US embassy cable - 05TAIPEI1684

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001684 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, CH, TW, Cross Strait Politics 
SUBJECT: CHEN ADMINISTRATION WARNS KMT, BEIJING OVER 
LIEN-HU MEETING 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 1626 
     B. TAIPEI 1625 
     C. TAIPEI 773 
     D. TAIPEI 1572 
     E. TAIPEI 1437 
 
Classified By: AIT Acting Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Chen administration's April 5 "Seven 
Point" statement was aimed at laying down a marker for both 
Beijing and the KMT ahead of a proposed meeting between PRC 
President Hu Jintao and KMT Chairman Lien Chan, according to 
a readout provided to AIT on April 6.  Taiwan officials said 
that the government did not oppose Lien's visit to Beijing, 
but would react strongly if Lien signed any sort of "peace 
agreement" with the PRC leadership.  While Chen 
administration officials have warned in public of a "slow 
down" in cross-Strait economic measures, privately they have 
assured AIT that there has been no decision to reverse the 
government's plan to resume cross-Strait initiatives after 
May.  The April 5 National Security Council (NSC) meeting 
convened by President Chen Shui-bian also decided that the 
government would encourage a visit to Beijing by People First 
Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong but President Chen would not 
authorize Soong to carry any formal messages on his behalf. 
Officials continue to express concern over attempts by the 
KMT to cite USG "acceptance" of Beijing's Anti-Secession Law 
and "support" for the recent KMT-CCP accord as a 
justification for the opposition party's unilateral overtures 
to Beijing.  End Summary. 
 
Seven Points, Three Goals, One Objective 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) NSC Senior Advisor for cross-Strait affairs Chen 
Chung-hsin provided AIT a readout on the April 5 NSC meeting 
chaired by President Chen Shui-bian that produced a "Seven 
Point Statement" on cross-Strait policy (Ref A).  Chen said 
the NSC had three objectives for calling the meeting and 
issuing a public statement.  First, the NSC saw the need to 
enhance coordination within and among the NSC, Executive Yuan 
(EY), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and DPP Legislative 
Yuan (LY) Caucus.  Secondly, the NSC wanted to secure 
agreement to make clear its "bottom line" limit for 
government tolerance of KMT actions.  Finally, the NSC 
determined it needed to send a message to Beijing that the 
government remained ready to talk, but only if Beijing ceased 
its "united front" tactics. 
 
3. (C) The NSC's Chen acknowledged that the government did 
not expect KMT Chairman Lien Chan to agree to an inter-party 
meeting or consult with the DPP administration before his 
visit to Beijing.  The overriding objective of the April 5 
exercise, Chen continued, was not to block Lien's visit but 
to warn both Lien and Beijing that the government would take 
harsh measures against both parties if the visit produced a 
formal KMT-CCP accord.  Chen said that Taipei's "red line" 
would be if Lien and PRC President Hu Jintao were to sign any 
type of "peace agreement" that would lull the Taiwan public 
into believing that Beijing had renounced the use of force 
when it had not.  "We don't oppose Hu and Lien exchanging 
opinions," Chen emphasized, "but we will not tolerate Lien 
signing agreements as if he were the leader of a sovereign 
country." 
 
Creating a DPP-KMT Back-channel 
------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) Chen told AIT that the Chen administration also agreed 
on April 5 to cut all official contacts with the KMT except 
those required in the LY.  While senior Chen administration 
officials would refuse to meet with KMT counterparts, Chen 
said that the DPP's LY Caucus would keep open a line of 
communications with the KMT.  In this context, Chen said the 
DPP Caucus was tasked with informing the KMT leadership that 
the Chen administration would not take any legal or political 
retaliatory actions against the KMT as long as Lien did not 
sign any formal documents during his upcoming visit to 
Beijing.  Chen said the government was encouraging the KMT 
(and Beijing) to use the "Lunar New Year charter flight 
model," in its approach to engaging Beijing.  If the KMT were 
willing to step back and let the government take the lead on 
future cross-Strait economic measures, Chen continued, then 
the DPP made it clear that the government will give the KMT 
credit for "creating a positive atmosphere" for progress. 
 
5. (C) However, Chen asserted that the DPP Caucus also 
conveyed the message that if the KMT did sign a "peace 
accord" or blocks action on the special defense procurement 
budget in the current LY session, the DPP might carry out 
threats of legal action (Ref B).  Chen stated that the 
current Ministry of Justice investigation of KMT Vice 
Chairman P.K. Chiang's recent Beijing visit was in response 
to a private law suit initiated by a "grass-roots DPP 
supporter" and was not a government initiative.  When 
pressed, however, Chen acknowledged that the government 
approved of the MOJ's decision to proceed with an 
investigation as a "warning" to Lien over what he might face 
if he "goes too far" in Beijing.  Chen added that the DPP had 
also told the KMT that it would use the December local 
election campaign to smear the KMT as traitors if Lien signed 
a formal accord with Beijing.  (Comment: Opinion is divided 
within both camps over how large a factor cross-Strait issues 
will be in the year-end local election.  To be safe, however, 
KMT candidates have been conspicuously quiet on the recent 
KMT-CCP contacts, with several admitting to AIT that they 
fear the issue may setback their electoral prospects.  End 
Comment.) 
 
Taiwan's Open Door Policy in Doubt 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The NSC's Chen said that no decision had been made on 
whether to reconsider the government's plans for cross-Strait 
economic liberalization measures to retaliate against Beijing 
for its recent "united front" activities (Septel).  However, 
the NSC's Chen said that Beijing had repeatedly conveyed to 
Taipei its hope that the Chen administration would "not close 
the door" to future cross-Strait contacts in the wake of the 
Anti-Secession Law.  Chen stated that if Beijing insisted on 
playing the "united front" card in place of dealing directly 
with the Chen administration, the issue of "closing the door" 
might be revisited after the Lien-Hu meeting. 
 
Will Chen Play a Soong Card? 
---------------------------- 
 
7. The NSC's Chen ruled out the possibility that the 
President would formally authorize PFP Chairman James Soong 
to travel to Beijing as an "authorized" representative of the 
Taipei government.  Chen said Beijing was less likely to 
accept Soong at this stage if he were a formal DPP envoy 
given the President's refusal to accept "one China" or the 
"1992 consensus."  However, Chen said the government would 
actively support a visit by Soong in a private capacity, if 
he focused on "explaining the Chen-Soong 10 points" to the 
PRC leadership (Ref C). 
 
USG Being Dragged Into Political Debate 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Taiwan officials continue to urge the USG to be 
careful not to be drawn into the domestic political debate 
over the KMT's cross-Strait initiatives (Ref D).  KMT 
spokesmen and LY members have made repeated public assertions 
in recent days that the USG has accepted Beijing's 
Anti-Secession Law and has made a strategic decision to 
withdraw its security commitments to Taiwan.  KMT officials 
and opposition-affiliated media outlets have also claimed 
that the USG has put pressure on the Chen administration to 
endorse the KMT's overtures to Beijing.  DPP Deputy Secretary 
General Yen Wan-ching told AIT on April 7 that EAP DAS 
Schriver's April 6 testimony should help quiet the debate 
over the USG position on the Anti-Secession Law, but he 
bemoaned that the Taiwan media did not give the testimony 
wide coverage (Note: the pro-unification United Daily News 
did not report on the hearings at all.  End Note.) 
 
Comment: Ultimatum or Empty Threat 
---------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) The April 5 meeting appears to have simply confirmed a 
policy course set by the President as early as March 28 (Ref 
E).  The NSC meeting's main accomplishment appears to have 
been to provide a venue in which to publicize the 
government's strategy to derail the KMT's recent cross-Strait 
initiatives.  Notably, the government did not consider 
measures to take ownership of items on the KMT-CCP "Ten 
Points" as a means for wresting back control of the agenda. 
As Septel reports, the Chen administration's plan to use a 
combination of carrots and sticks to force the KMT to back 
off its plans to engage Beijing unilaterally will face strong 
resistance from the KMT.  If the strategy fails, and the KMT 
and CCP do initial an agreement later in the year, the DPP 
government may be forced to choose just how many of its 
threats over legal action and cross-Strait economic 
engagement it can afford to follow through on. 
KEEGAN