US embassy cable - 05PARIS2394

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, FR, UNSC 
SUBJECT: APRIL 7 LARSEN MEETINGS WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS 
FOCUS ON LEBANON ELECTIONS, NEXT STEPS 
 
REF: A. PARIS 2243 
     B. PARIS 2305 (EXDIS NOTAL) 
     C. BEIRUT 1092 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: French Elysee and MFA officials reported that 
UN Envoy Larsen, during April 7 meetings in Paris, emphasized 
the absolute centrality of holding Lebanon's elections on 
schedule, for which he proposed creation of a 10-12 member 
committee composed equally of opposition and loyalists to 
reach agreement on the electoral law and election date. 
Larsen also stressed the need to look at post-election 
international assistance to Lebanon and floated the idea of 
an international task force to coordinate security, economic 
and institutional assistance.  French officials were cautious 
on the latter idea, and stressed the need to wait to hear the 
views of an elected Lebanese government and avoid creating 
international tutelage over Lebanon or a cumbersome 
coordination mechanism.   On Lebanon's internal situation, 
Larsen noted that increased nervousness among pro-Syria 
loyalists is leading them to look for new alliances, and 
expressed concern over lack of unity and an emergent leader 
among the opposition.  Larsen also suggested creation of a 
small team of two to four people to verify, but not certify, 
the Syrian withdrawal, an idea fully supported by the GoF. 
Larsen and MFA officials discussed a possible third UNSCR on 
Lebanon, with both sides open to the idea.  French officials 
also reported that Larsen was reluctant to contact Danish FM 
Moeller to urge him to cancel planned visits to Beirut and 
Damascus, and preferred that the U.S. and France take the 
lead; FM Barnier was scheduled to call Moeller on the issue 
April 7.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) UN Special Envoy for 1559 implementation Terje-Roed 
Larsen visited Paris April 7 to brief GoF officials on his 
just-completed meetings in Beirut and Damascus.  We received 
separate readouts on Larsen's visit from Presidential Middle 
East Advisor Dominique Boche and MFA DAS-equivalent for the 
Levant Christian Jouret April 8.  Jouret reported that Larsen 
was expected to meet with FM Barnier, but due to his late 
arrival in Paris April 7, he met with the minister for only 
about five minutes.  Larsen had a working lunch with MFA 
Political Director Stanislas de Laboulaye, MFA A/S-equivalent 
for North Africa/Middle East Jean-Francois Thibault, MFA 
A/S-equivalent for IO Affairs Jean-Maurice Ripert, and 
Jouret.  Larsen was later received at the Elysee by 
Diplomatic Advisor (NSA equivalent) Maurice 
Gourdault-Montagne and Boche. 
 
3. (C) Boche reported that Larsen emphasized two main points 
during his Elysee meetings: the absolute centrality of 
holding elections on time, and the need to think about 
post-election international assistance to Lebanon.  On 
elections, Larsen said the pro-Syrian loyalists in Lebanon 
wanted to delay for as much as one year, and we needed to 
force progress to maintain the schedule.  He proposed the 
creation of a working group committee composed of five to six 
oppositionists and an equal number of loyalists, to reach an 
understanding on the election date, and the electoral law, 
i.e. large or small districts.  Jouret told us separately 
that it wasn't clear whether the working group idea was 
Larsen's, Jumblatt's or perhaps someone else's.  Jouret added 
that Larsen wanted to keep the committee proposal discreet, 
and viewed it as a possible embryonic form of a national 
unity government to prepare elections.  Neither Boche nor 
Jouret suggested GoF resistance to, or great enthusiasm over 
the working group idea. 
 
4. (C) On post-election international assistance to Lebanon, 
Boche noted that Larsen floated the idea of an international 
task force on the ground to coordinate security, economic and 
institutional assistance.  Both Boche and Jouret suggested 
GoF caution on the task force proposal.  Boche said the GoF 
stressed to Larsen that nothing was possible without the 
election of a new Lebanese government, and we needed to 
remain cautious and wait to hear what that government wanted 
in terms of assistance.  Boche said the GoF side raised 
points recently made with visiting U.S. officials (refs a-b) 
that Lebanon was not a failed state, had a strong national 
tradition, and should not be under any form of international 
tutelage, or even a heavy coordination mechanism similar to 
that in place for the Palestinians.  Boche said the GoF side 
also cautioned that international coordination on the ground 
might be interpreted negatively in the region.  Boche summed 
up that the GoF preference was for cooperation on 
coordinating bilateral assistance to Lebanon post-elections, 
vice a heavy coordination mechanism which would give the 
impression that the Lebanese couldn't manage on their own. 
Jouret quipped that the French message was that the Lebanese 
were not the Palestinians nor the East Timorese. 
 
5. (C) On Lebanon's internal situation, Jouret said Larsen 
observed that the pro-Syrian loyalists in Lebanon were 
getting increasingly nervous and looking for new alliances. 
Bashar al-Asad was aware of the problem, and realized that 
"loyalists were no longer all loyal."  At the same time, 
Larsen viewed the opposition as facing many difficulties and 
lacking unity, an assessment shared by the GoF.  Jouret said 
Larsen was troubled by the non-emergence of a single, 
recognized leader among the opposition, which remained in 
disparate groups. 
 
6. (C) Jouret noted that Larsen also spoke of the need to 
verify the Syrian troop and security services' withdrawal, 
and proposed the creation of a small team of two to four 
people for this purpose.  Larsen wanted the verification team 
to remain very discreet, with no publicity, and proposed that 
their mission should be to verify, but not certify, the 
Syrian withdrawal.  Jouret confirmed that the GoF fully 
supported the verification team proposal. 
 
7. (C) Jouret reported that, during the working lunch, Larsen 
and MFA officials had discussed whether a new Lebanon UNSC 
resolution might be necessary, with both sides concluding, 
"why not?"  Jouret said the possible scope of such a 
resolution, and whether it might focus on elections, for 
instance, remained to be determined.  Nevertheless, the GoF 
was open to the idea. 
 
8. (C) When we asked Jouret whether Larsen raised the SARG's 
desire to be rewarded for its Lebanon withdrawal, he 
confirmed that the subject did not come up.  Jouret conceded 
that Larsen had raised the SARG's continued dismay over the 
poor state of its relations with France, which it wanted to 
resolve through dialogue.  Jouret reported that the MFA 
response was "No way," and stressed that Larsen remained the 
sole international interlocutor for the SARG and GOL on these 
issues.  On this point, Jouret confirmed that the GOF was 
seeking to turn off Danish FM Moeller's proposed visit to 
Damascus and Beirut (ref c), and had raised the issue already 
via its embassy in Copenhagen.  Jouret said the GoF had 
suggested that Larsen raise the issue in a call to Moeller, 
however Larsen was reluctant to do so, given Norwegian-Danish 
sensitivities, and preferred that the U.S. and France take up 
the issue with the Danish FM.  FM Barnier, therefore, had 
agreed to call Moeller and would urge him to cancel the 
Beirut and Damascus stops.  Jouret said as of the morning of 
April 8, he was unsure whether the Barnier-Moeller call had 
taken place though it was scheduled for April 7. 
 
LEACH