US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1724

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001724 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: KMT VICE CHAIR CHIANG SEEKS USG HELP IN FORGING 
CROSS-STRAIT CONSENSUS 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: KMT Vice Chairman P.K. Chiang urged the USG 
to intervene in public and private to urge the Chen 
administration and KMT leadership to cooperate on 
cross-Strait policy.  Chiang, who provided the Director a 
readout of his recent trip to the Mainland, expressed concern 
that mounting domestic political acrimony over the recent 
KMT-CCP contacts may undermine prospects for progress in 
cross-Strait relations.  Chiang said he would urge KMT 
Chairman Lien Chan to meet with President Chen Shui-bian 
before Lien's upcoming visit to Beijing and asked AIT to 
encourage the Chen government to create a positive atmosphere 
for such a meeting.  Chiang acknowledged the risk of the KMT 
facilitating PRC "united front" tactics, but said that if 
Lien could travel to Beijing with President Chen's blessing, 
his visit could serve as a major boost for Chen, Lien, and, 
most importantly, the people of Taiwan.  AIT will continue to 
reinforce the need for cooperation with leaders on both sides 
of the partisan divide.  We also concur with Chiang's 
suggestion of continued USG public statements to build on the 
helpful April 6 HIRC testimony given by EAP DAS Schriver. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) KMT Vice Chairman P.K. Chiang, accompanied by former 
TECRO Washington Rep. Ding Mou-shih, hosted the AIT Director 
to lunch April 11 to provide a readout on his late March 
visit to Beijing (Septel) and discuss growing domestic 
political tensions over the KMT's ongoing contacts with the 
PRC.  Chiang emphasized that his purpose for leading the KMT 
delegation to Beijing was not to usurp the government's 
authority to conduct cross-Strait negotiations, but rather to 
create a positive atmosphere for officials on the two sides 
to move ahead on economic and other exchanges that would 
improve the livelihood of the Taiwan people.  Chiang said 
that it was in this spirit that he personally delivered a 
detailed readout of his visit to Premier Frank Hsieh.  Chiang 
added that it would be tragic if the partisan bickering that 
grew out of his March visit ended up undermining prospects 
for improved cross-Strait relations. 
 
Chen-Lien Meeting Critical 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Chiang said he was fully aware of the sophistication 
of Beijing's "united front" tactics, and stated that it was 
not in the KMT's interests to fall into their trap.  Chiang 
said that a domestic consensus, with support from the 
government, was a precondition for any real progress in 
cross-Strait relations.  In this context, Chiang said he 
would encourage KMT Chairman Lien Chan to meet with President 
Chen Shui-bian before traveling to Beijing later in the year. 
 Chiang asserted that without the President's support, Lien's 
visit would be largely meaningless.  However, if Lien could 
talk to Beijing with the President's blessing, Chiang said 
the visit could achieve a "win-win-win" for Lien, Chen, and, 
most importantly, the Taiwan people.  Chiang added that a 
Chen-Lien meeting should not only be limited to discussing 
Lien's Beijing trip, but should also provide a forum for the 
two leaders to discuss the range of issues, including 
economic policy and Legislative Yuan (LY) action on the 
special defense procurement budget.  Chiang cautioned that 
without a Chen-Lien meeting, passage of any major legislation 
in the current LY session may be difficult. 
 
Fear and Loathing in Taipei 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Chiang noted, however, that prospects for a Chen-Lien 
summit are complicated by the deep level of mutual distrust 
and increasingly strident rhetoric emanating from both camps. 
 Chiang bemoaned the negative language Chen employed in his 
April 9 speech inviting Lien to meet (Note: on April 9, Chen 
offered to meet with Lien and even endorse his Beijing visit, 
but in the next breath he accused Lien of only caring about 
China, not Taiwan. End Note).  Chiang acknowledged that his 
own party has its hard-liners as well.  He added that many of 
Lien's advisors are urging him not to respond to Chen's offer 
to meet, recalling the negative experience of Lien's last 
meeting with Chen in 2001 over the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. 
 
U.S. Can Play a Critical Role 
----------------------------- 
5. (C) In this context, Chiang urged the USG to employ a mix 
of public and private messages to encourage Taiwan's 
political leaders to work towards a consensus.  Ambassador 
Ding commented that while the April 6 testimony by EAP DAS 
Schriver was helpful, the Taiwan media either underplayed the 
story or distorted Schriver's comments.  Ding suggested that 
repeated, clear messages about the importance for domestic 
consensus and cross-Strait engagement would help create a 
more positive domestic atmosphere.  Chiang also asked AIT to 
urge President Chen to "tone down" the public language he has 
been using towards the KMT in order to preserve room for 
future contacts. 
 
Comment: Fostering Moderation 
----------------------------- 
 
6. (C) President Chen's April 9 "offer" to endorse Lien's 
visit notwithstanding, neither side shows much appetite for 
conciliation.  Voices of moderation like Chiang's are in 
short supply, and hard-liners on both sides are actively 
twisting past USG policy statements to advance their own 
partisan agendas.  To counter this trend, AIT will continue 
to privately press leaders in both political camps to move 
towards a cross-Strait policy consensus and explore 
opportunities for public diplomacy.  AIT has already widely 
disseminated the text of DAS Schriver's remarks.  We endorse 
Chiang's suggestion for further public statements out of 
Washington.  If some sort of domestic consensus can be 
achieved ahead of Lien's visit, it could potentially 
facilitate the first real progress in cross-Strait relations 
in almost seven years.  However, if the two sides fail to 
move beyond partisan gamesmanship, it may result in yet 
another long-period of legislative gridlock and cross-Strait 
policy inertia. 
PAAL