US embassy cable - 05PARIS2399

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(C) CWC/BWC: MEETING OF CLOSE ALLIES, PARIS, MARCH 10, 2005

Identifier: 05PARIS2399
Wikileaks: View 05PARIS2399 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-04-08 15:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PARM PREL TBIO CBW
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 PARIS 002399 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR CD DEL; HAGUE FOR CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, TBIO, CBW 
SUBJECT: (C)  CWC/BWC: MEETING OF CLOSE ALLIES, PARIS, 
MARCH 10, 2005 
 
REF: A. STATE 041125 
     B. STATE 246161 
     C. STATE 41021 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso 
ns 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Close Allies (U.S., UK, France, Germany) met 
to coordinate actions for the upcoming OPCW Executive Council 
meeting and to review both joint and bilateral efforts on 
compliance, Article VII implementation, financial/personnel 
matters and CW destruction.  Discussion on BWC primarily 
focused on planning for the June Experts Meeting on Codes of 
Conduct for Scientists.  Although useful as a tool for 
coordination, the Paris meeting was truncated due to a French 
labor strike and lacked its traditional interaction due in 
part to the absence of key participants and a general 
reliance on the U.S. to take the lead on CWC/BWC issues.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) France hosted a meeting of the Close Allies on March 
10 to cover pressing issues relating to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). 
The U.S. Delegation was led by Guy Roberts, OSD BWC Deputy, 
standing in for Amb. Donald Mahley.  He was joined by the 
U.S. Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons, Amb. Eric Javits, and a delegation 
consisting of State BWC Deputy Katharine Crittenberger (State 
VC), Jennie Gromoll and Dan Callahan (State AC), Sue Ryan and 
Louis Alvarado (State VC), Ed Freeman (DOC) and Emboff Leslie 
Ordeman.  UK Delegation - Sarah Price, Gerald Erskine (MOD), 
James Harrison (MOD), Martin Rudduck (Trade), and Mark 
Matthews (Hague del).  France - Marion Paradas (MFA), Sophie 
Moal-Makame (Hague Del), Frederic Aubry, Laure Becque-Corcos, 
Stephanie Dare-Doyen (Trade), Bruno Dupre, Emmanuel Pizzo 
(MOD), Etienne Sur, Gabriel Bernier and, on loan from UK 
Hamish Cowell (MFA).  Germany - Bernhard Brasach, Gabriele 
Kraatz-Wadsack (MFA) and Ronald Albrecht (Hague Del/Art. VII 
Facilitator). 
 
3.  (C) Allies were in general agreement with the U.S. 
approach on most CWC and BWC issues, although testy about 
U.S. and Russian CW destruction deadlines and their 
inter-relationship.  It is clear that the UK is spread thin 
on WMD issues and distracted by its upcoming Presidency of 
the EU, current G-8 Presidency and Geneva BWC Chairmanship 
for 2005.  But for sporadic comments, the UK did not engage 
beyond the party line on CWC or BWC.  Due to a Paris strike, 
UK CD Amb. John Freeman was unable to attend and address the 
group on his plans for the BWC Codes of Conduct session in 
June. MFA Rep Sarah Price spoke on his behalf.  However, 
others around the table were not well versed on the fine 
details, and little detailed discussion ensued.  (Note: The 
UK released the "second Freeman letter" in Geneva March 21, 
(and distributed it during this meeting) having had only 
comments from the U.S.  End Note.)  Although the French had a 
large delegation, there was little interaction in any 
discussion.  The German delegation filled the void by 
peppering the U.S. del with detailed questions, primarily on 
CWC related issues. 
 
 
--Compliance-- 
 
4.  (C) Del members Crittenberger and Ryan provided updates 
on the U.S. compliance diplomacy initiative and compliance 
issues related to Kazakhstan, Iran, and Libya.  U.S. 
presentations were positively received by allied partners and 
generated compliance discussion. 
 
5.  (C) Although the French presented no "new elements of 
compliance," Marion Paradas offered that compliance diplomacy 
has "good momentum."  During Australia Group-related meeting 
in Beijing the week before, the Chinese MFA Reps emphasized 
the "need for treaty compliance and nonproliferation 
initiatives." 
 
6. (C) Regarding specific country compliance issues, U.K. 
experts Erskine and Harrison stated that the U.K. shares U.S. 
compliance concerns but had little new information to report. 
 The U.K continues to monitor 10 states of concern closely, 
including Libyan CW destruction efforts as they want to be 
confident before stating that Libyan WMD has been eliminated. 
 U.K. continues to have concerns about Iran, as does the 
U.S., but had little to add to the U.S. presentation. 
Erskine stated that the U.K. has "many questions" about how 
Iraq's CWC declaration will be compiled.  The U.K. is 
monitoring Middle Eastern countries that may or could join 
the CWC including Syria and Lebanon. 
 
7. (C) Citing U.S. efforts to acquire copies of specific 
Technical Secretariat (TS) reports of inspections in Iran in 
1999, German Rep Brasach lamented the inadequate scrutiny by 
States Parties of Iran's initial declaration and that the TS 
was too quick to give Iran's declared CWPFs certificates of 
destruction.  Berlin is discussing this issue with the TS; it 
needs to be more transparent about its activities.  UK Reps 
agreed with U.S. and German positions.  Germany is concerned 
that the OPCW needs to make certain that there is a "real" 
conversion of the Rabta CWPF, and that Tripoli not follow the 
example of past conversions in Russia and elsewhere that 
either left CW production capacity intact or did not result 
in commercially viable enterprises.  Libya and Russia could 
benefit from additional international assistance to implement 
their CWC obligations. 
 
 
--Financial Issues-- 
 
8.  (C) 2006 OPCW Budget:  Del delivered points regarding 
U.S. perspective on the 2006 OPCW budget, indicating we will 
push for a very lean budget and further improvements in the 
"results-based" aspects of the budget.  Del also noted that 
we will seek further increases in the number of OCPF 
inspections ("Other Chemical Production Facilities," 
producing discrete organic chemicals not listed on Schedules 
1, 2, 3 above certain thresholds); push for a practical 
approach to dealing with the increasing number of vacancies; 
and take a closer look at the adequacy of the current 
training scheme for new inspectors.  The del also highlighted 
the increasing problem of non-payment, which has resulted in 
a sizable number of member states losing voting rights for 
failure to pay dues.  All recommended demarching capitals to 
encourage payment.  The UK echoed the U.S. points on pursuing 
a lean 2006 budget, further developing results-based 
budgeting (RBB) elements, increasing OCPF inspections, and 
addressing vacancies and non-payment.  Germany assesses 
payment problem is worse because additional States Parties 
are paying only enough of their assessments to keep their 
voting rights.  Berlin thinks that Brazil's payment shortfall 
is due to a "political grudge over an old issue," referring 
to the Bustani situation.  Beyond this, German and French 
dels offered little on this issue other than general support 
for U.S. and UK points. 
 
9.  (C) Director-General selection:  Amb. Javits reviewed 
U.S. approach to selection process for the next 
Director-General.  The U.S. would support reappointment of 
Argentinean Director-General Rogelio Pfirter whose contract 
ends in June 2006, if he is interested.  Allies agreed 
Pfirter had done an excellent job, post-Bustani, in running 
the OPCW.  It was acknowledged the Latin American Group 
(Grulac) has profited from several terms, and because there 
was no early indication of support for any other qualified 
candidates, there was a general expression of the group that 
the DG, if willing, deserved the support of the Close Allies 
for another term.  However, France and the UK said formal 
decisions from capitals were needed.  After confirmation of 
support in capitals, Allies will ascertain Pfirter's 
willingness to serve another term and indicate group's 
support for his candidacy if he is interested.  All agreed a 
needed precedent could be established during this nomination 
process -expected to be non-controversial - unlike when 
former DG Bustani raised his re-appointment under Any Other 
Business.  Germany made a point of noting this group should 
coordinate our approach, unlike last time when one country 
moved out unilaterally. 
 
10.  (C) U.S. Del shared its thoughts on process.  Ideally, a 
letter would be sent from the Chairman of the Executive 
Council to all States Parties, by early April announcing the 
decision of the DG to be a candidate and setting a date of 
August 1 for other candidates, if any, to step forward and 
submit CVs.  Candidates would address the September 27-30 
Executive Council.  A decision could then be taken based on 
its recommendations at the November Conference of the States 
Parties (CSP-10). 
 
11.  (C) UK and German Reps noted the WEOG ought to be 
careful in its presentation of this proposal to the EC 
Chairman, lest excessive WEOG fingerprints hurt the process. 
If acceptable and in an effort to avoid excessive debate on 
procedures, the EC Chairman would state the above process in 
his letter and consult with regional vice-chairman to achieve 
general acceptance for this approach.  Allies agreed to 
confirm this approach in capitals, consult in The Hague and 
be sure Pfirter is on-board.  The next EC Chairman will be 
voted at March EC and installed May 10. 
 
12.  (SBU) "Amigo" system:  The German del voiced a general 
concern about the recent trend of the TS hiring staff from 
member state delegations to the OPCW, but did not raise 
doubts about any specific individual.  This approach, 
characterized by Brasach as the "amigo" system, could have 
the effective result of narrowing the likely pool of 
applicants that are seriously considered, and also noted a 
number of members from current delegations that are angling 
for a spot in the Technical Secretariat (TS).  Amb. Javits 
offered that, while the "amigo" system should not be taken to 
an extreme, the DG should be given a certain latitude in 
selecting his senior staff, having done a good job so far. 
The UK del noted that, while this is a tricky question, there 
are no glaringly bad examples so far, offering praise for the 
Legal Advisor, Amb. Onate (Mexico) and Special Projects 
Director Amb. Khodakov (Russia) and that the specific nature 
of the OPCW's work would inherently favor those candidates 
who have had direct experience with the OPCW. 
 
13.  (SBU) ILOAT/Provident Fund:  Del provided a U.S. 
non-paper analyzing the International Labor Organization's 
recent judgment on claims by TS staff related to the 
Provident (investment) Fund, and stressed that steps should 
also be taken to protect the OPCW from similar charges in the 
future.  Del noted increased member state oversight was not 
sufficient and that the procedures for running the Fund need 
to be revised to formally limit the risk of financial losses, 
which could prompt further claims in the ILOAT.  The UK and 
France voiced their displeasure with the judgments and agreed 
upon the need to permanently resolve this issue. 
 
 
--Article VII (Implementation)-- 
 
14.  (SBU) Allies were surprisingly accepting of U.S. 
suggestions on potential measures taken after the CSP for 
those States Parties not fully implementing the Convention, 
but noted the likely difficulty in getting such measures 
approved.  Specific timelines and criteria are spelled out in 
U.S. non-paper distributed prior to the Paris meeting.  (See 
para 34).  Formal comments have been requested by mid-April. 
The UK del offered strong support for the paper, but appear 
to view it as a tactical exercise, not as a "bottom line." 
France appeared the most lukewarm in its support, seemingly 
inclined to push the issue off until the fall.  German Rep 
suggested adding even more detail to the paper, yet surmised 
it would be difficult to get Executive Council agreement to 
any measures prior to the September EC.  He specifically 
noted that in a recent meeting with members of the African 
Group, delegations appeared united in opposition to the idea 
of "measures" against those who fail to meet the deadline, 
and that the emphasis should remain on assistance.  He 
suggested this group meet with newly appointed Art. VII 
"czar" Mexican Amb. Onate.  Examples were given of 
legislative problems making implementation slow even in key 
capitals such as Onate's.  Roland Munch and Mark Matthews 
(present/past Facilitators) noted the disorganization and 
infighting amongst Technical Secretariat offices.  Onate is 
off to a good start naming 23 target countries and will be 
traveling personally to many of the TS and national 
workshops. 
 
15.  (SBU) Del member Gromoll noted the urgency for bilateral 
assistance visits in capitals, giving examples of the 
progress made the week before in Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda. 
U.S. and TS lawyers sat down with those trying to establish 
implementing measures, such as the Office of National 
Authority rep, and walked through details and in all cases 
agreed a national Action Plan for completion of measures 
prior to agreed December 2005 deadline.  Each country was 
reticent to accept U.S. help but by the visit's end were 
praising success made (this holds true in many Caribbean 
countries as well).  U.S. high-priority countries were 
relayed to group.  While regional workshops are helpful in 
general, Gromoll argued that the time has come for a 
state-by-state review of needed assistance and close 
coordination with the TS on prioritization of those that have 
requested assistance and those targeted as non-proliferation 
concerns.  Representatives of those States Parties receiving 
assistance could usefully be approached to spread the word on 
usefulness of bilateral visits. 
 
16.  (SBU) The three allies agreed that the paper should be 
distributed more widely during or around the June EC, and 
that doing so earlier would put a damper on the current 
period when assistance is the emphasis.  In this way, States 
Parties might turn in requests for assistance by the 
requested June EC meeting knowing penalties will be 
instituted.  Group will stay in close contact on those 
countries needing assistance in an effort to cover the 
waterfront before more time passes.  While agreeing in 
principle and lauding the cause, UK, France and Germany have 
merely relied on regional workshops and not focused the 
resources on what is needed at this juncture (even within the 
EC).  Munch and Matthews noted on the margins appreciation 
for Washington's efforts and continued nudging of this group 
in particular. 
 
17.  (U) French MOD Rep then noted planned training sessions 
in Paris in June and October and potential to do them again 
in successive years.  MFA Rep Moal noted 45-50 participants 
have attended in the past, at which point Munch interjected 
States will attend as a method to insulate themselves from 
doing nothing further before the CSP.  U.S. Rep Roberts 
re-emphasized the need for bilateral visits and the high cost 
of inviting all States Parties to a session in Paris (hinting 
that participants are likely to be those higher-ranking 
wishing a trip to Paris). 
 
 
--Information Update on CW Destruction-- 
 
 
18.  (C) Allies focused mainly on Russian and U.S. 
destruction efforts.  However, Germany believes the situation 
in Albania is a concern from a nonproliferation perspective, 
CW must be kept out of the "wrong hands."  Germany is not 
concerned from the perspective of Albanian compliance with 
CWC.  Regarding assistance for the Kambarka CWDF, Germany 
indicated that while there had been delays on the Russian 
side, such as problems with delivery of equipment by 
subcontractors, it was overall satisfied with the level of 
bilateral cooperation.  Germany indicated that completing the 
facility by the end of 2005, as envisioned by Russia, was 
unlikely and, in any case, the facility would not likely 
begin destroying CW until mid-2006.  The Russians have 
expressed interest in Germany providing assistance in 
constructing a facility to destroy nerve agent stocks at 
Leonidovka and is apparently planning on constructing the 
Maradykovskiy plant on its own.  (Note: No mention was made 
of the facility at Pochep. End Note.).  The UK voiced 
concerns about Russian plans at Maradykovskiy, especially 
regarding disposal of the reaction masses, and will, like the 
U.S., discuss this with the Russians on the margins of the 
March Executive Council.  (UK rep provided U.S. del with copy 
of UK questions on Maradykovskiy.)  On the margins, UK 
indicated interest in helping Russia construct a CWDF at 
Kizner. 
 
19.  (C) U.S. Rep Roberts provided an update on the status of 
U.S. destruction efforts.  Without specifically pressing on 
the issue of the U.S.'s ability to meet the 2012 deadline, 
the allies, with Germany taking the lead, expressed concern 
that any delays in U.S. destruction efforts would make it 
difficult to put further pressure on Russia to meet its CW 
destruction obligations in a timely manner.  The allies are 
also looking to the U.S. to "set the best example," vis-a-vis 
Russia, on issues such as endpoint of destruction and 
ensuring proper verification.  Germany and the UK showed 
particular interest in U.S. plans for second stage disposal 
of hydrolysates resulting from neutralization at the Newport 
CWDF, with the former voicing concerns about recent 
statements from DoD officials that one of the options being 
considered for accelerating destruction is re-evaluating the 
endpoint of destruction. 
 
20.  (C) In response to allied concerns, Roberts reminded 
allies that the U.S. is committed to doing all it can to meet 
its destruction obligations in stark contrast to the 
less-than-adequate Russian destruction efforts.  Roberts 
affirmed that the U.S. has not changed its position, and 
remains unconvinced that first-stage neutralization of 
Russian nerve agent satisfies the endpoint of destruction. 
Roberts emphasized that the U.S. has no intention of cutting 
a bilateral deal with Russia on endpoint, and encouraged the 
allies to take a more active role in advancing discussion of 
this issue at the OPCW.  The German del expressed 
satisfaction with Robert's statement that nothing in the 
recently published verification plan and facility agreement 
for the Newport CWDF was intended to establish first-stage 
hydrolysis as constituting the end-point of agent destruction 
for CW purposes. 
 
 
--OCPF Inspections-- 
 
21. (C) The UK emphasized the need for stronger support in 
the WEOG on OCPF inspections and believes that any 
consideration of tweaking the proposed U.S./Swiss formula 
should be pushed off until we are at endgame. The UK wants 
OCPF selection methodology resolved by the June EC.  Germany 
offered support in "generic" terms, including the involvement 
of States Parties in the selection process, but then raised 
more general issues, such as State Party failure to declare 
OCPFs, the need for random re-inspections, and asking how 
many inspections would be enough.  Germany agreed the system 
must be fixed. Such a fix could entice new members to accede 
to CWC.  France expressed "appreciation" of U.S./Swiss 
efforts, but emphasized the importance of ensuring "balance" 
in the selection process.  France suggested that dels 
consider developing "technical arrangements" to avoid any 
perceived imbalances, but specifically said they were not 
advocating changes to the proposed formula.  Instead, France 
recommended incorporating into any eventual decision 
transparency measures and opportunities for evaluation to be 
employed during initial utilization of the selection criteria 
so that member states can see the impact of the new approach. 
 
----------------------------- 
Biological Weapons Convention 
----------------------------- 
 
--2005 Work Program-- 
 
22.  (SBU) Chairman's Views.   Although the 2005 Chairman, UK 
Amb. John Freeman was unable to attend the meeting due to its 
curtailment; UK HOD Price spoke on his behalf.  She 
circulated the draft of a second diplomatic note Freeman 
intends to provide all States Parties, elaborating in more 
detail upon his plans for addressing the 2005 agenda item and 
for the June Experts Meeting on Codes of Conduct for 
Scientists.  Freeman plans to send the letter out "quite 
soon," (Note: Occurred March 21. End Note.) will take 
comments, and is not trying to be prescriptive.  In sending 
the letter, he will be encouraging broad based participation 
in the meeting, trying to ensure the right people speak at 
the appropriate times, and inviting feedback from Parties. 
He is particularly interested in what States Parties want at 
the end of the process.  From his perspective, one draft code 
of conduct is not achievable or desirable, but he hopes to 
stimulate discussion and raise awareness of the myriad 
activity taking place.  Price explained that Freeman might be 
looking at a result that could include elements or 
considerations that should be take into account by those 
preparing codes of conducts.  The UK is conducting outreach 
with MFA's and S&T communities; Secretariat in Geneva is 
preparing background papers on work on-going and potential 
participants. 
 
23.  (SBU) Views of Others.  German del welcomed the details 
and plans to make 2-4 presentations at the Experts Meeting 
focusing on the work of government science, university and 
professional bodies; Germany wasn't having much luck 
generating interest from industry.  Brasack said the German 
constitution does not provide for "promulgating" codes so the 
result of the 2005 meetings cannot be one universal code of 
conduct.  Results could include non-exhaustive, generic 
elements that could be of importance when laying down codes 
at a national level.  U.S. Rep Roberts noted that governments 
can impose training requirements, etc., in providing grants 
or contracts, even when there are no Constitutional 
requirements.   Roberts reviewed the U.S. objectives for the 
meeting (ref c).  French Rep Paradas stressed the importance 
of managing expectations of the WEOG, noting that the results 
of 2005 should be consistent with those of 2004 and 2003. 
French MFA Official Bernier noted that the MFA was working 
with the PM's office, the Ministry of Health and the National 
Advisory Board for Health and Life Sciences in preparing for 
the meeting.  They, too, were having difficulties engaging 
industry, which doesn't want to be associated with BW. 
France was looking for basic, straightforward and reasonable 
results. 
 
24.  (SBU) Organization of Meeting.  France stressed the 
importance of the distinctions between open and closed 
sessions.  UK Rep Price said they were looking for diverse, 
representative participation in the Meeting, noting they too 
had generated little industry interest.  Brasach suggested 
that WEOG exchange lists of presentations in order to reduce 
overlap and fill in gaps.  U.S. Rep, picking up on the French 
comments about open/closed meetings, deployed guidance ref c 
on participation in the Meeting, the role of relevant NGO's 
versus political interest groups, U.S. opposition to NGO's 
being embedded in national delegations, and suggested as a 
management tool that the Chairman request abstracts from all 
non-government entities wishing to contribute to the Experts 
Meetings.  The UK did not comment on the abstract proposal. 
25.  (C) Follow Up on 2003/2004.  Discussion on follow-up of 
the 2003, 2004 meetings in part digressed into discussion of 
how to approach the Sixth Review Conference (RevCon) in 2006. 
French deloff Bernier suggested reviewing the usefulness of 
the 2003-2005 Work Program and addressing how to handle it 
including follow-up in 2006.  Brasach responded that the 
process was "dual-use" - it addressed important, practical 
measures, and could provide material for further elaboration 
post-RevCon.  While the RevCon won't agree to continue Ad Hoc 
Group activities, the importance of bioterrorism, and other 
urgent bio-related issues, are such that States may not want 
a four-five year gap.  All should be thinking about suitable 
topics for follow-up. 
 
26.  (C) UK Rep said it had yet to assess results of the 
current Work Program, but it does see value in intersessional 
activity between RevCons to expand knowledge and keep States 
talking about the BWC.  Further, they would not want to 
signal that the past three years have been wasted; our 
assessment of the Work Program should be promoted positively. 
 U.S. Rep agreed that we need to approach the Sixth Review 
Conference with a positive message on the 2003-2005 Work 
Program.  At that time, we will be looking to see what States 
have done in follow-up to the Work Program elements.  The 
RevCon should reflect on the 2003-2005 Work Program, as 
specified when the program was agreed.  Germany, France, and 
U.S. indicated they were preparing updated lists of experts 
and labs to provide the UN SYG regarding investigations of 
BW/CW use. 
 
27.  (U) Sixth RevCon:  Chairmanship.  No candidates have 
been noted; the non-aligned will hold the chairmanship. 
 
28.  (SBU) Sixth RevCon:  Substance.  French Rep reported the 
European Union is coordinating European preparations for the 
RevCon.  The Dutch are sponsoring an EU seminar in April, and 
while EU President, had requested a study focusing on 
"Institutions/Substance/CBMs/New Elements."  The UK will 
continue EU work under its Presidency focusing on practical 
measures to win consensus and allow small but valuable input 
to the Review Conference.  UK noted there were a number of 
ideas being bandied about, such as the UN SYG's High-Level 
Panel suggestions to negotiate Verification and Biosafety 
Protocols.  London has tried to dampen UN-related enthusiasm 
for a Verification Protocol and believes the notion of a 
single Biosafety Protocol also needs to be dealt with.  UK is 
coordinating with Finns and Austrians on the RevCon ideas 
(they follow UK in the EU Presidency).  Germany pointed to 
the CWC Review Conference  where  Action Plans on 
universality and national implementation were adopted as a 
model for the BWC RevCon; UK suggested  that universal 
membership and compliance are the key issues to address. 
 
29.  (SBU) U.S. Rep noted that the U.S. was in the early 
stages of preparing for the Review Conference, but confirmed 
that a return to Protocol or "verification mechanism" 
negotiations was off the table.  U.S. noted that the WEOG was 
in line for Drafting Committee Chairmanship, and asked if 
others had considered how to organize the RevCon - conduct a 
traditional Article-by-Article Review or organize along other 
lines? 
 
30.  (U) BWC/1925 Geneva Protocol Anniversaries.  Germany 
will host a seminar March 23 in Berlin on the occasion of the 
BWC's 30th anniversary.  France reported that its earlier 
efforts to coordinate with the Swiss on a symposium 
commemorating the 1925 Geneva Protocol's 80th anniversary 
were "on hold."  They weren't clear what the Swiss might be 
planning.  U.S. and UK noted the BWC Depositaries would 
release a joint statement on the BWC's 30th anniversary 
(March 26).  France may do the same in June as Depositary of 
the Geneva Protocol.  G-8 Senior Review Group members have 
agreed to note the anniversaries and the progress of the Work 
Program in July Gleneagles Summit statement. 
 
31.  (U) BWC CBMs.  All are on track to submit CBM 
declarations by April 15 deadline and encourage others to do 
the same.  (Note: EU WMD Coordinator Gianelli is cracking the 
whip on the many EU countries not submitting acceptable CBMs 
in past.) 
 
32.  (U) French Interior Ministry comments on INTERPOL 
Bioterrorism database: French Reps confessed that the 
Interior Ministry statement two days prior had been a 
surprise; MFA had not even seen full draft.  They promised to 
provide Interior Minister Villepin's statement and any 
additional information as it becomes available. 
33.  (U) Next Meeting:  Germany offered to host in Berlin in 
September/October. 
 
End Cable Text. 
LEACH 

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