US embassy cable - 05MADRID1349

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 001349 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/PGI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, SP, Counterterrorism 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: MADRID FEEDBACK 
 
REF: STATE 60796 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kathy Fitzpatrick; reason 1.4 (b) an 
d (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  We appreciate the opportunity to weigh in on 
issues related to the Global War on Terrorism per reftel 
action request.  Overall, counterterrorism cooperation 
between the U.S. and Spain is excellent, remaining a 
cornerstone of the bilateral relationship despite friction on 
other important issues.  There are problems related to 
information sharing (in both directions) and structural 
problems within the Spanish counterterrorism security 
apparatus, but these issues are manageable and are being 
addressed at several levels.  This message does not include 
new resource requests, but notes that we have to continue our 
high level of engagement with Spanish authorties in order to 
develop improved access to counterterrorism information by 
U.S. investigators.  Spain remains a capable partner in the 
War on Terror and appears willing to further deepen 
counterterrorism relations with the USG.  End Summary. 
 
=========================== 
TERRORISM IN SPAIN 
=========================== 
 
2. (C) The March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings made Spain 
the site of the worst terrorist attack in history against an 
EU country, but Spain was already an active front in the 
Global War on Terrorism as a result of its arrest of 
significant al-Qaida figures beginning in 2001 and its 
identification of numerous Islamic extremist groups operating 
within its borders.  Since the Madrid train bombings, Spanish 
authorities have detained over 120 suspected Islamic 
extremists (including 78 directly related to the train 
attacks) and derailed terrorist plans to bomb Spain's High 
Court and other high-profile targets.  Terrorist 
organizations active in Spain include: 
 
A. al-Qaida.  The trial of Syrian national and al-Qaida 
financier Barakat Yarkas, who was arrested in November 2001 
in connection with the September 11 attacks, is set to begin 
on April 22.  Yarkas has been linked by police to many 
Islamic extremist suspects who formally belong to other 
extremist groups listed below. 
 
B. Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM).  GICM associates 
were involved in the March 11 attacks, including individuals 
who were also involved in the Casablanca bombing in Morocco. 
Moroccan nationals comprise the largest group of North 
African immigrants in Spain and the majority of suspects 
arrested in connection with Islamic terrorist cases. 
 
C. Salafist Group for Call and Combat.  Many Algerian 
nationals in Spain suspected of involvement in terrorism have 
links to this organization. 
 
D. Armed Islamic Group (GIA).  GIA members who eluded the 
Algerian authorities and fled to Europe were instrumental in 
recruiting, organizing, and radicalizing young Islamists in 
Spain.  A GIA terrorist who was released early from a Spanish 
prison due to a clerical error was among the key organizers 
of the March 11 attacks. 
 
E. ETA.  Though ETA is in a steep decline as a result of 
arrests made possible by improved Spanish-French police 
cooperation and hasn't committed killings in nearly three 
years, it remains Spain's most important terrorist 
organization in the eyes of the Spanish public.  This is in 
part because ETA periodically detonates small explosives to 
demonstrate its continued viability as an armed group, 
including a recent bombing near a convention where King Juan 
Carlos was due to appear.  Despite press speculation, 
authorities have not found a link between ETA and Islamic 
terrorist groups. 
 
============================================= == 
STRONG COUNTERTERRORISM RELATIONS WITH SPAIN 
============================================= == 
 
3. (C) The high level of counterterrorism cooperation between 
U.S. and Spanish authorities is one of the cornerstones of 
our bilateral relationship.  In addition to high level 
discussions and exchanges with Spain to discuss 
counterterrorism activities -- including recent visits to 
Madrid by Attorney General Ashcroft and Attorney General 
Gonzales and upcoming visits to Washington by GOS Minister of 
Interior Alonso and Minister of Justice Aguilar -- we can 
point to numerous successes in our joint effort to combat 
terrorism 
 
4. (S)  Spanish/USG GWOT successes in Spain include: 
 
A. Spain's participation in military operations in 
Afghanistan, most recently through leadership of a PRT in 
western Afghanistan and partial-leadership of the FSB in 
Herat.  Spain continues to provide unrestricted access to its 
military bases at Rota and Moron and blanket flight 
clearances for U.S. military aircraft, including for GWOT 
operations. 
 
B. Good flow of actionable intelligence information from 
Embassy Madrid to Spanish security officials, and good 
reciprocal intelligence sharing by the GOS with USG agencies. 
 Intelligence sharing on terrorism has improved markedly 
since September 11 and has continued to improve under the 
Zapatero government.  Spanish officials at the highest levels 
are aware of the USG's level of support for Spanish efforts 
and President Zapatero recently told the Deputy Secretary 
that USG information was essential in the dismantlement of 
several Islamic extremist cells. 
 
C. Good flow of information from Spanish police to U.S. law 
enforcement officials.  Much of this information is passed to 
Legat informally before it becomes part of a sealed judicial 
case.  Examples include information passed to Legat by the 
Catalonian regional police that helped uncover a Pakistani 
money transfer and illegal document operation in Barcelona 
that may have been involved in sending money to significant 
al-Qaida figures.  Another example is the discovery by 
Spanish officials of correspondence between Spain-based 
terrorists and terrorists serving prison terms in the U.S. 
for their involvement in the first World Trade Center bombing 
in 1992. 
 
D. Spain's participation in the Container Security (CSI) and 
Megaports initiatives.  While the Megaports program is moving 
forward steadily, on CSI we have encountered administrative 
difficulties and delays on both the U.S. and Spanish sides. 
However, the fact that approximately 80 percent of containers 
flowing from the Middle East to U.S. ports pass through 
Spanish ports makes Spain's participation in these programs 
at the three major ports of Algeciras, Barcelona, and 
Valencia essential to U.S. homeland security so we are 
pressing forward. 
 
E. Formation of a Joint Counterterrorism Working Group 
comprised of U.S. Department of Justice officials, Spanish 
Ministry of Justice officials, Spanish prosecutors, and 
terrorism experts from both countries.  This responds to 
Spain's desire for a political symbol of our commitment to 
work with Spain on counterterrorism issues and to the USG's 
desire for a joint body to help streamline judicial and 
investigative cooperation in terrorism cases.  Though the 
Working Group is in its early stages, we hope to use it to 
strengthen collaboration with Spanish prosecutors on 
terrorism investigations and increase direct cooperation 
between U.S. and Spanish counterterrorism investigators. 
 
F. Improved cooperation on border security, including on 
Spain's decision to centralize overseas passport processing. 
The USG has offered to share electronic visa lookout 
information on a trial basis and Spanish officials have 
indicated some interest, though this initiative may be 
hampered by logistical problems on the Spanish side.  The USG 
has worked with Spanish authorities to help improve their 
reporting through international and bilateral channels of 
lost/stolen passports. 
 
G. Spain/USG signed bilateral protocol to U.S.-EU Mutual 
Legal Assistance (MLAT) and Extradition treaties.  There is a 
substantial flow of terrorism-related MLAT requests in each 
direction.  For example, Spanish authorities were extremely 
responsive in a U.S. MLAT request for information regarding 
the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui. 
 
H. Good cooperation on terrorism financing cases.  Spanish 
authorities make asset checks according to our terrorist 
financing notifications and work to prevent the illegal use 
of the Spanish banking system.  Spain works with the USG in 
international organizations such as FATF to strengthen 
international terrorism financing regimes.  Spain continues 
to upgrade its asset search systems and will soon implement 
one of Europe's toughest anti-terorrism financing laws 
allowing preventive and administrative freezing of assets. 
 
============================================= 
BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN ON INFORMATION SHARING 
============================================= 
 
5. (S) Information sharing for lead purposes between U.S. and 
Spanish police and security services is working well, but 
there are significant difficulties in sharing U.S. 
intelligence information with Spanish courts since such 
information cannot be protected from public disclosure.  USG 
delays and denials on requests for access to intelligence 
information and witnesses for judicial purposes have 
generated friction with Spanish judges, particularly 
high-profile magistrate judges Baltazar Garzon and Juan del 
Olmo.  U.S. Department of Justice, Embassy, and Legat 
officials are engaged in an ongoing dialogue with Spanish 
judges and judicial officials on the controls each government 
has in place to prevent the release of shared intelligence 
information. 
 
6. (S) For different reasons, USG law enforcement authorities 
sometimes have difficulty obtaining responses to official 
requests for information on terrorism cases, particularly 
information pertaining to ongoing judicial investigations in 
Spain.  Under the Spanish system, once a judge is assigned to 
a case, that judge exercises control over the investigation 
and has sole authority over dissemination of official 
information related to the investigation.  Judges, who 
operate with substantial independence, may permit Spanish 
police to share information for lead purposes on an 
unofficial basis.  However, judges sometimes deny access to 
investigative information citing judicial secrecy provisions 
that cannot be overriden by other Spanish authorities. 
Legat and the Consular Section work closely with Spanish 
judges and prosecutors to avoid such logjams, but judicial 
secrecy remains an impediment to the USG's access to 
important sources of information related to international 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. 
 
============================================= ============== 
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN SPAIN'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
============================================= ============== 
 
7. (S) Though Spain has an impressive counterterrorism 
apparatus, there are structural problems that continue to 
hamper its law enforcement efforts: 
 
A. Most important is the lack of cooperation and coordination 
among Spanish law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
There is a tradition of intense inter-service rivalry between 
the CNI (the intelligence service), the Civil Guard, and the 
National Police, all of which play a significant role in 
counterterrorism operations.  There is an added layer of 
conflict between the national security services and regional 
police, especially with the Basque Regional police.  By all 
accounts, the CNCA (the national counterterrorism center) 
launched in 2004 has failed to improve information sharing 
and coordination among the national services.  The USG has 
worked with Spanish authorities to improve internal 
collaboration, for example by providing only one "CODIS" DNA 
database instead of the separate databases requested by the 
various services.  We are also encouraging the GOS to look at 
ways other countries have found to better integrate their 
security agencies to combat terrorism. 
 
B. Spanish authorities excel at disrupting terrorist 
organizations, but have much more difficulty in achieving 
convictions.  This is due in part to Spanish laws enacted 
during the democratic transition -- and intended to overcome 
the abuses of the Franco era -- that provide substantial 
rights to defendants and significantly impact the ability of 
prosecutors to win cases and/or obtain strong prison terms 
for convicted terrorists.  There are also problems related to 
the ability of Spanish authorities to obtain strong evidence 
for judicial purposes, in part because security agencies are 
reluctant to release information that would reveal sources 
and methods.  Police sources have also indicated that they 
have sometimes been required to carry out arrests prematurely 
in response to political pressure to demonstrate strong 
actions against terrorism.  Another important factor is the 
understandable desire of Spanish officials to prevent any new 
attacks similar to the March 11 bombings, so there is a 
predisposition to act preventively, even where legal cases 
have not been fully prepared.  One result of this has been 
that of the 117 Islamic extremists in Spanish jails at the 
end of 2004, 103 were being held in "preventive detention" 
rather than on specific charges related to a terrorist attack 
or plot. 
 
C. Finally, the Spanish public remains fixated on ETA as 
Spain's primary security threat.  Despite clear evidence of a 
large and growing Islamic extremist presence in Spain (a fact 
of which the Spanish authorities are very aware) and the 
devastating Madrid train bombings, polls consistently 
indicate that Spanish citizens consider ETA to be a greater 
danger than jihadist groups.  While Spanish police have 
tripled the number of investigators working against Islamic 
extremist groups, they face public and political pressure to 
use their resources to focus on putting an end to ETA's 
long-running campaign against the Spanish state.  There is 
also a question of mindset, with Spanish security officials 
realizing that they have some distance to go in becoming as 
proficient against Islamic radicals as they are against ETA, 
which operates within an ideological context that is far more 
familiar to Spanish investigators. 
================= 
COMMENT 
================= 
 
8. (C) Spain is a capable and willing ally in the Global War 
on Terrorism.  While we do not see a need for signficant new 
resources for counterterrorism cooperation with Spain, we do 
need to find ways to improve our existing channels of 
communication and to better understand each other's judicial 
systems.  In the case of ETA, the Spanish government showed 
considerable adaptability in confronting the threat.  We 
believe the GOS will show the same level of flexibility in 
dealing with Islamic extremists and that the USG is well 
placed to provide analytical, technical, and judicial 
assistance when it could be useful to Spanish authorities. 
 
 
 
MANZANARES