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| Identifier: | 05AMMAN2909 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05AMMAN2909 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Amman |
| Created: | 2005-04-11 07:11:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PTER PREL IZ JO |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 002909
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015
TAGS: PTER, PREL, IZ, JO
SUBJECT: THINKING AHEAD: IRAQ TRAINING PROGRAMS IN JORDAN
UNDER THE ITG
REF: A. AMMAN 02714
B. BAGHDAD 01247
Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (C) The recent row between Jordan and Iraq sparked by
alleged Jordanian suicide bomber Ra'ed al-Banna demonstrated
how brittle this bilateral relationship can be when
mismanaged (on the Jordanian side in this instance) and how
much emotional baggage the Iraqis in particular bring to the
relationship. King Abdullah and the GOJ remain fully aware
of their strategic interest in continuing to develop robust,
multi-layered relations with the Iraqi government and
emerging Iraqi institutions. This commitment includes doing
all in their power to help stabilize and consolidate
authority in Iraq, principally through the provision of
facilities and staff to train Iraqis in many different
fields, including badly needed security and military training
(ref A). Jordan's proximity to Iraq, reasonable travel and
lodging costs, and experienced trainers make it a natural
choice for training programs conducted outside Iraq. And we
invested a great deal in these facilities at a time when we
had few other options to get training started rapidly. Their
continued use will be important to maximize the per-head cost
of the training, to expose Iraqi trainees to an Arab model of
policing and security that is markedly different from the
Saddamist style, and to anchor in a practical way a critical
relationship between Iraq and an Arab ally.
2. (C) Listed below are some of the more notable training
programs, either ongoing or conducted recently with the
potential for future training:
-- Jordan International Police Training Center (over 14,000
Iraqi police cadets trained to date)
-- New Iraqi Army training (1,978 trained by Jordanian Army)
-- Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (ICTF) training (Jordanian
Special Operations Command)
-- Training for Iraqi Air Force pilots and crews of the Iraqi
Air Corps (Jordanian Air Force)
-- Advanced military studies for Iraqi officers (Jordanian
National Defense Institute)
-- Training for Iraqi air traffic controllers and aviation
inspectors (Jordanian Civil Aviation Authority)
-- Training on bank inspections and open-market operations
(Central Bank of Jordan)
-- Information technology training provided to several Iraqi
ministries (e.g., health, education, planning)
-- Food inspection training (Jordanian Food & Drug
Administration)
-- Training of Iraqi nurses/staff nurses (Jordanian Ministry
of Health)
-- Census training (Department of Statistics)
In addition to the GOJ-affiliated programs listed above, the
private sector is also conducting considerable training in
Jordan.
3. (C) With the standup of the Iraqi Transitional Government
(ITG), the GOJ will be watching for signals of the new Iraqi
leadership's attitude towards training programs here. Post
stands ready to work with the GOJ to help meet Iraqi training
needs and to respond to ITG concerns about the Jordan-based
programs.
4. (U) Minimize considered.
HALE
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