US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO684

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 000684 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: THE JAFFNA BLUES:  NORTHERN TAMILS FEAR COLOMBO 
COMPLACENCY WITH CEASEFIRE STATUS QUO 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 635 
 
     B. COLOMBO 559 
     C. COLOMBO 458 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C) During a March 30-April 1 trip to the northern 
districts of Jaffna and Vavuniya, poloff and POL FSN met with 
local government officials, members of the judiciary, aid 
workers, human rights activists, Members of Parliament, 
university faculty and students, religious figures, members 
of the security forces, and a representative of the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM).  While living conditions have 
undoubtedly improved during the ceasefire, discussions with 
Tamil interlocutors, whose sympathies spanned the spectrum of 
pro- and anti-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
sentiment, revealed a uniform suspicion of Colombo's 
sincerity in pursuing a negotiated settlement to the 
conflict.  In particular, many expressed fear that the 
Sinhalese-majority south regards the ceasefire as an adequate 
"settlement" and is uninterested in pursuing a more permanent 
resolution.  Continued restrictions on fishing rights and 
access to former residential areas in High Security Zones 
imposed by the security forces were routinely cited as 
particular grievances.  On the ground, local government 
representatives and the LTTE seem to have established an 
effective modus vivendi to facilitate the delivery of 
government services and tsunami aid.  Whether valid or not, 
the overwhelming local perception of not-so-benign neglect 
from the center can be manipulated by the LTTE to stoke 
long-standing resentment of the GSL and to validate Tiger 
propaganda claims that the LTTE alone can ensure the welfare 
of the Tamil community.  End summary. 
 
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THE VIEW ALONG THE A-9: 
PEACE PROCESS STUCK AT CENTER 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  (C)  Poloff and POL FSN visited the northern districts of 
Jaffna and Vavuniya March 30-April 1, traveling by road along 
the A-9 highway (open since mid-2002).  Tamil interlocutors, 
as well as INGO representatives, in government-controlled 
territory uniformly expressed consternation at the lack of 
movement on the peace process, with most faulting the 
Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and President Chandrika 
Kumaratunga for the failure to move ahead.  This view emerged 
clearly and repeatedly with contacts across the political 
spectrum, from full-blown Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) apologists, like Tamil National Alliance (TNA) Members 
of Parliament, to individuals opposed (albeit quietly) to 
LTTE policies.  Many blame the President's preoccupation with 
other issues (e.g., pacifying her pro-Marxist coalition 
partner, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP); ensuring her 
political longevity via a controversial referendum; and, more 
recently, distributing tsunami relief). 
 
3.  (C) Several contacts, including a political science 
professor at the University of Jaffna and a former local 
civil servant, attributed the slowdown in progress to a lack 
of interest in the Sinhalese-majority south in a long-term 
political resolution to the conflict.  Instead, they 
speculated, the Sinhalese and their political leadership may 
view the ceasefire as a satisfactory "settlement" and have no 
intention of pursuing further negotiations.  Even local 
government representatives, such as the Government Agent in 
Vavuniya and the Assistant Government Agent in Jaffna, voiced 
dismay at the slow pace of improvements promised after the 
Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), such as the provision of housing 
for persons internally displaced by the conflict.  According 
to M.S. Shanmugam, Government Agent in Vavuniya, only 2 
percent of the funding promised for housing by the World Bank 
and UNDP has come through for the internally displaced (IDPs) 
in his district, while not a single cent for housing 
reconstruction from the GSL has been received.  At this rate, 
housing reconstruction for the conflict-displaced in Vavuniya 
will take 18 years to complete, he concluded dismally. 
 
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HIGH SECURITY ZONES: 
HIGHLY RESENTED 
--------------------- 
 
 
4.  (C)  Although many interlocutors acknowledged that life 
has generally improved during the ceasefire, they also 
complained there have been no recent significant steps 
forward.  Instead, some claimed that the GSL was gradually 
and quietly chipping away at local residents' rights by 
imposing restrictions not agreed to in the CFA.  The GSL 
decision to exclude the High Security Zones (HSZs) from 
resettlement was one common irritant cited repeatedly in 
discussions.  (Note:  HSZs are areas deemed to be of special 
strategic or security importance by the Sri Lankan military. 
HSZs--much of which used to be residential areas before the 
conflict--are now occupied by the security forces.  IDPs 
whose former homes lie within an HSZ have not been permitted 
to return.  The TNA claims that about 30 percent of the land 
in Jaffna has been designated as HSZs; the actual total is 
significantly lower.)  One such IDP, TNA MP Mavai 
Senathirajah, has filed a case with the Supreme Court 
protesting the HSZs as a violation of his fundamental rights. 
 He said he plans to reject a GSL counter-offer of 
alternative land.  (Note: Senathirajah did not mention, of 
course, that the LTTE has imposed its own version of High 
Security Zones in the territory it controls.  In a separate 
meeting in Colombo, Human Rights Commissioner Radhika 
Coomaraswamy told poloff that the HSZ issue is a particularly 
tricky one for the Supreme Court since the establishment of 
HSZs can be legally justified only during a State of 
Emergency.  If the Supreme Court were to rule in favor of the 
GSL and approve the HSZs, she reasoned, it would also have to 
recommend reinstituting a State of Emergency.  She speculated 
that the Court will attempt to duck this politically 
unappealing scenario by dragging out the proceedings for as 
long as possible.) 
 
 
5.  (C)  According to Major General Sunil Tennekoon, 
Commander of Security Forces Headquarters in Jaffna, 
restrictions on the HSZs are necessary to ensure force 
protection; those restrictions could be relaxed if the LTTE 
demonstrates an improved commitment to maintaining the CFA. 
He has already opened up a buffer zone on the periphery of 
some of the HSZs to cultivation, he noted, and is waiting to 
see how this pilot program proceeds (and whether LTTE 
violations of the CFA continue) before deciding on further 
adjustments.  In a separate conversation in Ratnapura on 
April 6, however, Major General Susil Chandrapala, current 
Deputy Chief of Army Staff and Tennekoon's predecessor in 
Jaffna, sounded a more sympathetic note, indicating that he 
believed some of the IDPs' sense of grievance is justified. 
"A lot more could be done" to ameliorate the HSZ situation, 
he asserted, but personal political agendas and "vested 
interests among our own people" in the south had prevented 
his efforts to do so during his tenure. 
 
6.  (C)  A number of interlocutors, including Senathirajah, 
fellow TNA MP M.K. Eelaventhan, Assistant Government Agent V. 
Verabadravillai, human rights lawyer M. Remadious and former 
Municipal Commissioner C.V.K. Sivagnanam, also cited the 
abridgement of fishing rights  as another source of local 
dissatisfaction.  (Security forces have placed a number of 
restrictions on fishing conditions, including distances from 
shore, hours and the kinds of boats that may be used.)  The 
MPs, noting that fishing rights, like the HSZs, are not 
mentioned in the CFA, expressed concern that the GSL may be 
trying surreptitiously to re-introduce restrictions on local 
life aimed at bringing the north back to the status quo 
before the ceasefire--when the State of Emergency was still 
in effect. 
 
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DISAFFECTED YOUTH 
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7.  (C) A group of Jaffna University students who met with 
poloff March 31 expressed deep-seated skepticism that the 
GSL--especially with the JVP as a partner--is serious about 
the peace process.  Instead, they charged, President 
Kumaratunga is preoccupied with trying to change the 
electoral system and abolish the executive presidency--moves 
they believe would minimize minority representation in 
Parliament.  Rather than viewing the JVP as the main obstacle 
to a peaceful resolution, the students blamed the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party and the United National Party, which have 
alternated control of the government over the past 20 years, 
for prolonging the conflict.  Every time one seems ready to 
come to a settlement with the LTTE, the other party accuses 
it of selling out.  Sri Lanka is not only administered by the 
GSL, they asserted; the LTTE administers part of it.  The 
President should thus move ahead with constitutional changes 
recognizing that fact, they said.  When asked if the LTTE 
could also show greater flexibility, the group replied that 
the Tigers had already made significant concessions, e.g., 
revising the demand for a separate state; the ball was now in 
the GSL's court. 
 
8.  (C) Poloff asked the students how their lives would 
improve if the LTTE's proposal for an Interim Self-Governing 
Authority (ISGA) were implemented.   They quickly offered 
several responses:  the Sri Lanka Army would go away; the 
HSZs would disappear; there would be freedom of movement (no 
more checkpoints) and "freedom of action"; and residents' 
"economic needs would be satisfied" because foreign aid for 
reconstruction would begin flowing more freely.  (There 
seemed to be no expectation that private investment--and 
thus, perhaps, jobs for these soon-to-be graduates--would be 
forthcoming.)  When asked whether the LTTE would allow 
"freedom of action" under the ISGA to political opponents, 
the students fell silent and eventually changed the subject. 
(Comment:  Whatever their claims to "freedom of action" under 
the LTTE, the students' silence in response to this query 
suggested they do not believe they have freedom of speech. 
End comment.) 
 
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"JOINT MECHANISM": 
JAFFNA'S JAUNDICED VIEW 
------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) Many Tamil interlocutors blamed the GSL for continued 
delays in concluding a "joint mechanism" with the LTTE on 
tsunami aid (Ref A), viewing GSL hesitation as further proof 
 
SIPDIS 
of insincerity in the peace process.  Despite the absence of 
a formal mechanism, aid workers and local government 
authorities cited ongoing close and effective cooperation on 
tsunami relief at the working level between local GSL 
 
SIPDIS 
representatives and the LTTE.  The real value of agreement on 
a formal mechanism, most emphasized, would lie in the 
political message it signaled from the center.  Jaffna 
Assistant Government Agent Verabadravillai, noting that most 
of the tsunami-affected families in his district are in 
LTTE-controlled territory, said that there "should be some 
way of interaction at the political level" between the two 
parties; at the working level, however, coordination is 
strong.  C.V.K. Sivagnanam, Coordinator of the Jaffna Tsunami 
Task Force, stressed that communication and coordination on 
both sides are strong at the working level--but expressed 
quiet despair about prospects that the GSL would formally 
institutionalize those relations by signing on to the 
mechanism. 
 
10.  (C)  In a separate meeting with INGO representatives, 
UNHCR Durable Solutions Officer Agraj Dragaj echoed this 
sentiment, commenting that agreement on a joint mechanism 
"would demonstrate political will to resolve the (ethnic) 
problem" at the central level.  ICRC Head of Sub Delegation 
Fred Robarts agreed, describing agreement on a mechanism as 
"more of a political achievement at the central level" since 
local "coordination is (already) going ahead at a practical 
level."  He added that the LTTE-affiliated Tamil 
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), which had initially tried 
to dominate relief activities, has "become gradually more 
consultative."  The local CARITAS representative cited one 
possible practical benefit of the mechanism: quicker and more 
efficient clearance of relief items for the north.  He added 
that over USD 140,000 in relief items for his organization 
have been held up in Colombo for an extended period, pending 
Customs clearance.  (Note:  This problem is not limited to 
aid items intended for the north.  End note.) 
 
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CEASEFIRE:  OKAY FOR NOW 
-------------------------- 
 
11.  (C)  Despite the general sense of dissatisfaction with 
the lack of progress toward negotiations, few interlocutors 
foresaw an imminent break in the ceasefire.  (Comment:  The 
exception was the TNA, which routinely hints at a possible 
return to hostilities.)  Vavuniya has been generally quiet, 
according to sources there, with no assassinations by the 
LTTE or rival groups within the past six months.  A March 28 
grenade attack on the LTTE office in Vavuniya, which injured 
three people, was an anomaly, according to District Court 
Judge M. Elancheliyan.  He speculated that the EPRLF, a 
former anti-LTTE paramilitary group that he claims remains "a 
little close to the government" and has not been fully 
disarmed, was responsible.  Most interlocutors in Jaffna 
regarded the civil disturbances there earlier in March (Ref 
C) as a blip and stressed that tensions had eased since then. 
 Voitto Leinonen, Deputy Head of District for the Sri Lanka 
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), said that the recent civil unrest 
was not related to the CFA.  He described dialogue between 
the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) and the political wing of the LTTE 
as "good," adding that the two sides met monthly to iron out 
differences.  The two militaries have not met for two years, 
despite repeated requests from the SLA, he acknowledged. 
 
12.  (C)  A political science professor at the University of 
Jaffna told us he believes that the LTTE's desire to preserve 
the international image--and, to some extent, the 
attention--it has cultivated during the ceasefire will deter 
the Tigers from returning to hostilities.  Major General 
Tennekoon accused the LTTE of trying to capitalize on any 
incident to stoke further tensions.  (Accidents involving 
military vehicles, unfortunately, provide a handy pretext. 
According to one interlocutor, there were four such incidents 
in March alone, one of them fatal.)  Tennekoon discounted 
other interlocutors' assessment that the March protests were 
at least partially spontaneous; instead, he asserted, they 
were stage-managed entirely by the LTTE.  Most disturbing, he 
said, was that the LTTE had used schoolchildren in the 
demonstrations.  (Note:  This is not an entirely new 
development.  The LTTE used a similar tactic during the Point 
Pedro disturbances two years ago.  End note.)  Tennekoon said 
that he had protested the LTTE's manipulation of 
schoolchildren to the SLMM and UNICEF. 
 
13.  (C) Interlocutors offered several theories for what 
sparked the recent unrest.  The LTTE was trying to provoke 
incidents between the military and civilians, Tennekoon 
suggested, because the Tigers "don't want us to get closer to 
the people."  Despite Tiger attempts to undermine better 
civil-military relations, Tennekoon reported enthusiastic 
turnouts to the SLA's "hearts-and-minds" programs, i.e., 
sports events, medical clinics, blood drives, etc.  He has 
begun a Tamil instruction program for some of his soldiers, 
but acknowledged that only a handful of SLA personnel 
currently in Jaffna can speak the local language.  Senior 
Superintendent of Police (SSP) in Jaffna K.D.L. Dalpatadu 
said the Tigers are "trying to set the stage for a popular 
uprising."  He believes LTTE-agitated demonstrations are 
intended to "estimate the response from the security forces"; 
to improve the Tigers' intelligence collection capability; 
and to demoralize the security forces.  The Tamil-speaking 
SSP acknowledged, however, that there are sometimes 
legitimate civilian grievances that the security forces must 
work quickly to address.  For example, he reported, he had 
arrested two SLA soldiers and fired one of his own policemen 
who were accused of sexual assault.  The ICRC's Robarts said 
that the military sees the protests as an attempt to "test" 
its soldiers.  In general, he said, outbursts at the local 
level merely reflect the lack of good relations between the 
two sides "at the top."  He added, however, that ICRC had 
advised the LTTE not to use schoolchildren in demonstrations 
and to keep the protests peaceful. 
 
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COMMENT 
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14.  (C) Life has undoubtedly improved for residents of the 
north since the ceasefire, but the lack of progress toward 
the next difficult stage--resuming negotiations--for the past 
two years is creating a strong perception among the local 
community of disengagement--and disregard--in the capital. 
It is hard for visitors to Jaffna to overlook the stark sense 
of grievance among the local population, but President 
Kumaratunga (who has never been to Jaffna during her 10 years 
in office) may be in danger of doing just that.  The 
President may be calculating that the international sympathy 
the GSL gained as a result of the tsunami has alleviated the 
pressure on her to re-engage with the LTTE.  Local residents 
see it differently, however.  To them, the tsunami's heavy 
toll on Tamil communities (five of the eight worst-affected 
districts are either under complete LTTE control or contain 
significant pockets of LTTE control/influence) should mean 
greater GSL attention to these areas--and thus a greater need 
to engage with the LTTE on some level.  That the GSL 
continues to delay agreeing to a joint mechanism on tsunami 
relief--however legitimate the reasons for the delay may be 
(Ref A)--is viewed locally as just further evidence of 
Colombo's detachment and insincerity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LUNSTEAD