US embassy cable - 05PARIS2391

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, IR, SY, LE, MNUC, PARM, FR 
SUBJECT: APRIL 5 KHATAMI VISIT TO FRANCE 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: French officials described President Chirac's 
April 5 discussion with Iranian President Khatami as cordial 
and focused largely on Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian 
question, and, to a lesser extent, the nuclear issue, which 
was the main topic of the FM Barnier-FM Kharrazi discussion 
earlier that day.  Chirac stressed to Khatami French support 
for Lebanese sovereignty, full withdrawal of Syrian troops 
and intelligence, and implementation of UNSCR 1559, which he 
explained was not aimed at overthrowing the Syrian regime. 
Chirac also sought Iran's support in encouraging Hizballah's 
full integration into Lebanese politics.  Elsyee officials 
described the Iranians as disquieted by U.S.-French 
cooperation on Lebanon, and fearful of potential instability 
on their periphery or a U.S.-approved Israeli strike against 
Iran.  On the nuclear issue, Chirac appealed for continued 
Iranian dialogue with the EU-3, and stressed support for the 
talks from the U.S., Russia and China.  French officials 
described Khatami as dismissive of U.S. gestures in support 
of the EU-3 and misinterpreting the March 10 announcement as 
signifying EU-3 readiness for UNSC referral.  Chirac also 
stressed the essential importance of the Israeli-Palestinian 
issue and appealed for greater Iranian support for 
Palestinian PM Abbas.  FM Barnier and FM Kharrazi reportedly 
discussed at length the definition of objective guarantees on 
Iran's peaceful application of nuclear technology.  Barnier 
also stressed the need for Iranian impartiality in Iraq, 
reiterated French positions on Syria/Lebanon, and addressed 
the Israeli-Palestinian issue in passing.  A meeting between 
the French and Iranian MFA Secretaries-General addressed 
technical and cultural cooperation, as well as the MEK.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (C) Iranian President Khatami visited Paris April 4-5, his 
second visit to France since 1998.  The purpose of Khatami's 
visit was to deliver the opening address at a UNESCO 
conference on the five-year anniversary of the launch of his 
"dialogue of civilizations" initiative, an event also 
attended by Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.  Khatami 
met with President Chirac at the Elysee April 5, while 
Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi met with French FM Barnier 
earlier that morning.  The Iranian MFA Secretary-General also 
had a meeting with his French counterpart on the margins of 
Khatami's visit.  We received a preliminary readout on the 
Khatami-Chirac meeting from Presidential Middle East/Americas 
Advisor Dominique Boche April 5, and a more detailed readout 
on the Khatami and Kharrazi discussions from MFA 
DAS-equivalent for Iran/Iraq/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine 
Sivan April 7.  Boche and Sivan both stressed that Khatami, 
not the GOF, had initiated his visit to Paris to attend the 
UNESCO event and the GoF had offered the bilateral meetings 
as a courtesy.  After departing Paris, Khatami was expected 
to travel to Rome to attend Pope John Paul II's funeral. 
 
KHATAMI-CHIRAC: LEBANON, EU-3 TALKS, ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN ISSUES 
-------------------- 
 
3. (C) According to MFA DAS Sivan, regional topics -- namely 
Syria/Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian issue -- dominated 
the Chirac-Khatami discussion, with the nuclear issue 
discussed in much less detail.  Boche added that the 
discussion briefly addressed Iraq, and that Khatami did not 
address internal political issues or Iran's upcoming 
elections.  Boche described Khatami as an interesting and 
free-speaking interlocutor, but assessed his influence in 
Iran as questionable.  Though the discussions were friendly, 
Boche said Khatami conveyed a sense of general worry on 
potential instability on Iran's periphery (Lebanon, Syria, 
Iraq), and that the Israelis might launch a strike against 
Iran with U.S. blessing.  Boche observed that the 
long-standing problem with the Iranians was that they wanted 
to be recognized as a regional power and play a big role, but 
they believed Iran could attain such respect only by 
demonstrating its capacity to threaten others or cause 
damage.  MFA DAS Sivan, meanwhile, described the tone of the 
Chirac-Khatami discussions as "cordial and correct." 
 
4. (C) Boche described the Iranians as disquieted by 
U.S.-French cooperation on Lebanon, and said Khatami repeated 
long-standing arguments that the GoF should distance itself 
from the USG, which, unlike France, was not interested in 
Lebanon's sovereignty and independence, but instead was 
pursuing a pro-Israeli agenda aimed at overthrowing regional 
governments.  Boche said that Khatami emphasized that Iran 
was playing a helpful role in moderating Hizballah and 
Palestinian rejectionists, and encouraging Syrian withdrawal; 
the overall message was that France did not need to rely on 
the U.S. and could seek help from Iran instead. 
 
5. (C) Sivan offered more detail on Chirac's message to 
Khatami on Lebanon, which he said was intended to reaffirm 
French support for Lebanese sovereignty and implementation of 
UNSCR 1559 and the Ta'if accords.  While Chirac stressed to 
Khatami that all Syrian troops and intelligence services must 
withdraw from Lebanon, he also explained that UNSCR 1559 was 
not intended to threaten the Syrian regime.  Sivan described 
Khatami's response as "very nuanced."  The Iranian President 
described a sense of shock over Hariri's assassination, and 
affirmed that Iran recognized France's special role in 
Lebanon, which was not antagonistic.  At the same time, 
Khatami stressed that the Syrian regime should not be too 
marginalized.  Chirac also raised Hizballah with Khatami, and 
stressed the need for Iran to encourage Hizballah's "full 
integration" into Lebanese political institutions.  Sivan 
noted that Chirac did not enter into further detail on 
disarming or dismantling Hizballah, as called for in UNSCR 
1559. 
 
6. (C) Sivan said the Chirac-Khatami discussion did not enter 
much detail on the nuclear issue.  Chirac reminded Khatami 
that Iran needed to continue its dialogue with the EU-3, 
which was the only way to reach a solution.  Sivan described 
Khatami as offering a very soft response, "a la Iranienne," 
confirming that Iran wanted to continue the talks, but needed 
to protect its sovereignty. (Note: In press remarks in Paris, 
Khatami declared that Iran would not give up its sovereign 
right to civilian nuclear power, as it was entitled to under 
the NPT.  FM Kharrazi went further in an April 7 "Le Monde" 
interview in asserting that Iran would never renounce its 
right to enrich uranium to obtain fuel for civilian reactors. 
 End note.)  Chirac described U.S. gestures of support for 
the EU-3 talks as indicating a real opening in attitude, and 
cited strong support for the EU-3 also coming from Russia and 
China.  Boche described Khatami as very negative on the USG 
in general, and underestimating U.S. policy shifts on WTO 
accession and sale of aircraft parts to Iran.   Boche 
reported that the Iranians had similarly misinterpreted the 
EU-3 as having rallied behind the U.S. position to take the 
Iran nuclear issue to the UNSC.  Boche expressed doubt that 
there would be any movement in the Iranian position before 
Iran's June presidential elections, after which he hoped 
there might be a wider negotiating margin, depending on the 
results.  Boche described the current Iranian strategy as 
seeking to divide the EU-3, by telling each EU-3 interlocutor 
that the other two EU-3 members were the problem.  He 
conceded that the most recent steering committee results were 
not great, but opined that the fact that the talks were not 
suspended pending elections was in itself positive. 
 
7. (C) Sivan reported that Chirac pressed Khatami on the 
essential importance of the Palestinian issue, and the need 
for Iran to play a constructive role.  Chirac cautioned that 
Iran should not risk a deterioration of the situation and 
should help Palestinian President Abbas, by restructuring its 
support to Palestinian groups.  Khatami reportedly responded 
that Iran was not part of the problem and it did not want 
divisions with France over the Palestinian issue. 
 
BARNIER - KHARRAZI 
-------------- 
 
8. (C) Sivan reported that the Barnier-Kharrazi meeting 
focused on the nuclear issue, though Iraq, Syria/Lebanon, and 
the Israeli-Palestinian issue were also discussed,  Barnier 
reminded Kharrazi of Iran's need to reach agreement with the 
EU-3 on the exact definition of objective guarantees on full 
cessation, and a lengthy discussion ensued, on which Sivan 
offered no detail.  On Iraq, Barnier reminded Kharrazi of the 
need for Iran to "act with impartiality" and help ensure that 
Iraqi Shi'a don't monopolize power and give a role to Sunnis. 
 According to Sivan, Kharrazi responded by citing the 
important ties between Iran and Iraq.  On Lebanon, Sivan 
described Barnier as affirming the French position later 
discussed during the Chirac-Khatami meeting.  Like Chirac, 
Barnier stressed French support for Lebanon's sovereignty, 
implementation of UNSCR 1559 and the Ta'if accords, and a 
complete Syrian withdrawal.  Barnier also assured Kharrazi 
that French action was not directed against Syria, and that 
France did not want regime change in Damascus.  According to 
Sivan, Kharrazi said he understood French support for 
Lebanese sovereignty, however Syria did not understand French 
policy.  Kharrazi also stressed the need to leave the 
question of disarming Hizballah to the Lebanese, a point with 
which Barnier did not disagree.  Sivan said Barnier addressed 
the Israeli-Palestinian issue in passing, and called for Iran 
to show restraint and support for President Abbas. 
 
9.  (C) Sivan noted that the meeting between French MFA 
Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lafon and his Iranian 
 
SIPDIS 
counterpart addressed technical and cultural cooperation. 
The Iranian side also raised the MEK presence in France to 
which the French side responded by explaining the GoF's 
existing policy considering the MEK a terrorist organization, 
and its opposition to terrorism in general. 
LEACH