US embassy cable - 05YEREVAN612

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GWOT ASSESSMENT: ARMENIA

Identifier: 05YEREVAN612
Wikileaks: View 05YEREVAN612 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Yerevan
Created: 2005-04-07 11:07:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PTER PREL AM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

071107Z Apr 05
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/PGI, EUR/CACEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 04/07/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, AM 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: ARMENIA 
 
REF: A) STATE 60796 
 
Classified By: DCM A.F. Godfrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (S) While Armenia consistently declares its eagerness to 
contribute to the Global War on Terror, most government 
officials and institutions do not believe that there is an 
imminent threat from within Armenia.  While Armenia may be 
less vulnerable to terrorist attack than some of its 
neighbors, it is not immune.  Our greatest concern is to 
prevent Armenia from becoming a transit country for illicit 
materials, persons or finances.  Armenia has achieved some 
success in the war on terror but, for the most part, Armenia 
does not yet feel it is a battleground.  End Summary. 
 
Responsible Institutions 
------------------------ 
 
2. (S) The Armenian National Security Service (NSS) has 
primary responsibility for the fight against terrorism, with 
the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Justice, the Procurator General's Office making 
contributions as well.  Russian Border Guards have 
responsibility for securing Armenia's international borders 
with Iran and Turkey, complicating this Mission's ability to 
engage on the issue. 
 
Securing the Borders 
-------------------- 
 
3. (S) Securing Armenia's state borders to prevent the 
illicit transit of people and materials is our primary area 
of concern.  In late 2004, a vehicle which originated in 
Armenia was seized in Turkey after a small amount of 
Cesium-137 was discovered where it had been secreted in a 
load of scrap metal.  This discovery followed the conviction 
in Armenia of a man who was attempting to smuggle highly 
enriched uranium.  The NSS has been generally cooperative 
with the Embassy, especially on issues of smuggling of 
radioactive material.  The USG has already provided 
monitoring equipment to help the GOAM interdict the smuggling 
of radioactive substances and is implementing a project to 
link computer data bases available to border guards. 
Nonetheless, more needs to be done to help the GOAM secure 
the borders and prevent the use of Armenia as a transit 
country. 
 
4. (S) With 98 percent of Armenia's population ethnic 
Armenian, GOAM interlocutors frequently point to the 
difficulty a non-Armenian would have "blending in" with the 
population as a reason that Armenia could not be effectively 
used as a transit or staging country for terrorism.  The NSS 
does keep a close watch on visiting Arabs, monitoring Syrian 
and Iranian nationals especially closely.  They take the 
watch lists seriously, distribute them, and for the moment, 
there is no serious transit problem.  The GOAM cites 
successes in identifying and detaining alleged Chechen 
terrorists, detaining Iranian nationals traveling on false 
documents, as well as some recent successes in hindering 
illegal border crossings as evidence to support their 
contention.  Nonetheless, Iranian citizens travel to Armenia 
as small businessmen and for vacation, as do Syrian and 
Lebanese citizens.  While we would agree with the GOAM that 
Armenia is an unlikely staging ground for major terrorist 
operations, it is certainly not inconceivable. 
 
Kongra Gel Has A Presence 
------------------------- 
 
5. (S) With a small ethnic Kurdish minority, the GOAM 
tolerates a Kurdish Cultural Center that is affiliated with 
Kongra Gel.  Kongra Gel is not able to raise funds in Armenia 
(the ethnic Kurdish population is extremely poor), but their 
continued presence is an area of concern. 
 
Cash Flow Largely Unregulated 
----------------------------- 
 
6. (C) According to recent estimates, nearly one billion 
dollars in remittances flows into Armenia every year, 
providing a much-needed social safety net for most families 
and fueling the large underground economy.  But these flows 
of funds also create the potential for use of Armenia as a 
transit country for terrorist finance.  We already know that 
at least some of the money coming into the country is linked 
to organized crime, especially tied to Russia, but the GOAM 
has no way to verify that terrorist money is not flowing 
through Armenia as well.  With USG assistance, the GOAM is 
working to establish a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as 
the first step in getting control of this potential problem. 
 
U.S. Training Helps Us, But Not Trainees 
---------------------------------------- 
7. (C) The USG has offered a number of ATA and other CT 
training courses to Armenian government officials but, with 
few exceptions, foreign training is not seen as 
career-enhancing and we have yet to see significant ripple 
effects within the organizations (especially the NSS and 
police) that have been targeted to receive training. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (S) Our challenge is to build Armenia's ability to 
interdict illicit traffic in materials and persons and to 
strengthen oversight of financial institutions so that 
Armenia is not used as a transit point for terrorist finance. 
 Success will require increased commitment from the GOAM, and 
that will require a change in attitude to recognize the 
reality of the threat. 
EVANS 

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