US embassy cable - 05MADRID1353

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001353 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2015 
TAGS: PTER, MO, SP 
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL SEES LITTLE PROGRESS ON WESTERN SAHARA 
 
REF: A) MADRID 1324 B) ALGIERS 599 
 
Classified By: Poloff Ricardo Zuniga; reason 1.4 (b). 
 
1. (C) MFA DAS for Maghreb Affairs Carlos Fernandez Arias 
told poloff on March 31 that Spain sees few signs of progress 
in negotiations to resolve the Western Sahara dispute and 
only limited indications of improved Moroccan-Algerian 
relations.  Arias (protect) said FM Moratinos and other GOS 
political figures were more optimistic than he was about the 
chances for advancing on the Western Sahara issue, a point 
borne out by FM Moratinos' emphatic support for moving ahead 
expressed during his meeting with the Deputy Secretary on 
April 2 (Ref A).  Arias' analysis was that all of the parties 
are entrenched in their positions and feel little pressure to 
compromise.  On a more positive note, Arias said that none of 
the actors, including Polisario, contemplated a resumption of 
military operations as a viable means for breaking the 
impasse. 
 
2. (C) On Moroccan-Algerian relations and the recent meeting 
between Bouteflika and King Hassan (Ref B), Arias said the 
high level meeting made him "cautiously optimistic" that both 
sides were at least interested in toning down their 
disagreement.  He viewed the lack of substantive press 
reporting on the meeting as a positive indicator, since 
official silence implied the two leaders engaged in a serious 
discussion of the issues rather than political posturing. 
 
3. (C) Arias said Morocco was unsettled by Algerian and 
Polisario diplomatic successes over the last year and seemed 
to using this period of relative inactivity on Western Sahara 
to mount its own diplomatic offensive, for example in Latin 
America.  He said Morocco understood that it had been 
repeatedly outflanked by the other parties to the dispute, 
for example by South Africa's decision to support Sahrawi 
self-determination, and was undertaking a serious effort to 
broaden its support. 
 
4. (C) Arias suggested the international community's next 
steps should remain focused on building confidence, 
humanitarian projects, and building up the stature of the 
Arab Maghreb Union, setting aside thornier issues for a more 
propitious moment.  Arias said that if events began to take a 
more positive turn, it would be essential for a U.S. figure 
of James Baker's stature to replace de Soto as the Special 
Representative of the  so that the parties would feel 
pressure to negotiate.  He said he'd heard mention of a 
possible Latin American candidate to replace de Soto, but 
insisted that only a USG figure would have the political 
weight to push the parties forward when necessary. 
 
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COMMENT 
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5. (C) Spain has significant strategic interests in seeing a 
settlement on Western Sahara in order to remove the main 
irritant in Moroccan-Algerian relations and thereby solidify 
Spain's unstable southern flank, but domestic political 
pressure is another important factor in Moratinos' desire to 
move ahead quickly.  Zapatero's overtures to Morocco have 
accomplished much in terms of improved security cooperation 
and diplomatic relations with Rabat, but the GOS has little 
to show for it on Western Sahara.  This leaves Zapatero open 
to opposition criticism that his tilt towards Morocco has 
come at the expense of the Sahrawis, whose cause enjoys broad 
popular support in Spain.  We have tried to convey our 
skepticism that a major U.S. figure would be willing to step 
in where Baker had been unsuccessful, but expect Moratinos 
and others to continue hoping for direct, high-le