US embassy cable - 05QUITO779

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 QUITO 000779 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PGOV, EC, CU 
SUBJECT: FINAL PUSH FOR GOE VOTE ON CUBA 
 
REF: A. QUITO 695 
 
     B. QUITO 682 
     C. QUITO 625 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reason 1.4 (b) 
 
1.  (C) With the UN Human Rights Commission scheduled to vote 
on the Cuba resolution April 14 or 15, our campaign to swing 
Ecuador to "yes" has reached the home-stretch.  In the last 
10 days, Embassy efforts have included: 
 
-- Calling on GoE President Lucio Gutierrez (Ref B). 
Gutierrez promised "no worse" than an abstention, but noted 
that domestic opposition to a yes vote was so fierce as to 
box him in; 
 
-- Lobbying Foreign Minister Patricio Zuquilanda on the OAS 
SYG vote and Cuba resolution.  On the latter, Zuquilanda 
recounted a recent GoC demarche for a no vote and his "you 
must be kidding" response.  He offered no indication Ecuador 
would shift from its traditional abstention position, however; 
 
-- Pressing MFA Bilateral Affairs and Mulilateral Affairs 
undersecretaries for condemnation of Castro in Geneva; 
 
-- Informing Presidency contacts that the USG views 
countries' Cuba votes with great interest and concern; 
 
-- Approaching foreign diplomats (Spanish, Vatican, other EU) 
to seek a coordinated lobbying campaign (Ref A). 
 
2.  (C) Where have we gotten so far?  We believe Ecuador 
remains a solid abstention, but has not entered the yes camp. 
 Reasons are essentially three:  a GoE overriding belief in 
"non-intervention" in the internal matters of other states; a 
general affinity for Castro's Cuba amongst MFA diplomats; and 
an Administration fear that a yes in Geneva would destabilize 
an already teetering government. 
 
3.  (C) Countering Reasons 1 and 2 are long-term Embassy 
goals we unfortunately won't reach by April 15.  Regarding 
Number 3 and Ecuador's current, overheated political 
environment, Gutierrez is wise to avoid any measure that 
brings the indigenous, about the only group still outside the 
fray, into the streets.  While we have no proof, we imagine 
our Cuban Embassy counterparts and a visiting GoC 
vice-minister (and perhaps the Venezuelans as well) already 
have lobbied indigenous leaders to emerge en masse should 
Ecuador back the U.S. resolution. 
 
4.  (C) Conversely, Gutierrez's domestic predicament might 
also provide an opening for one last push on Cuba.  At the 
height of violent April 5-6 demonstrations in Quito, a 
frantic Administration official telephoned us, having heard 
the Embassy "had withdrawn its backing" for the president 
(untrue).  He worried a U.S. policy switch represented the 
final Administration coffin nail and urged us to continue 
supporting his embattled boss.  Such fears are not 
exaggerated; popular opinion holds that it was the 
admonitions of a former U.S. ambassador that emboldened 
Ecuadorians to depose former GoE President Abdala Bucaram in 
1997. 
 
5.  (C) Of course we cannot go tit-for-tat with Gutierrez, 
promising continued U.S. support in exchange for his Cuba 
vote.  But with careful language, we might imply that, by 
showing backbone in Geneva, the GoE and its president would 
earn significant USG gratitude.  Washington would view 
another abstention, however, as rejection of a key U.S. 
policy initiative in the hemisphere. 
 
6.  (C) We understand that Political Undersecretary Burns 
will receive Zuquilanda in Washington April 11, WHA A/S Roger 
Noriega will pull him aside at the same-day OAS special 
session, and that a senior State official might call 
President Gutierrez, all conversations focusing on the Geneva 
vote.  Assuming WHA/CCA and DRL will provide basic points on 
the resolution and the decaying human rights situation in 
Cuba, we offer here suggestions to tailor the presentation to 
Ecuadorian realities: 
 
-- Push "principles over politics" to guilt Gutierrez and 
Zuquilanda toward yes, perhaps focusing on the plight of 
dissidents imprisoned for their ideals; 
 
-- Note countries that favor the resolution, with focus on 
hemispheric and, in particular, South American nations; 
 
-- Spotlight supportive governments that also faced a 
left-leaning, pro-Castro populace, and explain how they 
overcame public opposition on the Cuba resolution; 
-- Assert an Ecuadorian "yes" would send a strong signal to 
U.S. policy makers and appropriators (without getting into 
specifics). 
 
7.  (U) Any call to Gutierrez or meetings with his FM must 
also tackle the evolving, volatile political situation in 
Ecuador, lately exacerbated by an unpopular Supreme Court 
decision to allow the once-exiled Bucaram to return. 
Suggested talking points include: 
-- Democracies require strong institutions -- including 
independent legislatures and judiciaries -- in order to 
thrive; 
 
-- Thriving, stable democracies invite investment, spawn 
economic growth; 
 
-- Democracy by its nature is messy and difficult; dialog 
between actors is key; 
 
-- In the USG you have an ally that wants to help. 
KENNEY