Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 05DHAKA1632 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05DHAKA1632 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Dhaka |
| Created: | 2005-04-07 11:19:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | PTER PREL BG |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 001632
SIPDIS
STATE FOR DS/IP/SA AND DS/IP/ITA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015
TAGS: PTER, PREL, BG
SUBJECT: BANGLADESH GWOT ASSESSMENT
REF: A. STATE 60710
B. STATE 60749
Classified By: P/E Counselor D.C. McCullough, reasons 1.4 b, d.
1. (S) Bangladesh's status as a moderate country with a small
terrorist footprint could quickly change if steps are not
taken to redress widespread Bangladeshi cynicism about the
GWOT, the corruption that degrades all sectors of society,
poor governance in general and ineffective law enforcement in
particular, the prominence of Islamist groups in providing
educational and social safety nets for the poor, acute
political violence, and a dysfunctional political system that
accords disproportionate influence to Islamist groups allied
to the ruling BNP. Bangladesh's fragile fabric could be put
to the test by a tumultuous general election in early 2007.
Our Successes So Far
--------------------
2. (S) The BDG affirms it is a strong supporter of the GWOT
and, like its Islamist political partners and most
Bangladeshi political parties, condemns major acts of
terrorism as inhumane and un-Islamic. After being pushed by
the USG and others for two years, the BDG recently pledged to
ratify the nine UN CT conventions it has yet to endorse. The
BDG made a positive statement about the Iraq elections which
indirectly criticized terrorist attempts to obstruct them.
Agencies at post have a productive relationship with BDG CT
entities, and have generally enjoyed good cooperation in
pursuing persons or threats directed against U.S. interests.
There are some signs of growing BDG willingness to curtail
extremists, whose actions since 2004 have been increasingly
bold and embarrassing to the BDG.
3. (C) The BDG, particularly its central bank, is working
hard with us to develop and apply anti-money laundering laws
and practices. It has made full use of ICITAP- and
ATA-funded police professionalization courses, and has
welcomed the recent arrival of post's Resident Legal Adviser
from DOJ'S OPDAT to promote anti-money laundering and other
law enforcement capabilities. The BDG routinely implements
UN-sanctioned directions to freeze terrorist assets, and has
shut down local branches of terrorist NGO's like the
Saudi-based Al-Haramain.
4. (S) We have learned that the BDG's ability to be
responsive to our requests is greatest when the action is
couched in non-GWOT language like law enforcement
cooperation, support for UN/international mandates, or,
discreetly, bilateral partnership. It is least responsive
when the action is visibly tied to Iraq or an Islamist figure
or group with political influence in the ruling coalition.
The Challenges
--------------
5. (S) Virtually all Bangladeshi Muslims, including and
sometimes especially the pro-Western elites, believe that the
GWOT is an anti-Muslim American obsession. They see U.S.
military action in Iraq as excessive and counter-productive.
Pervasive corruption, porous borders, weak institutions,
dysfunctional politics, bankrupt leadership in the ruling and
opposition political parties, and a significant domestic
Islamist constituency with links to cohorts in Pakistan and
the Middle East -- all the ingredients exist for domestic and
international terrorists to penetrate and operate in
Bangladesh.
6. (S) The small coterie of BDG leaders who make policy are
exceptionally risk averse and suspicious of political,
economic, or bureaucratic reform. They are fixated on
retaining power to make money and keep (vengeful) opponents
at bay. As a matter of perceived self-interest and perhaps
delusion, BDG leaders believe they need the votes and
grassroots activists of Jamaat Islami Bangladesh (JI) and the
openly extremist Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) to control marginal
constituencies. Thus, the BDG's official position is there
is no terrorism or religious extremism in Bangladesh, and
that the Islamists recently arrested for attacking
"un-Islamic" targets are criminals guilty of criminal code
violations. Indian endorsement of the opposition Awami
League's charge that Bangladesh is falling to radical Islam
further discourages the nationalist BDG from cracking down on
Islamists. Also, unsubstantiated Indian allegations that the
BDG supports or condones the use of Bangladesh by anti-India
insurgents heighten BDG sensitivities to questions of
"terrorism" in general in Bangladesh.
7. (S) The two national intelligence organizations, the
military DGFI and the civilian NSI, have competing
responsibilities for CT. In general, like the police, they
are poorly led, trained, and equipped. Their CT
responsibilities are low priority, in part because much of
both organizations' capacity is directed against the BDG's
political rivals. These minimal capabilities, compounded by
their high politicization, account for the BDG's failure to
solve, with potentially one partial exception (the Kibria
case), all major acts of political violence and terrorism in
Bangladesh, including the May 2004 grenade attack that
seriously injured the British High Commissioner.
8. (C) On terrorist financing, the BDG's policy and practice
are, with one exception two years ago, to move against
persons and organizations only in accordance with UN
mandates. It will not respond to a bilateral USG request for
action.
Solutions
---------
9. (S) Political: To mitigate Bangladeshi perceptions that
the GWOT, and the U.S., is anti-Muslim, we should expand
outreach projects to show Bangladeshis -- especially youth
and mid-level politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers
-- that the U.S. is a pluralist society that respects all
faiths, including Islam. Visa delays and high costs have
turned many Bangladeshi students away from the U.S. towards
Australia, Canada, and the UK; more scholarships and a more
predictable visa process would promote greater interest in
U.S. higher education. Opinion-makers, like senior editors,
should be taken on tours of Afghanistan to witness and report
on that country's rebirth and the long-term U.S. commitment
for sustaining a stable and sovereign country. IVP and other
exchange programs, including IMET, enhance the participants'
appreciation of the U.S. and give them long-term
U.S.-oriented professional and educational grounding. In a
country of 140 million people, there is no shortage of good
candidates for expanded exchange programs.
10. (C) Programs: We regret that successful programs here
like ICITAP and ATA are being eliminated or reduced because
of higher priorities elsewhere; both could be usefully
expanded. Another important project that attracted
exceptional Bangladeshi support was the PISCES ports of entry
monitoring program, which is stalled now due to lack of USG
resources. We are optimistic that our new RLA will make a
significant contribution to helping the BDG improve its
anti-money laundering and terrorist finance capabilities.
11. (S) Resources: Partly because Bangladesh's CT threat is
mostly in the not-yet-proven category, we know little,
compared to Pakistan or Indonesia, about Bangladesh's
Islamist groups and practices. We know there has been an
explosion in madrassah enrollment in the past 10 years, that
Islamist groups have gained legitimacy and grassroots
strength through the inclusion of JI/IOJ in the government,
and that JI is organized and disciplined far beyond the
mainstream parties. However, we have only snapshots of these
groups' outlooks, priorities, and their susceptibility to
international Islamist exploitation. For two years, we have
requested a mid-level political officer slot to focus
full-time on terrorism and political Islam in Bangladesh; we
continue to believe such a person could make a significant
difference to the USG's understanding of Islamist extremism
in Bangladesh. At a regional level, analysts should look at
Bangladeshi laborers in the Middle East, Malaysia, and
Indonesia to assess anecdotal evidence that they send home
money and conservative social practices.
CHAMMAS
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04