US embassy cable - 05DHAKA1632

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BANGLADESH GWOT ASSESSMENT

Identifier: 05DHAKA1632
Wikileaks: View 05DHAKA1632 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Dhaka
Created: 2005-04-07 11:19:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PTER PREL BG
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 001632 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR DS/IP/SA AND DS/IP/ITA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, BG 
SUBJECT: BANGLADESH GWOT ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: A. STATE 60710 
 
     B. STATE 60749 
 
Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reasons 1.4 b, d. 
 
1. (S) Bangladesh's status as a moderate country with a small 
terrorist footprint could quickly change if steps are not 
taken to redress widespread Bangladeshi cynicism about the 
GWOT, the corruption that degrades all sectors of society, 
poor governance in general and ineffective law enforcement in 
particular, the prominence of Islamist groups in providing 
educational and social safety nets for the poor, acute 
political violence, and a dysfunctional political system that 
accords disproportionate influence to Islamist groups allied 
to the ruling BNP.  Bangladesh's fragile fabric could be put 
to the test by a tumultuous general election in early 2007. 
 
 
Our Successes So Far 
-------------------- 
 
2. (S) The BDG affirms it is a strong supporter of the GWOT 
and, like its Islamist political partners and most 
Bangladeshi political parties, condemns major acts of 
terrorism as inhumane and un-Islamic.  After being pushed by 
the USG and others for two years, the BDG recently pledged to 
ratify the nine UN CT conventions it has yet to endorse.  The 
BDG made a positive statement about the Iraq elections which 
indirectly criticized terrorist attempts to obstruct them. 
Agencies at post have a productive relationship with BDG CT 
entities, and have generally enjoyed good cooperation in 
pursuing persons or threats directed against U.S. interests. 
There are some signs of growing BDG willingness to curtail 
extremists, whose actions since 2004 have been increasingly 
bold and embarrassing to the BDG. 
 
3. (C) The BDG, particularly its central bank, is working 
hard with us to develop and apply anti-money laundering laws 
and practices.  It has made full use of ICITAP- and 
ATA-funded police professionalization courses, and has 
welcomed the recent arrival of post's Resident Legal Adviser 
from DOJ'S OPDAT to promote anti-money laundering and other 
law enforcement capabilities.  The BDG routinely implements 
UN-sanctioned directions to freeze terrorist assets, and has 
shut down local branches of terrorist NGO's like the 
Saudi-based Al-Haramain. 
 
4. (S) We have learned that the BDG's ability to be 
responsive to our requests is greatest when the action is 
couched in non-GWOT language like law enforcement 
cooperation, support for UN/international mandates, or, 
discreetly, bilateral partnership.  It is least responsive 
when the action is visibly tied to Iraq or an Islamist figure 
or group with political influence in the ruling coalition. 
 
The Challenges 
-------------- 
 
5. (S) Virtually all Bangladeshi Muslims, including and 
sometimes especially the pro-Western elites, believe that the 
GWOT is an anti-Muslim American obsession.  They see U.S. 
military action in Iraq as excessive and counter-productive. 
Pervasive corruption, porous borders, weak institutions, 
dysfunctional politics, bankrupt leadership in the ruling and 
opposition political parties, and a significant domestic 
Islamist constituency with links to cohorts in Pakistan and 
the Middle East -- all the ingredients exist for domestic and 
international terrorists to penetrate and operate in 
Bangladesh. 
 
6. (S) The small coterie of BDG leaders who make policy are 
exceptionally risk averse and suspicious of political, 
economic, or bureaucratic reform.  They are fixated on 
retaining power to make money and keep (vengeful) opponents 
at bay.  As a matter of perceived self-interest and perhaps 
delusion, BDG leaders believe they need the votes and 
grassroots activists of Jamaat Islami Bangladesh (JI) and the 
openly extremist Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) to control marginal 
constituencies.  Thus, the BDG's official position is there 
is no terrorism or religious extremism in Bangladesh, and 
that the Islamists recently arrested for attacking 
"un-Islamic" targets are criminals guilty of criminal code 
violations.  Indian endorsement of the opposition Awami 
League's charge that Bangladesh is falling to radical Islam 
further discourages the nationalist BDG from cracking down on 
Islamists. Also, unsubstantiated Indian allegations that the 
BDG supports or condones the use of Bangladesh by anti-India 
insurgents heighten BDG sensitivities to questions of 
"terrorism" in general in Bangladesh. 
7. (S) The two national intelligence organizations, the 
military DGFI and the civilian NSI, have competing 
responsibilities for CT.  In general, like the police, they 
are poorly led, trained, and equipped.  Their CT 
responsibilities are low priority, in part because much of 
both organizations' capacity is directed against the BDG's 
political rivals.  These minimal capabilities, compounded by 
their high politicization, account for the BDG's failure to 
solve, with potentially one partial exception (the Kibria 
case), all major acts of political violence and terrorism in 
Bangladesh, including the May 2004 grenade attack that 
seriously injured the British High Commissioner. 
 
8. (C) On terrorist financing, the BDG's policy and practice 
are, with one exception two years ago, to move against 
persons and organizations only in accordance with UN 
mandates.  It will not respond to a bilateral USG request for 
action. 
 
Solutions 
--------- 
 
9. (S) Political: To mitigate Bangladeshi perceptions that 
the GWOT, and the U.S., is anti-Muslim, we should expand 
outreach projects to show Bangladeshis -- especially youth 
and mid-level politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers 
-- that the U.S. is a pluralist society that respects all 
faiths, including Islam.  Visa delays and high costs have 
turned many Bangladeshi students away from the U.S. towards 
Australia, Canada, and the UK; more scholarships and a more 
predictable visa process would promote greater interest in 
U.S. higher education.  Opinion-makers, like senior editors, 
should be taken on tours of Afghanistan to witness and report 
on that country's rebirth and the long-term U.S. commitment 
for sustaining a stable and sovereign country.  IVP and other 
exchange programs, including IMET, enhance the participants' 
appreciation of the U.S. and give them long-term 
U.S.-oriented professional and educational grounding.  In a 
country of 140 million people, there is no shortage of good 
candidates for expanded exchange programs. 
 
10. (C) Programs: We regret that successful programs here 
like ICITAP and ATA are being eliminated or reduced because 
of higher priorities elsewhere; both could be usefully 
expanded.  Another important project that attracted 
exceptional Bangladeshi support was the PISCES ports of entry 
monitoring program, which is stalled now due to lack of USG 
resources.  We are optimistic that our new RLA will make a 
significant contribution to helping the BDG improve its 
anti-money laundering and terrorist finance capabilities. 
 
11. (S) Resources: Partly because Bangladesh's CT threat is 
mostly in the not-yet-proven category, we know little, 
compared to Pakistan or Indonesia, about Bangladesh's 
Islamist groups and practices.  We know there has been an 
explosion in madrassah enrollment in the past 10 years, that 
Islamist groups have gained legitimacy and grassroots 
strength through the inclusion of JI/IOJ in the government, 
and that JI is organized and disciplined far beyond the 
mainstream parties.  However, we have only snapshots of these 
groups' outlooks, priorities, and their susceptibility to 
international Islamist exploitation.  For two years, we have 
requested a mid-level political officer slot to focus 
full-time on terrorism and political Islam in Bangladesh; we 
continue to believe such a person could make a significant 
difference to the USG's understanding of Islamist extremism 
in Bangladesh.  At a regional level, analysts should look at 
Bangladeshi laborers in the Middle East, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia to assess anecdotal evidence that they send home 
money and conservative social practices. 
CHAMMAS 

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