US embassy cable - 05BANGKOK2541

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002541 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, TH, Southern Thailand, Terrorism 
SUBJECT: THAI INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY OBSERVERS DISCUSS 
NATURE OF SOUTHERN TROUBLES 
 
REF: (A) BANGKOK 2401 (B) BANGKOK 2322 (C) BANGKOK 
     1008 (D) 04 BANGKOK 8377 (E) 04 BANGKOK 
     7171 (F) KUALA LUMPUR 4806 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Clarke.  Reason 1.4 (d) 
 
1.  (S)  Summary:  In recent Embassy meetings with several 
Thai government and academic experts on Thailand's southern 
separatist troubles, several themes emerged:  1) the Royal 
Thai Government (RTG) sparked deep resentment and lost 
credibility among Muslims in the South after detainees taken 
at Tak Bai died while being transported for further 
interrogation; 2) the degree to which assistance from outside 
Thailand to local separatists remains unknown; and, 3) there 
is real concern about the possibility that international 
extremist groups could be tempted into active involvement in 
the South.  End Summary. 
 
ATTACKS ON APRIL 3 SUGGEST NO LETUP IN VIOLENCE DESPITE 
CONCILIATORY LANGUAGE FROM THAKSIN 
 
2.  (C)  On April 5, Poloffs interviewed Dr. Surasit 
Vajirakachorn, Associate Dean at the National Institute of 
Development Administration and a lecturer on southern Thai 
developments, about the South.  Surasit characterized the 
April 3 bombings at Hat Yai Airport and in Songkhla (Ref. A) 
as "demonstrations" by militant separatists that their 
campaign against the government and the economies of the 
southern provinces would not let up, even as Prime Minister 
Thaksin directs a major shift to a more conciliatory southern 
policy.  Surasit estimated that the separatist movement in 
the south has grown to about 10,000 members of which about 
half are armed fighters. (Note: This estimate was offered by 
the professor, but it is by far the highest we have heard. 
3000 is the more common total heard.  End note).  Surasit 
told poloffs that before the Southern Border Provinces 
Administrative Center (SBPAC) and the 
Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 43 were dismantled by PM 
Thaksin in Spring 2002, there were no more than 1000 active 
separatists.  He dated the separatist growth spurt from the 
shutting down of these two organizations, with the numbers 
boosted further after the Krue Se Mosque incident, the Tak 
Bai incident and the arrests of religious teachers from the 
Thamma Witthaya religious schools. 
 
3.  (C)  Poloffs and a Washington visitor also spoke March 16 
with General Surapong Suwana-adth of the Royal Thai Army 
Headquarters Directorate of Intelligence (who is slated 
shortly to become Chief of Intelligence at Supreme Command) 
and Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, political science professor at 
Chulalongkorn University and prominent expert on defense and 
security issues about the South.  They also attributed the 
recent up-tick in violence in the South to the killings of 
Thai Muslims by RTG security personnel last year.  Surapong 
and Panitan said that the majority of the victims (over half) 
were civilians (they did not include the Krue Se-related 
attacks or Tak Bai casualties in their statistics, which 
would have pushed their estimated percentage of civilian 
deaths considerably higher).  They added that it appears that 
the attackers are employing tactics that vary by district - 
in some districts, drive by shooting or machete attacks are 
most common; in others bombings and in others arson.  There 
is no discernible pattern.  Surasit opined that use of cell 
phone detonated improvised explosive devices could indicate 
expertise learned from abroad, but wouldn't hazard a guess 
about from specifically where. 
 
4.  (C)  Surapong said that in the struggle for "hearts and 
minds," Tak Bai dealt a severe blow to the RTG,s image and 
was a setback to the government's efforts to calm the 
situation in the Muslim border provinces.  As a result, the 
security forces are looking again at their (lack of) training 
in riot control, Surapong said.  In his view, security forces 
might be able to improve the volume and quality of 
information from civilian informants in order to be more 
"surgical" in apprehending separatists.  He said there would 
be better use of information, noting that a new 
"development-based" Army unit, the 15th Division, is slated 
for deployment to the south and should buttress efforts to 
win hearts and minds.  (Note:  After Thaksin's comments (Ref. 
B) during last week's parliamentary debate on the south that 
troops would less visible in  some areas in the region, it is 
not clear whether the 15th Division will actually be 
deployed.  End Note.) 
 
5.  (SBU)  In Poloffs' meetings, Surapong, Panitan and 
Surasit all noted that there have been no separatist-related 
incidents in another Muslim-majority border province, Satun. 
They each speculated that separatists, anxious not to draw 
attention by security forces to smuggling activities that may 
be funding their activities, avoid attacks on government and 
civilian targets in that province. 
 
DEFACTO SEPARATION IN THAI BUDDHIST RURAL FLIGHT? 
 
6.  (C)  Many Thai Buddhists living in the southern provinces 
are relocating to safer, more urban locales in the region, 
according to Dr. Panitan.  He said that the flight could 
either be from perceptions of a deliberate campaign by 
separatists to create a defacto separate Muslim area in the 
deep South, or simply a derivative of the general violence. 
Panitan claimed that roughly 100,000 Buddhist residents of 
Narathiwat, and 300,000 from Yala and Pattani, have moved, 
most leaving rural businesses or residences overnight (or for 
longer periods) to stay in Songkhla or Hat Yai, where 
security is deemed to be better.  Government figures for 
those who have moved out of fear of the violence is lower -- 
about 20,000.  (Note: Panitan's figures and anecdotal 
comments about non-Muslims fleeing troubled areas in the 
south match those of other observers.  Reftels C, D,and E. 
End Note.)  Panitan added that suspicion between the Thai 
Muslim and Buddhist communities is growing.  Buddhist 
businessmen carry guns when traveling in the afflicted 
provinces and in their places of businesses.  Some are taking 
target practice and hiring security guards. 
 
ROYAL FAMILY MEMBERS AT RISK? 
 
7.  (S) Panitan claimed that Thai officials are concerned 
about recent unspecified threats originating in the south to 
the Royal Family members.  Panitan declined to give 
additional information, but said that there is genuine 
concern that some separatists may intend to target a member 
of the royal family during a royal visit to the affected 
provinces. 
 
OUTSIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE BUT DEGREE UNKNOWN 
 
8.  (C)  Panitan said that there is ample visible evidence 
that unaccounted funding is coming in to the deep South from 
outside.  As an example, he cited the case of local Islamic 
teachers, many of whom had attended religious schools in the 
Middle East and returned to Thailand, having relatively 
prosperous looking homes, "complete with a big satellite dish 
to pick up al-Jazeera" but with no evidence of income to 
support their house and other possessions.  Surasit said that 
there is, in his opinion, assistance from "across the 
border," (i.e. Malaysia), particularly in providing refuge 
for separatists skipping across the border to evade Thai 
authorities.  Colonel Surapong said that the outside funding 
question is very worrying and one that Thai authorities are 
trying to get a handle on, particularly the activities of the 
International Islamic Relief Organization. 
 
MOVEMENT OF DUAL NATIONAL DIFFICULT TO TRACK 
 
9.  (C)  Panitan said that the RTG does not have firm and 
effective control over movement of Thai or dual national 
Muslims across the border.  Surapong claimed that some 
separatist suspects the authorities are seeking are hiding in 
rural areas, some just across the border in Malaysia. 
Panitan characterized relations between Thai and Malaysian 
law enforcement and border police as good; strains between 
the two neighbors' security services exist at higher ranks. 
(Note:  Embassies Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur have heard similar 
comments from both Thai and Malaysian border officials. 
Reftels D and F.  End note.) 
 
FEAR THAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS COULD BE TEMPTED TO BECOME 
INVOLVED 
 
10.  (C)  On the question of whether the separatists would 
welcome Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) assistance, Surapong opined 
that some would value JI expertise but not the international 
attention this would draw to them.  He said that JI had used 
Thailand as a sanctuary in the past but, citing the example 
of Hambali, noted that the JI leader had kept himself 
isolated from mainstream Thai Muslims.  In an aside, Panitan 
and Surapong both agreed there was a general separation 
between Wahabi/Sufi influenced Muslims and the majority of 
southern Thai Muslims, who rejected global jihadism.  Surasit 
said that the possibility of an international terrorist group 
insinuating itself into the conflict is his greatest worry. 
 
11.  (C)  Comment:  These conversations with three 
"authoritative" Thai observers demonstrate again that Thai 
experts really are unable to put a name on or identity the 
persons or organizations responsible for bomb attacks such as 
those occurring in Songkhla province on April 3.  Another 
thread running through the discussions with Panitan, Surapong 
and Surasit was the frequent assertion that dismantling the 
joint civilian/military bodies several years ago, and 
adoption of overly hard-line tactics against the separatists, 
cost the RTG a significant degree of support among Muslims in 
the southern border provinces and tipped the balance, leading 
to the current woes.  Of concern are the continued reports 
that non-Muslim Thais in the south, out of fear and 
intimidation, are relocating away from the troubled areas. 
 
ARVIZU