flying in the Aegean); and 
that Athens' 10 NM territorial air claim is inconsistent with 
international law.  The Turks and the Greeks recently agreed 
on a series of CBMs, although none directly connected to the 
Aegean, and political engagement moves forward with exchanges 
of ministerial visits accelerating. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
14. (C) Reflecting a reluctant but step-by-step evolution in 
GOT thinking in the wake of Iraq's January elections, Tuygan 
is generally supportive of U.S. efforts to build Iraq's 
democratic future.  He will say that Turkey,s goals for Iraq 
are the same as ours.  At the same time, he will be conscious 
of Turkish public opinion, which is overwhelmingly negative 
toward U.S. intervention in Iraq and our approach to the 
Middle East.  Tuygan will point out that, despite this 
negative public opinion, Turkey has provided assistance:  its 
offer to send peacekeepers in 2003, use of Incirlik Air Base 
tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF), and transit (via Habur gate) of supplies for our 
forces and humanitarian goods.  Turkey is active in 
reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for 
Iraq, and training in Turkey of Iraqi diplomats, Sunni 
political groups and, as its main contribution to the NATO 
training mission, Iraqi security forces.  So far the Iraqis 
have turned down Turkish offers to train Iraqi officers in 
Turkey under NTM-I.  Turkey could consider sending 
significantly more Turkish trainers to Iraq, which appears to 
be the Iraqis, preference, but there seems to be little 
appetite in Ankara. 
 
15. (C) While we believe Tuygan has helped influence the 
GOT's generally more positive approach to Iraq since January 
30 elections there, he is likely to refer to concerns which 
have long been a part of the GOT,s approach:  Turkish 
frustration and anger over a perceived lack of U.S. action 
against the PKK in northern Iraq, Kurdish separatism and 
designs on Kirkuk, treatment of the Iraqi Turkmen population, 
and attacks against Turkish truck drivers. 
 
Caucasus: Georgia 
----------------- 
 
16. (C) Although the Turks participate in training Georgian 
security forces, Ankara stays closely attuned to Russian 
views and has not gone much beyond pro forma expressions of 
support for Georgia's sovereignty and independence.  Turkey 
was slow to understand and accept the Rose Revolution and 
there are still many in the government who see Georgia's 2003 
change as merely part of a regions-wide plan orchestrated by 
Soros and the USG.  On Abkhazia and South Ossetia Turkey does 
not display an active diplomacy except to urge the end to the 
blockade of Abkhazia.  On Ajara the Turks remained supportive 
of Abashidze until the last minute and facilitated Russian 
emissaries' arrival in Batumi. 
 
Caucasus: Azerbaijan 
-------------------- 
 
17. (C) Seeing the Minsk process as going nowhere, Turkey 
remains publicly committed to supporting Azerbaijani demands 
for a return of the territories occupied by Armenia and at 
various times has linked development of bilateral relations 
with Armenia to resolution of, or significant progress on, 
N-K.  However, Turkey appears less committed to Ilhan Aliyev 
than it was earlier to Haydar. 
 
Caucasus: Armenia 
----------------- 
 
18. (C) Turkish/Armenian relations are stalemated not only by 
Armenian refusal to issue a clear acceptance of Turkish 
territorial integrity and the border, but also by Turkish 
insistence on linking improvements to Armenian concessions on 
occupied Azeri territory.  There are no official diplomatic 
relations; the border remains closed.  The last bilateral 
meetings were in the fall of 2004 and, even then, the 
meetings were making no progress.  Indirect bilateral trade 
(via Georgia) and very modest people-to-people contacts 
continue.  Armenia would materially help a breakthrough by 
explicit recognition of the Turkey/Armenia border. 
 
19. (C) Public debate on the Armenian genocide question has 
become substantially more open.  Nevertheless, Turkey's 
Parliament recently began a public campaign to "prove" Turkey 
did not commit genocide through proposed "scientific, 
historical" research by Turkish and Armenian scholars.  Over 
the past year, the MFA has turned a deaf ear to our advice 
that improvements in Turkish/Armenian relations are the best 
way Turkey could help itself on this score. 
 
Central Asia 
------------ 
 
20. (C) Turkey's aims remain at the scaled-back level which 
they fell to after an initial post-1991 rush of expectation 
that Central Asia would embrace Turkic solidarity.  Ankara 
finds Karimov and Niyazov difficult to deal with and 
relations with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are flat; 
educational exchange and some business investment motivate 
relations with Kazakhstan.  Turkey was initially hesitant to 
accept change in Kyrgyzstan as coming from the aspirations of 
the Kyrgyz.  Some, such as Prime Ministry foreign policy 
advisor and Gul associate Ahmet Davutoglu, see "Eurasian" 
cooperation with Russia as the way to reestablish a dynamic 
Turkish presence in Central Asia.  On an unofficial level, 
the Islamist lodge of Fethullah Gulen continues to run 
schools in Central Asia. 
 
Russia 
------ 
 
21. (C) With trade (heavily in Russia's favor owing to 
massive natural gas exports to Turkey) and tourism (two 
million Russians expected in 2005) booming, the GOT sees 
Russia as a promising partner.  So far Erdogan does not seem 
to have accepted Putin's invitation -- expressed in Ankara in 
December and Moscow in January -- for a Russo-Turkish 
strategic partnership as an alternative to the U.S. and EU. 
The Turkish press remains loathe to analyze Russia 
critically.  Given the low level of analysis of Russia's 
realities (e.g., public health disaster, anti-Turkish 
nationalism), Turks' awe at Russia's size, and lack of 
concern at Putin's move to more authoritarian governance, the 
"Eurasia" alternative remains a preferred alternative for 
anti-Western nationalist-autarkists on left and right. 
 
Ukraine 
------- 
 
22. (C) The GOT, heavily Moscow-centric and with weak 
analytic capabilities, showed scant interest in the Orange 
Revolution except to interpret it as another part of a 
Soros-USG master plan. 
 
NATO/EU 
------- 
 
23. (C) On NATO/EU cooperation, Tuygan will say the Turks 
cannot permit Cyprus' (i.e., the Greek Cypriots') 
participation in these discussions absent the EU steps to 
ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots (TCs), steps the 
Turks assumed would happen after Turkey supported the Annan 
plan and helped persuade the TCs to support it as well. 
Cyprus considerations trump Turkey,s parallel interest in 
promoting NATO-EU cooperation, and without EU taking steps 
for the TCs the Turks are not willing to break the logjam. 
24. (C) The Turks have taken two relatively small steps on 
this issue:  they allowed NATO to give defense planning 
software (NDPASS) to the EU, and are also allowing NATO,s 
NC3 Agency to provide technical assistance to the EU.  But 
recently an MFA official pleaded with us not to mention this 
information to Turkish politicians, implying that lower 
levels in the bureaucracy and the military essentially slid 
this item past Turkey,s leaders. 
 
The Black Sea 
------------- 
 
25. (C) If Tuygan raises Black Sea security, he will note 
that the Turks are committed to increasing their naval 
engagement and cooperation with other Black Sea littoral 
nations, but fear a robust NATO or U.S. maritime presence in 
the Black Sea might anger the Russians and make them pull 
away from participation in Turkey's Black Sea maritime 
initiatives, the on-call force of all littoral navies, 
BLACKSEAFOR, and the counter-trafficking operation, BLACK SEA 
HARMONY.  The Turks have proposed to their BLACKSEAFOR 
colleagues to multilateralize the Turks, BLACK SEA HARMONY 
operation, in which Turkey monitors suspicious sea traffic 
and reports the data to NATO.  In Turkey,s concept, all the 
Black Sea littorals would monitor traffic and report the 
results to each other as well as the Alliance with little or 
no involvement of other countries; when all participants are 
comfortable with cooperative operations, then the operation 
could be affiliated with NATO. 
 
26. (C) While we need to continue to engage with the Turks to 
seek a cooperative relationship on the Black Sea, we should 
be careful about how we seek an enhanced U.S. role (in any 
event, the Montreux Treaty severely limits the presence of 
non-littoral military vessels in the Black Sea).  Too 
vigorous a U.S. approach would increase Turkish resistance 
and confirm for many Turks, including the military, their 
belief that we are anxious to amend or scrap altogether the 
Montreux Convention. We should encourage their efforts to 
work with the other littorals while reminding them that, for 
NATO's sake, we have an interest in what they are doing and 
would appreciate being able to observe BLACKSEAFOR exercises 
or BLACK SEA HARMONY operations. 
 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
27. (C) Turkey is a partner in the Broader Middle East and 
North Africa Initiative.  Turkey, Italy and Yemen co-sponsor 
the Democracy Assistance Dialogue (DAD); the Turks will host 
the first substantive DAD meeting, focusing 
on women's issues, in Istanbul this June. 
 
28. (C) PM Gul visited Israel and the Palestinian territories 
in January.  PM Erdogan plans to go May 1-3; the Israelis 
hoped for an Erdogan visit early this year and now view a May 
visit as too late to be of political significance.  At the 
same time the Israelis are deftly playing on GOT sentiments 
by being the first to announce support for Turkey's bid for a 
UNSC seat for 2009-2010.  The Turks fancy themselves possible 
mediators between Israelis and Palestinians but lack the 
influence with either party to exercise that role.  Turkey 
could play 
a more useful role in Palestinian reconstruction or 
facilitating people-to-people contact. 
 
29. (C) The Turks have been unhelpful on Syria.  Their 
support for UNSCR 1559 was tardy, weak and grudging.  The 
GOT views Assad as a would-be reformer who needs to be 
supported against old-guard Syrian Ba'athists; FM Gul has 
publicly stated as much.  The MFA worries that Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon or regime change in Damascus will 
threaten "stability."  Tuygan's visit comes on the heels of 
the visit President Sezer is paying to Damascus despite our 
urging a postponement.  Tuygan will depict the visit as 
merely a return of Assad's 2004 visit to Turkey and will 
assure us Sezer privately raised Lebanon, Syrian support for 
terrorism and other topics of interest to the USG.  Whatever 
Sezer says in private, the Turks have done little to dispel 
the public perception of support for Assad and his policies, 
and the Sezer visit will have given Assad the impression that 
he is not isolated. 
Afghanistan: Looking Beyond ISAF VII 
------------------------------------ 
 
30. (S) Turkey's current efforts for Afghanistan have been 
valuable:  leading ISAF VII; permitting use of Incirlik AB 
for tanker aircraft, cargo and detainee movement and the 
transit of Italian equipment for the PRT in Herat; $10 
million in development assistance.  The Turks need to look 
beyond August (when the Turks give up command of ISAF VII) at 
what they can contribute to Afghanistan's long-term 
stability.  The obvious answer would be Turkish leadership of 
a PRT, but the Turks have been reluctant to do this outside 
of certain areas they prefer and with which they are already 
experienced (i.e., certain areas in the north).  To be fair, 
the Turks got mixed signals from the Alliance and us when 
they offered to lead a PRT about a year ago.  While Tuygan 
will likely not be enthusiastic about the PRT idea, some in 
Congress and elsewhere may again question the Turks, 
commitment to Afghanistan if they do not have a plan for how 
to contribute following their handover of ISAF command to the 
Italians. 
 
Economic Partnership Commission 
------------------------------- 
 
31. (C) The MFA Under Secretary traditionally co-chairs 
meetings of the Economic Partnership Commission (EPC) with E. 
 The last meeting, in December 2003, resulted in a list of 
recommendations on trade and investment disputes, which have 
only been partially followed up on the Turkish side.  A 
structural problem with the EPC is that the Turkish MFA does 
not have economic policy responsibilities congruent with 
those of the State Department.  The MFA is interested in 
pursuing the arrangement and is developing agenda proposals 
for a next meeting, which they would host in Ankara.  We 
should continue high-level contacts and address issues of 
interest to our business communities in expanding bilateral 
trade and investment, as well as potential U.S.-Turkish 
economic cooperation in third countries, such as the Balkans, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the Middle East (excluding 
Iran and Syria). 
 
Terrorism Finance 
----------------- 
 
32. (C) In contrast to otherwise good cooperation in the 
Global War on Terrorism, Turkey's efforts to block terrorist 
financing have fallen short.  Given Turkey's proximity to the 
Middle East and some domestic sympathy for terrorist 
objectives, this constitutes a worrisome weak link in the 
global financial system.  Progress in improving its weak 
legal regime and enforcement capability has been glacial. 
Although the MFA does not have direct responsibility, it is 
an advocate of greater international cooperation and 
compliance with international agreements (the UN's Counter 
Terrorism Committee, for example, has identified deficiencies 
in the legal treatment of terrorism finance) and the 
Financial Action Task Force recommendations.  Ankara needs a 
strong, clear message of the importance we put on a 
functional anti-terror finance regime that can make Turkey a 
full partner with us and Europe. 
 
Trade 
----- 
 
33. (C) We have serious problems in our bilateral trade 
relationship.   The research-based pharmaceutical industry 
is deeply concerned about inadequate protection for 
confidential testing data, and a quota system for rice and 
 
SIPDIS 
corn imports discriminates against U.S. and other foreign 
producers.  The Ambassador and senior Washington officials 
have raised both issues repeatedly at the highest levels in 
Turkey, and U.S. delegates have questioned the quota system 
at WTO meetings in Geneva.  We have not succeeded, however, 
in getting the Turkish government to understand the gravity 
of the situation.  Their refusal to discuss the issues (the 
Turks have not responded to repeated USTR request to schedule 
a meeting of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
Council) could leave the U.S. with no alternative to invoking 
bilateral trade measures, such as limiting GSP privileges 
(which were worth nearly $1 billion to Turkish exporters last 
year) and/or going to the WTO's dispute resolution 
mechanisms.  Our bilateral relationship does not need these 
additional irritants; Turkey should work with us to resolve 
problems. 
 
Trafficking in Persons 
---------------------- 
 
34. (U) Turkey is a transit and destination country for women 
and children trafficked primary for sexual exploitation. 
Most victims come from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union.  The GOT still does not fully comply with the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking. 
 
35. (U) However, Turkey's recent efforts are expected to move 
it from the Tier 2 Watch List to Tier 2 in 2005:  Turkish 
authorities stepped up training of law enforcement personnel 
to increase victim identification and end automatic 
deportation;  increased punishments for trafficking; signed 
an anti-trafficking MOU with Belarus; implemented a protocol 
for victim referrals with an NGO shelter; and distributed 
anti-trafficking brochures.  We should not inform Tuygan that 
Turkey is expected to move up to Tier 2 since the decision is 
not final.  However, it would be useful to impress on him 
that the anti-TIP effort remains a top USG (and EU) priority 
and that we will continue to monitor and seek to work closely 
with Turkey to help strengthen the Turkish effort. 
EDELMAN