US embassy cable - 05SANAA891

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000891 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ 
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2015 
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, PREL, PTER, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/09/2005 
 
REF: A. SANAA 883 
 
     B. SANAA 882 
     C. SANAA 876 
     D. SANAA 875 
     E. SANAA 863 
     F. SANAA 860 
     G. SANAA 836 
 
Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
1.    (S/NF) Ambassador Thomas Krajeski convened an EAC 
meeting on April 5, 2005, to discuss the possible threat and 
review security measures taken by the Embassy and community. 
EAC members recommended continuation of security measures in 
line with those delineated in REFTEL B, to include a 
restriction on non-essential travel and continued closure of 
the Embassy to the public.  Key offices and personnel 
represented at the meeting included:  DCM, DAT, FPD, IPC, MO, 
LEGATT, POLE, RMAS, OMC, RSO, USAID. End Summary. 
 
2. (C/NF)  The Ambassador briefed the EAC on his meeting with 
the President of the Republic of Yemen's government (ROYG) 
and noted the serious nature of fighting between ROYG forces 
and supporters of an insurrection in the Saada region. The 
Ambassador gave an overview of the security situation to the 
EAC, noting the perception that terrorists had operatives in 
Yemen on standby with others available to be brought in 
country.  Additionally, the Ambassador reminded the EAC that 
the terror network was thought to be targeting the American 
and Jewish community in Yemen as well as the ROYG.  The 
Ambassador noted the likelihood that terrorists want to make 
Yemen a place that they can operate in again as in the past, 
and stated that it was possible that terrorists perceive ROYG 
as one of the most vulnerable Arab regimes. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  EAC members noted that, to date, no intervention 
had occured against the terrorist cell currently being 
tracked by USG and ROYG agencies.  RMAS advised EAC members 
that information regarding the threat was of a very good 
quality and new analysis of the threat indicates that attack 
planning may not be as imminent as previously thought.  After 
a discussion lead by the DCM, EAC members decided that the 
threat remained serious and unpredictable, with to little 
known about the location, method, timing and targets of the 
potential attack.  Therefore, EAC members recommended the 
following security steps: 
 
- Send a Warden Message advising continued caution while 
informing the community that the Embassy would remain closed 
on Sunday, 10 April 2005. 
- Restrict employee travel to essential personnel traveling 
to the Embassy.  (RSO Comment:  The EAC decided that 
mandating the use of armored vehicles for the movement of 
personnel was not necessary and the MO stated that in his 
opinion the Embassy did not have sufficient armored vehicles 
in its inventory to support such a policy.) 
- Conduct an expanded EAC meeting at 1400 hours on Sunday, 10 
April 2005. 
- Continue the suspension of programs at the Yemen American 
Language Institute (YALI) in line with the Embassy's closings. 
- Ensure adherence to restrictions on incoming personnel in 
line with "Authorized Departure." 
- Continue to monitor employee travel times and routes to and 
from the Embassy. 
 
 
4. (S/NF) The Ambassador lead the EAC in a review of: 
Requirements under the newly implemented Authorized Departure 
policy;  Press Guidance;  Consular Issues following cessation 
of public services;  The overload of incoming communications 
impacting post operators and Post 1;  The impact of closing 
on YALI;  Overall security for community members to include 
an American Archeologist team involved in the excavation of 
the Queen of Sheba Temple in Ma'rib as well as the passing of 
threat information to Fulbright scholars throughout the 
country.  (RSO Comment:  The Public Diplomacy Officer 
informed the EAC that the archeological group conducting 
excavation in Ma'rib pulled back to Sanaa to lower their 
exposure, and the EAC agreed that Fulbright scholars would be 
provided information, through PD, necessary to allow them to 
make changes in their personal conduct to allow them to 
protect themselves.) 
 
5.  (S/NF)  RSO provided the EAC an overview of post's 
security profile noting ongoing tensions in Saada, as well as 
the fact that no additional incidents potentially related to 
Saada had occured in Sanaa since the grenade attacks against 
military targets as outlined in REFTELS.  Additionally, the 
RSO noted no indications of pre-attack planning by RSO 
surveillance detection elements and discussed steps taken by 
MOI to improve security on the street around Embassy 
residences, at choke points between the American housing area 
and the Embassy, as well as improvements in hotel security at 
the Sheraton in Aden.  The RSO informed the EAC that no 
incidents were noted on the Embassy or YALI perimeters 
related to their closing to the public.  Finally, RSO noted 
that passing new tearline information to the MOI regarding 
the latest threat was still pending issuance of a tearline 
from RMAS. 
 
6.  (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene on Sunday, 10 April 
2005, to review ongoing security measures. 
Krajeski