US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1709

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001709 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TW, Cross Strait Economics, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: KMT DEFENDS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CCP 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 01626 
     B. TAIPEI 01572 
     C. TAIPEI 01625 
 
Classified By: AIT Acting Director David Keegan, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  KMT Mainland Affairs Director Chang 
Jung-kung told AIT that the KMT and PRC are building a 
cooperative relationship that is based on their shared 
opposition to Taiwan independence.  Chang stated that the KMT 
and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have a tacit agreement not 
to discuss the status of the "Republic of China" and instead 
would focus their interaction on economic issues.  Chang and 
other KMT officials told AIT that the recent KMT cross-Strait 
initiatives represent a policy assessment that the Chen 
administration's attempts to align with the U.S. and Japan 
had failed, and that Taiwan's best approach would be to join 
the "band-wagon" of China's rising economic strength.  KMT 
officials remain adamant that they will assert unilateral 
leadership in cross-Strait engagement and will not consult 
with President Chen Shui-bian or any other political party. 
KMT officials reject government charges that KMT Vice 
Chairman P.K. Chiang's "Ten-Point" agreement with the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) amounted to "treason," arguing that he 
did not sign any formal document.  KMT officials have 
publicly rejected the "treason" charges, contending that that 
the Beijing government should not be considered a "foreign 
country" under the "ROC" constitution.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
KMT-CCP Agreement Good for Taiwan 
--------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) KMT officials continue to assert that they acted both 
legally and in the interest of cross-Strait stability despite 
the April 6 Ministry of Justice (MOJ) statement that 
prosecutors were investigating a private complaint 
challenging the legality of the "Ten-Point" agreement reached 
by the KMT and CCP on March 30.  While KMT Vice Chairman P.K. 
Chiang, who is the subject of the investigation, has offered 
his full cooperation, other KMT leaders have denounced the 
government for employing political persecution.  Privately, 
KMT officials claim the Chen administration's March 6 
"Seven-Point" statement was aimed at derailing the KMT's 
emerging relationship with Beijing. 
 
3. (C) On April 6, KMT Mainland Affairs Director (and party 
spokesman) Chang Jung-kung and KMT Overseas Affairs Director 
Ho Szu-yin, in separate meetings, provided AIT with the KMT's 
formal readout of its ongoing efforts to reach out to 
Beijing.  Chang asserted to AIT that the KMT-CCP 
rapprochement was aimed at stabilizing cross-Strait 
relations.  Chang admitted to AIT that the KMT commitment to 
the "Republic of China" (ROC) was unacceptable to its CCP 
counterparts.  Instead, Chang said, the PRC and the KMT have 
based their cooperation on their shared opposition to Taiwan 
independence, and have focused on that commonality.  To 
support his argument he said that the KMT's visit to Beijing 
reassured the PRC government that Taiwan independence was not 
the majority opinion in Taiwan.  As evidence of the KMT's 
access and influence on cross-Strait relations, Chang claimed 
that the PRC now believes that "as long as there is a KMT, 
Taiwan will not tread down the path of independence."  Chang 
went further, suggesting that Lien Chan's upcoming visit to 
Beijing would convince the PRC to tolerate even the most 
provocative pro-independence statements by Chen Shui-bian 
because they would understand that Chen would be unable to 
institutionalize his vision. 
 
------------------ 
Showing up the DPP 
------------------ 
 
4. (C) Chang dismissed the DPP's April 5 "Seven-Point" 
statement (Ref A) as irrelevant, asserting that it had failed 
to counter adequately the KMT-CCP "Ten-Point" agreement.  He 
told AIT that the DPP is disingenuous when it claims that it 
wants to engage the PRC.  Chang asserted that the PRC has 
been looking for opportunities to show good will toward 
Taiwan,  but the DPP government has blocked these efforts at 
every turn.  He criticized the DPP's April 5 call for a 
cross-partisan consultations as petty politics aimed at 
discrediting the KMT's achievements and making it impossible 
for anyone to visit the PRC.  In response to the DPP's 
allegation that the KMT-CCP "Ten-Point" agreement was 
illegal, Chang countered that the agreement was simply a 
consensus and not a signed document.  Publicly, Chang has 
stated that the government's claim that KMT contacts with 
Beijing violated Article 113 of the Criminal Code represented 
a disguised attempt to assert an independent Taiwan.  Since 
the "ROC" constitution recognizes "one China," Chang has 
argued that the only way for the government to charge the KMT 
with violating the ban on private entities "negotiating with 
a foreign government" would be for the Chen administration to 
define the PRC as a "foreign government." 
 
------------------- 
What's On the Table 
------------------- 
 
5. (C)  Media speculation notwithstanding, Chang stated 
firmly that the KMT delegation could not get any concessions 
on the PRC stance on World Health Assembly (WHA) observership 
for Taiwan.  (Note:  New Party official Spencer Chang told 
AIT, however, that initial discussions did include possible 
concession on the issue.  See Ref B.  End note.)  Chang also 
recognized that the KMT's status as an opposition party 
limited its role in cross-Strait politics, but argued that 
the party could still play an important and active role in 
engaging the PRC, especially on economic and business issues. 
(Note:  KMT Legislator Alex Tsai said, however, that the KMT 
hoped to work out some language with the PRC that would be 
seen by the Taiwan public as a PRC renunciation of the use of 
force.  See Ref C.  End note.)  Ho cited agricultural trade 
in particular as an important area of opportunity for 
cross-Strait relations.  Chang told AIT that, in fact, the 
KMT and CCP discussed 12 points, including the 10 released 
publicly and two points on problems with telemarketers based 
on Kinmen island, and facilitating travel of businessmen 
between the PRC and Taiwan.  He noted that many of the 
points, with the exception of the charter flights, are 
actions the PRC could take unilaterally and did not require 
Taiwan approval. 
 
6. (C) Chang conveyed confidence that the KMT would continue 
to be the main player in cross-Strait interactions.  He told 
AIT that while Beijing has welcomed anyone who accepts the 
"1992 consensus," President Hu Jintao personally invited Lien 
Chan to visit.  Chang made it clear that the KMT is unlikely 
to support inter-party dialogue on cross-Strait issues with 
either the People First Party (PFP) or the Pan-Green.  Chang 
told AIT that PFP Chairman James Soong wanted to talk to the 
KMT, but he dismissed the request as being insincere.  He 
also made the point that Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) 
Chairman Joseph Wu had attempted to dissuade every KMT 
delegation from visiting the PRC -- KMT Legislator Chiang 
Hsiao-yen in January and Chiang's recent trip -- but the KMT 
ignored both requests. 
 
----------------------------- 
KMT Jumps on the "Band-Wagon" 
----------------------------- 
 
7. (C) The KMT's Ho told AIT that the KMT's outreach toward 
the PRC represented an assessment made after the December 
2004 LY election that Taiwan's reliance on aligning itself 
with the United States was not a viable cross-Strait 
strategy.  Ho explained to AIT that the election results, 
along with then-Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary 
Armitage's comments in late 2004 criticizing President Chen's 
independence rhetoric, gave the KMT confidence to embark on 
what he called a "band-wagoning" strategy based on direct 
contact with the Mainland and an emphasis on business and 
economic relations with the PRC.  Ho, like Chang, justified 
the visit and "Ten Point" agreement as representing the 
people's will, remarking that longtime pro-independence 
supporter and Taiwan businessman Hsu Wen-long's public letter 
in support of a "one-China principle" underscored the 
public's support for engagement with China rather than 
confrontation.  Ho stated that the KMT would continue to 
build upon the agreement and positive rapport between the KMT 
and CCP and referenced Lien Chan's potential visit to the 
PRC.  According to Ho, the timing of Chan's visit was 
dependent on public opinion. 
 
8.  (C)  Ho was confident that there would be no political 
fallout for the KMT and the public would not brand the party 
as a "sell-out."  He agreed, however, that the PRC was using 
the KMT as part of a "cunning strategy" to control the 
cross-Strait agenda.  Still, Ho dismissed critics who said 
the KMT was serving as Beijing's tool, arguing that it did 
not matter whether the KMT was playing into the PRC's hands 
because the majority of people wanted to reduce cross-Strait 
tension. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Comment:  Internal Politics as Usual 
------------------------------------ 
 
9. (C) The KMT leadership shows little interest in responding 
to either the carrots or sticks being employed by the Chen 
administration to prevent the KMT from aiding PRC "united 
front" tactics.  Whether out of conviction that what they are 
doing is the right thing for Taiwan or simply a desire to 
undermine Chen Shui-bian and James Soong, the KMT leadership 
has made it clear that it is uninterested in forging a 
domestic political consensus on cross-Strait policy.  The DPP 
government's heavy-handed attempt to threaten criminal 
penalties over P.K. Chiang's recent visit is unlikely to 
dissuade the KMT from taking its own road with Beijing. 
Ironically, Chiang personally appears to be the rare voice of 
moderation within his own party.  His friendly April 7 
meeting with Premier Frank Hsieh, a similarly lonely voice of 
reason on the DPP side, marked a rare glimpse of 
statesmanship in an otherwise increasingly petty partisan 
game of political chicken. 
KEEGAN