US embassy cable - 05ANKARA2023

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, TU 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: POST FEEDBACK 
 
REF: ANKARA 005116 
 
(U) Classified Secret by Ambassador Eric Edelman for E.O. 
12958 Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
1. (S/NF) Summary.  There is significant US-Turkish 
cooperation in the GWOT.  Better coordination among Turkish 
intelligence and the various security services could improve 
Turkish leaders, understanding of the threat and 
effectiveness in cooperation with us.  The Turkish National 
Police provides excellent protection for U.S. diplomatic and 
military facilities.  The GOT,s counterterror (CT) finance 
regime, however, lacks sufficient legal authority and is weak 
on enforcement.  The CT finance regime would benefit from 
additional pressure from FATF, the relevant UN committees, 
and higher level USG engagement.  The lack of visible U.S. 
action against the PKK/Kongra-Gel in Iraq has not yet had a 
significant negative impact on US-Turkish CT cooperation; but 
continued U.S. inaction could eventually lead to 
deterioration in the ability or willingness of Turkish 
officials to cooperate with the USG.  End Summary. 
 
 
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SUCCESSES: STRONG US-TURKISH COOPERATION 
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2. (S/NF) We have good relations with and receive significant 
cooperation on antiterrorism from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Turkish National Police (TNP), the National 
Intelligence Organization (MIT), and other Turkish agencies. 
TNP provides excellent protection for U.S. diplomatic and 
military facilities throughout Turkey.  In addition to 
sharing intelligence information on various groups operating 
in Turkey, the TNP and the MIT are conducting aggressive 
counterterrorist campaigns and have detained numerous 
suspected terrorists in scores of raids, disrupting these 
groups before terrorist acts could be carried out.  TNP was 
extremely active and aggressive in monitoring and, in some 
cases, proactively detaining suspected terrorists prior to 
the June 2004 POTUS visit and NATO Summit in Istanbul. 
Interagency cooperation among Turkish services suffers from 
philosophical differences or turf battles, and a systemic 
weakness of analysis and coordination.  The weak analysis 
causes Turkish services and politicians to underestimate the 
degree they are targets and the importance of transit and 
support networks for international terror.  The Turks are 
also very reticent about sharing information on their own 
citizens. 
 
3. (U) Turkey remains a good ally in the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).  Turkey agreed to assume command of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan 
for a second time.  It will command ISAF VII from February to 
August 2005, contributing up to 1,600 troops.  The US and 
Turkish militaries are also cooperating in the training of 
Georgian and Azerbaijani security forces. 
 
4. (U) Turkey permits the transport to Iraq of humanitarian 
goods; contributes humanitarian goods and services; and sells 
vital material such as fuel, food, and water to U.S. forces 
in Iraq.  They also allow the use of Incirlik Air Base for 
U.S. tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both 
Operational Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF).  The GOT also allowed Incirlik to be used for 
the outbound rotation of US troops returning from Iraq. 
Turkey, moreover, is active in Iraqi reconstruction efforts, 
including the provision of electricity and the training of 
Iraqi diplomats, as well as contributing to the NATO training 
mission for Iraqi security forces. 
 
5. (C) Turkish officials provide excellent assistance 
regarding the VISA VIPER program.  Every month the Embassy 
receives the names of about 200 suspected Turkish terrorists 
from the Turkish authorities.  Most are domestic 
PKK/Kongra-Gel or leftist terrorists, but we have begun to 
see Al-Qaida affiliated suspects on these lists. 
 
6. (C) The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program has been 
very successful in providing training to our Turkish 
partners.  Turkish officials are eager participants in ATA 
training programs and, according to reports we have received, 
Turks are among the best students in these classes. 
 
 
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MISCELLANEOUS CHALLENGES 
------------------------ 
7. (S/NF) One impediment to greater cooperation with the GOT 
is the perception among Turkish leaders and the public that 
the USG is more focused on "their terrorists" (e.g. Al-Qaida 
and Hezbollah) than on Turkish concerns regarding "our 
terrorists" (e.g. DHKP-C and PKK/Kongra-Gel).  Turkish 
security and intelligence officials tend to be more focused 
and cooperative on terrorism issues directly related to 
Turkish security concerns than on other terrorism problems. 
Since 9-11 and especially since the November 2003 Istanbul 
bombings, there has been greater understanding and 
cooperation from Turkish officials at the working level 
regarding the threat posed to Turkey by terrorists linked to 
Al-Qaida, but problems persist. 
 
8. (S/NF) The Turks are not always transparent in their 
cooperation with the USG.  Although the Turks are good at 
sharing information, they have been willing to engage in 
joint operations against counterterrorism targets 
sporadically, deciding to approach a target based on 
capabilities and requirements.  The GOT responds to our 
requests, but sometimes significant periods of time may go by 
before we are informed about any progress on a specific 
counterterrorism issue. 
 
9. (S/NF) Standards regarding the implementation of the Leahy 
Amendment as applied to State/INL law enforcement training 
funding continue to prevent some forms of useful cooperation. 
 Because the GOT is unwilling to accept standard language in 
an agreement, funds for Turkey were cut.  According to 
agencies here with regional responsibilities, other U.S. 
missions in the region have an easier time gaining access to 
training funds for security officials, despite Turkey,s 
human rights record being equivalent or better. 
 
 
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THE TERROR FINANCE CHALLENGE 
---------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) In compliance with UN Security Resolution 1373, 
Turkey has ratified all United Nations conventions on 
combating terrorism.  However, Turkey has acted (by Council 
of Ministers decrees) to freeze the assets only of those 
terrorist organizations, persons, and entities designated 
pursuant to UN Security Council resolution 1267 (relating to 
Taliban and Al-Qaida), because Turkish law does not currently 
permit it to freeze the assets of other such organizations, 
persons, and entities.  Turkish efforts to seize the assets 
of those who fund terrorist organizations have been further 
hampered by limited political will, weak technical capacity 
and limited cooperation between agencies. 
 
 
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THE LONG TERM CHALLENGE: THE PKK ISSUE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
11. (S/NF) The PKK/Kongra-Gel has stepped up its terror 
campaign in Turkey since revoking its "unilateral" ceasefire 
on 1 June 2004.  Turkish policymakers remind us regularly 
that President Bush told their leaders during his June 2004 
visit here that we remained committed to take action to 
prevent the PKK from continuing its safehaven in Iraq, and 
they are waiting impatiently.  Our continued inaction against 
the PKK in Iraq, even non-military measures, especially as 
the organization steps up its attacks against this NATO ally, 
gives those who oppose our overall policy in the region a 
wedge issue in their effort to move Turkish policy away from 
a western orientation. 
 
12. (S/NF) The lack of visible U.S. military or political 
action against the PKK/Kongra-Gel has also significantly 
contributed to the anti-American political environment in 
Turkey.  Turkish newspapers and television programs are 
filled with conspiracy theories asserting that the U.S. is 
supporting the PKK; promoting an independent "Kurdistan" in 
northern Iraq (which, the theory goes, will inevitably expand 
to include southeast Turkey); and pursuing a foreign policy 
designed to weaken the Turkish Republic.  Although we do not 
believe that the lack of U.S. action against PKK has 
negatively impacted US-Turkish CT cooperation so far, 
continued U.S. inaction could eventually lead to a 
significant deterioration in the ability or willingness of 
Turkish officials to cooperate with the U.S. 
 
 
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POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
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13. (C) A number of steps could be taken to improve 
U.S.-Turkish cooperation in the GWOT.  The GOT could use more 
assistance in acquiring technical equipment, including 
computers.  The Turks would also benefit from training 
programs focused on computer networking, computer forensics, 
and maritime security. 
 
14. (C) With regards to the GOT,s counterterror finance 
regime, the GOT,s plans to criminalize terror finance; 
define terrorism in accordance with international standards; 
and streamline its financial intelligence unit, the Financial 
Crimes Investigative Board (MASAK), are important steps 
towards strengthening the regime. The USG, along with the 
FATF, Egmont, the UN, and the EU, should continue to look for 
ways to keep the pressure on the GOT to follow through with 
its proposed reforms. 
15. (C) Furthermore, the USG should continue its 
long-standing engagement with the GOT with training in 
counterterror finance as well as pursue high level engagement 
on policy.  Such engagement might be useful in order to raise 
the profile of this issue at senior levels of the GOT and 
give the bureaucrats, work a top-down push to speed up 
enactment of legal reforms. 
 
16. (C) Another area that can be used as leverage is 
Turkey,s upcoming review by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) at the end of 2005/beginning of 2006.  The GOT is much 
more likely to take action if it is getting pressure from 
other sources, in addition to US pressure.  MASAK seems to 
put great store in improving its image in FATF.  US 
representatives to FATF could raise the issue and seek ways 
for FATF to engage with Turkey prior to the upcoming review. 
In addition, the GOT, especially the MFA, are sensitive to 
meeting their obligations to the UN.  The US could look into 
the possibility of a visit by the 1373 or 1267 committee that 
could help focus the GOT,s attention on this issue. 
 
17. (C) Additionally, in Post's opinion, the GOT's weak 
anti-terrorist finance regime could benefit largely from more 
training in investigating and prosecuting financial crimes. 
The MASAK could benefit from more training on effective FIU 
operating procedures, including analytical training. 
 
18. (S/NF) We also need to pursue specific nonmilitary steps 
(reftel) against the PKK that can both weaken this terrorist 
organization and prove to the Turks that we take our 
counterterrorism rhetoric and commitments seriously.  For the 
present in Iraq, now that the Iraqi Transitional Government 
(ITG) is being formed we need to reinvigorate our trilateral 
process.  The authorities in the Kurdistan Region, moreover, 
should be pressed to at a minimum shut down PKK/Kongra-Gel 
offices outside the mountains; act against the PKK's 
resupply, movement, and recruitment efforts; and prevent the 
expansion of PKK facilities near the Turkish border. 
 
19. (C) Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) efforts to 
intensify focus and cooperation against PKK/Konga-Gel 
logistics and capabilities outside Iraq would build the 
GOT,s confidence in the USG,s commitment against the PKK 
and weaken the terrorist organization by drying up its 
funding streams and disrupting its operations.  The USG, 
moreover, should encourage a GOT-hosted or joint 
U.S.-GOT-hosted multilateral conference on European PKK 
activities.  The PKK is involved in a number of criminal 
activities in Europe (including drug running and extortion), 
but the GOT has had only limited success in convincing 
European countries to close down PKK-connected media outlets, 
front parties, and fund-raising organizations.  In many 
cases, the Turks lack the information needed to pursue a 
legal case against these PKK-connected groups in European 
courts.  An anti-PKK conference would assist our NATO ally in 
its fight against the PKK; aid U.S. public diplomacy efforts 
in Turkey; and provide a forum to showcase 
U.S.-European-Turkish cooperation in the GWOT. 
EDELMAN