US embassy cable - 05DJIBOUTI337

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000337 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR A/S NEWMAN FROM AMBASSADOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, DJ 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: POLITICAL CLARITY, EDUCATION AND PERSONAL 
CONTACT 
 
REF: STATE 60775 
 
Classified by: Ambassador Marguerita D. Ragsdale for reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d). 
 
1. (S) A successful effort to prosecute the global anti-terrorism war, 
especially in countries that already harbor extremists, must proceed on 
two levels. On one level, the U.S. must create a strategy for framing, 
implementing, marketing and obtaining support for national political 
preferences. On a second, it should continue to focus on country- 
specific plans of action tailored to the needs and characteristics of 
individual states particularly vulnerable to ideologies and ideas that 
contravene our own. Working both levels simultaneously would deprive 
extremism of the destitute, the disenfranchised and the disaffected 
whom it seeks to use to advance its cause. 
 
2. (S) On both levels, several actions would appear critical: 
- Match our actions with our rhetoric; 
- Harmonize policies and goals across disparate agencies; 
- Clearly articulate our expectations and consistently hold ourselves, 
our allies and other nations to those expectations; 
- Continue the capacity-building dimension of our economic assistance 
programs and act at the same time to augment projects that provide 
direct, quick, and visible impact in changing the daily lives of the 
vulnerable individuals in poor societies; 
- Use direct engagement and the popular quest and desire for education 
as a path to economic prosperity, to reach out to youth in order to 
encourage stability and promote alternatives to extremism. 
 
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National Preferences Clarified 
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3. (S) The way America is perceived by foreign populations is arguably 
the most important factor in the global war on terrorism and an 
indicator of our success or failure to date. Here the focus is image. 
International perceptions of us rest increasingly on international 
perceptions of our policies writ large. Our convictions of the 
rightness of our policies should be backed by a capacity to explain 
those policies in the most basic terms, both in Washington and abroad. 
The policies we convey must make sense to those tasked to convey them 
before they can make sense to those who must hear and understand them. 
In a world of high-tech communication and literacy capacities that are 
often weak, clarity is more and more key to making our position heard 
and understood in an increasingly skeptical world. 
 
4. (S) Yet the appearance of balance in our policies is important for 
our image as well. If we are to persuade others of our credibility, 
then we must use our political and economic clout to advance fair and 
equitable outcomes for international questions in which we are engaged. 
We are not expected to provide less than that. Problems arise when the 
content of our policies is seen as inconsistent with actions taken. A 
resulting sentiment among those we want most to influence would be that 
the United States only stands up for a cause when the cause is self- 
serving. This is often prime fuel for competing ideologies and ideals. 
Those of us in the field cannot be persuasive on a defined policy point 
if the actions of our nation contradict -- subtly or not -- the very 
message we are asked to put forward. For our message to be heard and 
embraced, we must hold other nations, and ourselves, to the standards 
we set. Similarly, we must hold countries -- whether friend or foe -- 
accountable for the actions they take. We also must hold ourselves 
accountable publicly, as we did in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse cases, 
when circumstances warrant. 
 
5. (S) Our external policies must also be consistent, without 
appearance of bias specifically on ethnic, racial, or religious lines. 
These three sensitive areas will continue to pose the greatest 
challenge in the image wars for the United States among developing 
nations. This is due in part to no lack of hesitation by those who 
oppose us to seek themes that might resonate with the economically 
disadvantaged. We can effectively challenge these themes through 
delivery of quick, visible and direct assistance to the most vulnerable 
populations. Capacity-building and long-term training, while desirable, 
can only go so far to win American influence if the population does not 
clearly perceive a tangible and direct benefit of assistance provided. 
China, for example, has been especially successful in Africa in this 
regard. In addition, quick impact and direct assistance have become 
most successful tools for our extremist detractors. For the volume of 
U.S. assistance given worldwide, approaching some $ x billion annually, 
we should demand far greater return of good will from our sizeable 
investment than we appear to have been able to garner post-September 
11. 
 
6. (S) The way we showcase American democratic values is also vital to 
our success in the global war on terrorism. Our values, which are clear 
and indisputable, must be seen in our actions on a daily basis and in 
the choices we make as a nation. The values cannot be perceived as 
shifting when a course of events is not to our liking. In a similar 
vein, we must be consistent in our definition of terrorism and of 
terrorist acts. If the U.S. decries, for example, one action as 
"terrorism" because it does not suit our purposes, yet tacitly condones 
a similar action that might be characterized as "terrorism" because it 
does, our commitments are called into question, especially by our 
partners and allies. Those who perceive U.S. actions in such a scenario 
as self-serving, and not for the greater good, are unwilling to commit 
for the long haul to aid the fight against terror and tyranny. 
Individuals in a poor or conflict-ridden country must be able to know 
the value of democracy firsthand. Our assistance to these countries may 
be the best way to start development of a nation's economy and 
democratic spirit. 
 
7. (S) For greater outreach specifically in the troubled Islamic world, 
the U.S. along with its Russian and EU partners, must also use all 
possible economic and political leverage with the Palestinian Authority 
and with Israel to bring about on an urgent basis a fair and equitable 
solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This conflict, more than 
others in the Middle East, has simmered too long and has become an 
easy, and unfortunately, resonant target for those detractors who 
portray the U.S. as complicit in the human suffering there. "Fair and 
equitable" are key words. It appears that a solution would not be 
considered "fair and equitable" in the Islamic world if it encompassed, 
for example, a cantoned or disjointed Palestinian entity. In making 
every effort to assist the Palestinians and Israelis resolve their 
differences without appearing -- and appearance is primary -- to favor 
one party or the other, we would swiftly eliminate a major "cause 
celebre" among some of our fiercest critics in this volatile region of 
the world. The U.S. image in the Middle East, and in the larger Islamic 
world, is unlikely to improve over time without our committed 
engagement to seek a solution that takes into account these concerns. 
 
8. (S) Increasingly important, as pressure on U.S. government resources 
rises, is the need to translate our democratic ideals into policies at 
the national level that have been well-coordinated among all agencies 
in the USG. Without inter-agency coordination, policy standardization 
cannot be achieved and policy implementation will be haphazard at best. 
This state of affairs will do little to convey consistency of message 
across cultural lines. 
 
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Country-Specific Tactics Applied Locally 
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9. (C) Our country team believes person-to-person engagement and 
popular education are superb approaches to winning the GWOT in 
Djibouti. The demographics and politics of Djibouti necessitate youth 
engagement. We believe that programs and activities that involve a 
high-school/young adult audience are more likely to build a sense of 
community responsibility and favor democracy than those aimed at 
established professionals. If we can engage a young Djiboutian in a 
program that promotes community involvement and social consciousness 
and at the same time exposes him or her to personal interaction with 
Americans, we believe that person will more likely develop into an 
adult who will shoulder seriously his civic responsibilities. The 
development of a socially conscious youth can contain extremist 
ideology and serve economic development. 
 
10. (C) We can also engage the country's youth by focusing on training 
of teachers. The teacher community is a natural bridge to the larger 
student body. The youth of Djibouti are avid learners, eager to take on 
new languages and challenges. We must exploit the opportunity presented 
by this eagerness. It is our expectation that teachers of English, and 
other subjects, properly trained and motivated, will be able to pass 
the message of our democratic values to their students. 
 
11. (C) Interagency programming cooperation is also a key aspect of our 
successes in Djibouti. In working together as a country team to combine 
resources for programs that might otherwise overlap, we maximize the 
resources of each agency. Public Diplomacy outreach, combined with 
USAID education efforts, and Department of Defense civil affairs 
projects, through CJTF-HOA, have been the Embassy's best tools at our 
disposal in countering the negative aspects of poverty. CJTF-HOA's 
particular outreach success in quick impact projects such as well 
digging, school refurbishment, and clinic reparations has created 
enormous goodwill for the U.S. in this country. We would like to see 
these kinds of activities by CJTF-HOA increased. In addition, USAID's 
cooperation with the Government of Djibouti's Education Ministry in its 
efforts to nationalize curricula in both private and public schools, 
including the many Islamic education institutes, is a necessary step 
toward reaching our target audience. Education programs can address 
Djibouti's long-term skills needs for both academically educated and 
vocationally trained youth. As it is often difficult to initiate 
cooperation with the Islamic schools directly, we believe the best 
approach to reaching these children and youth is through community 
activities. We have had success with small-scale programs such as 
hosting soccer tournaments and Embassy-sponsored essay contests. To 
have the greatest impact with these small programs, it would be prudent 
to expand cooperation among agencies and to increase the volume of 
American individual involvement at a popular level. 
 
12. (C) Skills training will also play an important role in how 
successful we are in the global war on terrorism. A lack of skilled 
workers in Djibouti results in poor quality products and a high rate of 
unemployment. These conditions are a breeding ground for discontent and 
are easily exploited by those with more narrow agendas. By encouraging 
economic growth, our aim would be to increase the stake an individual 
has in his country, thus making it far more difficult for extremist 
ideology to gain a foothold. 
RAGSDALE