US embassy cable - 05KINSHASA581

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000581 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, CG 
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR POST INPUT ON GWOT ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: SECSTATE 60775 
 
Classified By: Poloff Gons Nachman for Reasons 1.4 B and D 
 
1. (C) Although there is no evidence of current terrorist 
activity in the DRC, factors that could increase future risks 
include widespread corruption, lack of effective government 
authority around the country, weak state institutions, and 
abundant mineral resources including uranium. The areas 
outlined below represent Post's assessments of the 
counterterrorism needs for the Congo. 
 
Airport and Border Security 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (C) The main airport in the Congo is Ndjili Airport in 
Kinshasa. This facility is in dismal condition (i.e. even the 
x-ray machine rarely works), and immigration and customs 
officers are poorly trained and easily influenced. 
Additionally, the country has 54 border posts, some of which 
are manned on a part-time basis while others are not manned 
at all. In many areas of the country, such as Ituri, the 
border is completely porous and armed groups engage in 
international arms trafficking. 
 
3. (C) Congolese immigration and customs officials would 
benefit from greater training on border protection including 
document fraud, terrorism indicators, and recruitment of 
informants. The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) 
in Gaborone would be one option, an INL program could be 
another. 
 
Money Laundering 
---------------- 
 
4. (U) Although the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is 
not a regional financial center, its porous borders, lack of 
a well-regulated banking sector and functional judicial 
system, and inadequate enforcement resources make it 
susceptible to money laundering. Smuggling is widespread 
throughout the DRC, and money laundering often involves the 
proceeds from illicit import/export activities and diamond 
sales. Money laundering also is prevalent in the money 
transfer agencies in the DRC and their associated exchange 
facilities. Most economic activity in the DRC takes place in 
the informal sector, estimated to be at least four times the 
size of the formal sector, with most transactions, even those 
of legitimate businesses, carried out in cash. 
 
5. (C) There is a large Lebanese community heavily involved 
in the rough diamond trade, money transfer agencies, and 
export/import activities. Indo-Pakistani Muslims are also 
involved in export/import and banking activities. It is 
unclear to what extent those activities might support money 
laundering and/or terrorist finance of groups such as 
Hizbollah or Al Qaeda. 
 
6. (C) The Congolese government is attempting to improve 
banking security. With the assistance of the World Bank, the 
Congolese Central Bank and the IMF, the GDRC recently passed 
legislation criminalizing money laundering. Banks and 
non-banking financial institutions are now required to report 
all transactions over $10,000. Several insolvent banks have 
been liquidated. New computerized communications and 
accounting networks are to be installed to increase 
traceability of formal financial transactions. The GDRC, 
however, lacks the training, resources and expertise to 
effectively enforce the new legislation criminalizing money 
laundering and terrorist financing. The country needs 
assistance in developing a viable anti-money laundering 
agency within the law enforcement branch of its government. 
Treasury's financial crimes unit program could be useful in 
this regard. 
MEECE