US embassy cable - 05SANAA882

S E C R E T SANAA 000882 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ 
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, PREL, PTER, EAC, COUNTER TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/07/2005 
 
REF: A. SANAA 876 
 
     B. SANAA 875 
     C. SANAA 863 
     D. SANAA 860 
     E. SANAA 836 
 
Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary:  The Charge d' Affaires (CDA) convened a 
core EAC meeting at 1200 noon, on April 07, 2005, to review 
the current threat conditions at post.  Following core EAC 
review, CDA decided to call an expanded EAC to decide upon 
further steps necessary to inform and protect the community. 
The EAC decided to restrict non-essential travel, share 
pre-cautions via a warden message with the community, 
continue focus on preventing non-essential TDY visits in 
country and recommended requesting "Authorized Departure" for 
eligible personnel.  Key offices and personnel represented at 
the meeting included: CDA, CONS, DAO, FBI, FPD, IPC, MO, OMC, 
POLE, RSO, RMAS, USAID 
 
2.  (S/NF)  RMAS informed the EAC that to date no 
intervention had occured against the terrorist cell currently 
being tracked by USG and ROYG agencies.  Based on information 
reviewed, EAC members were told that attack planning was in 
progress, the threat remained serious and unpredictable and 
little was known about the location, method and target of 
attack.  Furthermore, the latest information points to a 
higher possibility of imminent attacks.  Therefore, EAC 
members determined that the threat warranted the following 
security steps in an attempt to shield the community from 
violence: 
 
- Send a Warden Message to the community advising avoidance 
of any non-essential travel or movement in Sanaa and other 
major cities. 
- Restrict employee travel to essential personnel traveling 
to the Embassy in armored vehicles on sporadic schedules. 
- Close the Embassy for the first work day, Saturday, with 
reassessment to determine the necessity for closing the 
Embassy additional days. 
- Suspend programs at Yemen American Language Institute 
(YALI) in line with Embassy closings. 
- Recommend additional security measures to the Sanaa 
International School. 
- Request (SEPTEL) Department approval for "Authorized 
Departure" of eligible personnel. 
- Continue focus on sending home early or denying country 
clearance of TDY personnel not seen as critical for the 
enhancement of life-safety. 
- Continue to monitor dramatic changes in employee travel 
times and routes to and from the Embassy. 
- Activate the phone tree emergency notification system and 
remind the community to monitor the Emergency and Evacuation 
(E&E) radio network. 
 
3. (SBU) RSO recommended and Charge accepted re-locating 
himself to the Ambassador's residence on the Embassy compound 
to reduce protective service requirements to an from work and 
lower his profile by staying on the Embassy compound except 
for essential liaison with the ROYG. 
 
4.  (C/NF)  The Charge advised the EAC that he met with the 
Minister of Interior who assured him that extra measures 
would be taken per RSO's previous request to protect the 
Sheraton Hotel, Embassy compound, residences of the American 
Embassy as well as streets and avenues of approach between 
the Embassy and residential areas. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  RSO revisited security at YALI with the MOI the 
morning of 7 April 2005.  Additionally, RSO is working with 
RMAS to develop a tear line to share with MOI providing names 
and additional details regarding the threat. 
 
6.  (SBU) The EAC decided to reconvene a core EAC meeting on 
Friday, 8 April 2005, to look into security updates and 
decide if more measures are needed or if an expanded EAC 
needs to be convened. 
Khoury