US embassy cable - 05QUITO773

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 000773 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PGOV, MASS, MOPS, SNAR, PTER, EC 
SUBJECT: WELCOME TO ECUADOR, GENERAL MYERS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
1.  (U) On behalf of the Mission Ecuador team, General, 
please accept a hearty welcome to Ecuador.  Into your three 
hour stop we have packed a bilat with GoE President Lucio 
Gutierrez, a press conference with your joint chief 
counterpart, and a working lunch with the Ecuadorian high 
command; the tight schedule unfortunately precludes a visit 
to the Cooperative Security Location in coastal city Manta, 
one of the largest U.S. military facilities south of the Rio 
Grande.  In your public and private commentary, we suggest 
you focus on praising Ecuador's contributions to the War on 
Drugs and hemispheric security, as evidenced by the 
buttressing of its border with Colombia and GoE troop 
contributions to peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Haiti and 
elsewhere.  You and I can discuss on arrival the current 
political situation and how you might use your public 
comments to support democracy, dialogue, and stability. 
 
-------------------- 
Instability the Norm 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (U) Few hemispheric nations rival Ecuador for sheer 
political instability.  Since 1996, six or nine (depending 
how you count) presidents have held office, several deposed 
on quasi-constitutional grounds.  "Fractious" describes 
Ecuador's political environment; over a dozen parties hold 
seats in Congress, and some 150 groups fielded candidates in 
October 2004 regional elections.  Instability and Ecuador's 
endemic corruption go hand in hand, as many victors, 
believing their time in office brief, endeavor to raid the 
trough early. 
 
3.  (SBU) Ecuador's economy is equally volatile, as bad 
statistics have leveled administrations and sent presidents 
into exile.  Gutierrez has been fortunate, however, that oil 
prices have skyrocketed on his watch, permitting the GoE 
leeway to meet payrolls, pay off political rivals, and reduce 
debt.  The windfall has masked structural inadequacies, 
however, and allowed postponement of needed reforms.  The oil 
sector is a perfect example, where declining production in 
government-run fields has kept Ecuador from exploiting 
petroleum's price rise.  Other concerns are the dismal 
investment climate here, judicial insecurity, and habitual 
disrespect for contracts. 
 
----------------------------- 
And Peaking Upon Your Arrival 
----------------------------- 
 
4.  (SBU) You arrive at a difficult juncture, with Ecuador's 
shallow-rooted democracy again under fire from the nation's 
numerous, me-first political actors.  The current instability 
could threaten U.S. counter-narcotics and security assistance 
programs, should a populist "solution" arise.  As usual, both 
government and opposition are attempting to drag us into the 
debate.  Our response?  The United States supports Ecuadorian 
institutions, not individuals, and certainly not one party 
over another. 
 
5.  (SBU) President Lucio Gutierrez took office in January 
2003 with popularity ratings approaching 60 percent.  The 
honeymoon was short-lived, however.  Owing to the president's 
turn toward fiscal austerity and his "cozying up" (their 
term, not ours) to Washington, Gutierrez's left-leaning 
coalition lasted a scant six months.  Since, he's pacted and 
unpacted with parties spanning the spectrum, sometimes to 
secure legislation packages but mostly to save his own skin. 
He has reason to:  Ecuador's political elites despise the 
mestizo former Army colonel. 
 
6.  (U) Gutierrez looked ready to fall in November, when the 
opposition attempted to impeach him on suspect grounds.  Not 
only did he survive, though, he mounted a counter-offensive 
to build a Congressional majority and overhaul Ecuador's 
highest tribunals, which he claimed were corrupt and beholden 
to political masters.  However, Gutierrez's moves against the 
judiciary backfired, uniting his opponents in a drive to 
replace (again) the still-politicized Supreme Court, perhaps 
taking down the president down in the process. 
 
7.  (U) A recent Court decision absolving exiled ex-president 
and Gutierrez ally Abdala Bucaram further infuriated the 
opposition.  Large disturbances occurred April 5-6, with 
protesters clashing with police outside government buildings. 
 The "Assembly of Quito," an ad hoc alliance of disparate 
opposition elements led by Quito Mayor (and former Ecuadorian 
Joint Forces Commander) Paco Moncayo, is demanding 
Gutierrez's ouster, claiming the time for dialog over. 
Further protests are scheduled this week, and Assembly 
leaders have called for an April 12 national strike. 
Gutierrez reportedly considered, but ruled out declaring a 
state of emergency in response. 
 
------------------------ 
Suggestions on Substance 
------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) Owing to pressing political problems, Gutierrez might 
be distracted from discussing bilateral pol-mil specifics 
during your palace call.  He is not apt to engage on 
controversial initiatives, whether Article 98 or Ecuadorian 
contributions to the coalition against terror.  We therefore 
recommend you raise positive security developments occurring 
on his watch, from ratcheting up Ecuador's northern border 
troop presence to capturing and deporting to Colombian FARC 
leader Simon Trinidad in 2004. 
 
9.  (SBU) Prospects for productive talks look better with 
Admiral Victor Rosero, your counterpart as Ecuadorian joint 
forces commander.  Savvy and U.S.-friendly -- he regularly 
refers to stints in Newport and Washington as career-making 
postings -- Rosero understands the changing threats Ecuador 
faces and the need to confront them.  Not the president's 
favorite, we continue to worry his tenure might be cut short. 
 We therefore hope your joint press availability with the 
affable admiral raises his public profile. 
 
10.  (C) Perhaps his greatest challenge, Rosero seeks to 
"re-invent" Ecuador's military before his CJCS term ends in 
2006.  He has welcomed support from the Center for 
Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), affiliated with the 
National Defense University in Washington.  To ensure 
success, however, we have endeavored to keep CHDS's 
participation under the radar, as nationalists would view any 
U.S. restructuring role as meddling.  In your private remarks 
with Rosero, we suggest you request a readout on re-invention 
progress and offer continued USG support. 
 
11.  (C) Another Rosero initiative is to increase the 
Ecuadorian military's hemispheric stature via participation 
in multilateral exercises and operations, especially 
peacekeeping.  Ecuadorian combat engineers deployed to Haiti 
last November as part of the MINUSTAH contingent.  The GoE 
has renewed its Haiti commitment an additional six months; we 
suggest you raise PKO in your public comments and ask Rosero 
privately if Ecuador remains amenable to future 
contributions.  War on Terror operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq were unpopular here, however, meaning USG efforts to 
recruit Ecuadorian forces for Coalition PKO duties there are 
likely wasted breath. 
 
12. (C) Domestic politics re-appear vis-a-vis security 
cooperation with northern neighbor Colombia.  Plan Colombia 
is widely misunderstood and wildly unpopular across Ecuador's 
political spectrum, and "involvement in Colombia" a political 
third rail.  Rosero hopes you not use the term 
"narcoterrorists" in your public commentary, as Ecuador has 
not such labeled the illegal armed groups (and he fears 
backlash from the left).  Nonetheless, Ecuador's northern 
force posture has tripled recently, units are patrolling the 
frontier's difficult terrain, and there have been no 
large-scale FARC incursions into Ecuador.  Recent media play 
has questioned the large expense the GoE incurs in the border 
deployment, however.  We therefore recommend you push a "stay 
the course" message. 
 
13.  (C) Had your schedule permitted, I would have liked to 
show off the Manta Cooperative Security Location (CSL), a 
counter-narcotics U.S. Forward Operating Location on the 
Ecuadorian coast.  On-line since September 2002, CSL-launched 
aircraft have provided intelligence contributing to numerous 
drug-runner takedowns.  The facility will never be popular 
here, especially among elites -- what Latin American nation 
wants foreign troops on its soil? -- but interagency efforts 
have resulted in a great increase in CSL acceptance.  The 
agreement granting us use of Manta expires in 2009; while 
we've received no instructions to renegotiate, we are 
attempting to reduce barriers to successful talks. 
 
14.  (C) "All Ecuador wants a Manta," Rosero has told me 
privately, referring mainly to the economic renaissance the 
city has enjoyed since the CSL's establishment.  Coordination 
improvements between Ecuadorian and U.S. air forces is also a 
source of pride, and our hosts are considering a formal 
request that CSL aircraft gather northern border intelligence 
for GoE use.  Hoping to keep the public spotlight off the 
facility, however, Rosero wishes you minimize its reference 
in your public comments.  I have some ideas on how we can 
meet his request while still "selling" bilateral Manta 
benefits. 
 
15.  (C) I cannot avoid mention of Article 98.  Few efforts 
have frustrated similarly; the Embassy initiated Article 98 
discussions before my arrival at post, yet is no closer to a 
deal now than then.  Reasons are many, ranging from Ecuador's 
counterproductive sovereignty concerns to a December 2002 
shooting involving an official American that called into 
question foreigners' immunities.  We've targeted various 
pressure points for our lobbying effort, including the 
Foreign Ministry, armed forces, Congress, and Gutierrez 
himself.  The diplomats and legislators ignore our 
entreaties, the uniforms claim it's a diplomatic matter, and 
Gutierrez says he wants a deal, but has yet to energize his 
negotiators. 
 
16.  (C) We continue to re-think tactics and approach fresh 
interlocutors.  That said, I see little hope until the 
president nears the end of his term (2007).  As Ecuador's 
constitution prevents consecutive re-election, a lame-duck 
Gutierrez might prove receptive to signing Article 98. 
Meanwhile, ASPA sanctions, especially those restricting U.S. 
training opportunities (IMET), are costing us influence with 
the Ecuadorian military.  Rosero is hoping that limitations 
on IMET be lifted and will be interested in hearing your 
views. 
KENNEY