US embassy cable - 05COLOMBO679

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000679 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, KJUS, KISL, MARR, ASEC, CE, MV, LTTE - Peace Process, Maldives 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT:  SRI LANKA AND MALDIVES 
 
REF: STATE 60710 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR REASON 1.4 (D). 
 
1.  (S) We appreciate the opportunity to review the status 
of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) in our two countries. 
In both countries we experience good counter-terrorism 
cooperation but could accomplish a great deal more with a 
relatively modest increase in resources. 
 
Sri Lanka 
--------- 
 
2.  (S) Sri Lanka cooperates well with the U.S. in the 
GWOT.  In general, Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) officials 
are responsive to requests related to the GWOT and seek to 
be as helpful as possible.  We know that "bad guys" of GWOT 
concern have transited Colombo in recent years and the Sri 
Lankans have tried to cooperate on such issues.  To 
buttress their ability to do so, we continue to push 
TIP/PISCES on the immigration front as well as the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI), Megaports and other 
relevant programs of counter-terrorism cooperation.  We 
enjoy superb cooperation with the GSL in areas like alien 
smuggling and visa/passport fraud, all of which have the 
potential to reap counter-terrorism benefits.  We hope to 
soon have expanded consular staffing that would enable us 
to participate more fully in airport interdiction efforts 
with our diplomatic colleagues, which would add greatly to 
our alien smuggling, trafficking in persons and, quite 
possibly, counter-terrorism efforts. 
 
3.  (S) It is important to note that counter-terrorism 
cooperation with the GSL is a two-way street, with Sri 
Lanka sharing important lessons learned from its own 
indigenous experience with terrorism (more on that below). 
For example, the Sri Lankan military has shared with us, 
and conducted training of U.S. military forces drawing 
from, the lessons they have learned regarding improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) from their years of facing the 
U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization Liberation 
Tamils of Tiger Eelam (LTTE), the world masters in IED 
technology.  American lives in Iraq and Afghanistan are 
being saved as a result.  We could learn much more from the 
Sri Lankan experience with the LTTE.  For example, while 
the US Navy continues to construct force protection 
paradigms for suicide attackers using only one lesson 
learned - the bombing of the USS Cole, the Sri Lanka Navy 
has endured twenty-three suicide boat attacks since 1990, 
each more sophisticated than the zodiac attack on the USS 
Cole, and has successfully defeated several attempts.  The 
US Navy should work more closely with the Sri Lanka Navy to 
exchange information and anti-terrorism techniques because 
it could help save more American lives. 
 
4. (S)  While the LTTE has been and, for the foreseeable 
future, will remain on the State Department's list of 
foreign terrorist organizations (FTO), it is not listed on 
PACOM's priority terrorist organization list.  Therefore, 
PACOM resources, funding, and manpower dedicated to anti- 
and counter-terrorism for Sri Lanka are at minimum levels 
in spite of the disturbing facts surrounding the LTTE.  For 
example, the LTTE maintains a fleet of at least ten 
seagoing cargo vessels that traffic the waters in South and 
Southeast Asia, carrying weapons, ammunition, explosives 
and other terrorism related equipment that is bought and 
sold on the gray and black weapons markets.  Probable LTTE 
ports and many of the LTTE vessels are known to the US 
Intelligence community.  The U.S. Pacific Command and the 
Armed Forces of Sri Lanka are in the process of signing an 
intelligence sharing agreement related to the GWOT that 
will increase the knowledge base on both sides, but Sri 
Lankan officials have already begun to realize that it is 
extremely unlikely that that the US would, for example, use 
exact positional data of LTTE vessels and/or cadre outside 
of Sri Lanka obtained under the agreement to undertake 
operations against the LTTE. 
 
5. (S/NF)  Although the cease-fire has held for several 
years with no return to battlefield combat, LTTE terrorism 
continues to be a daily fact of life for Sri Lankans.  LTTE 
opponents in the Tamil community as well as suspected 
police and/or military informers continue to be 
assassinated.  High-level opponents have been targeted for 
suicide bombing (a detained bomber detonated herself in a 
police station across from the chancery last July).  The 
numbers of terrorist attacks are down from the war years, 
but evidence of continued LTTE recruitment and training 
leaves little doubt that the Tigers remain fully capably of 
mounting such attacks.  Moreover, the LTTE has used the 
cease-fire to move cadres into Colombo, thereby increasing 
the likelihood of renewed terrorist attacks if the cease- 
fire fails or the peace negotiations falter.  Finally, the 
LTTE is the only terrorist organization in the world to 
have a hard-surface runway, its own aircraft and trained 
pilots.  The air and air defense wing of the LTTE possesses 
MANPADs and has successfully shot down more than a dozen 
SLAF aircraft during the war.  It is clearly in the U.S.' 
interest that the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) 
of the LTTE air wing not be allowed to spread to other 
transnational terrorist groups. 
 
6.  (S) Our ability to engender greater Sri Lankan 
cooperation in the GWOT and to more fully support the GSL 
in its own domestic struggle against terror is hampered by 
a lack of U.S. resources.  A primary example is the need to 
dedicate some ATA funding to Sri Lanka which we have not 
had since 2002.  (ATA had a history of great success in Sri 
Lanka before then:  from 1999-2002 ATA trained 138 Sri 
Lankan police officers in seven courses for an entire cost 
of roughly $1 million.)  Renewed ATA funding would enable 
us to improve Sri Lankan capabilities in areas like post- 
bomb investigation and explosive incident countermeasures, 
among other key topics.  We note that this would not just 
benefit Sri Lanka but also help protect us.  (The 
previously-mentioned suicide bomber was able to detonate 
herself because she had not been properly restrained by the 
under-trained police officers.)  We have been able to fill 
some of this gap with DOJ ICITAP funds which have supported 
law enforcement training, some of which has been relevant 
to counter-terrorism.  We understand that ATA funds are 
tight and highly-sought.  Nonetheless, a little ATA money 
could go a long way in our efforts here.  (See notal septel 
in separate channel on other GWOT resource needs.) 
 
7.  (S)  As addressees are aware, the LTTE has a vast, 
well-organized fund-raising operation around the world. 
Most observers here believe that the LTTE-founded Tamil 
Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), while doing much 
legitimate relief work in the North and the East, co- 
mingles its money and personnel with the LTTE.  This puts 
the USG in an awkward position since, despite our strong 
suspicions about the TRO, it is a registered, ostensibly- 
legitimate charitable organization in the United States 
(see the website at www.trousa.org).  Late last year 
(before the tsunami), we laid out for Washington our 
concerns regarding the TRO and asked that relevant USG 
agencies take a hard look at TRO/USA finances and 
activities and form a judgment as to whether its deserved 
its charitable status in the U.S. (04 Colombo 2002).  We 
are not aware if TRO/USA has been examined in this regard 
in the wake of our cable.  It needs to be if we are to 
maintain our counter-terrorism credibility and if our 
public commitment to addressing terrorism financing is to 
be taken seriously here in Sri Lanka.  FYI - We understand 
the British are in the process of de-registering the TRO 
there since its accounting and other financial procedures 
are not in keeping with British charitable regulations 
(although the TRO/UK has quickly reconstituted itself under 
a new name). 
 
8. (S)  Turning to the broader terrorism finance issue, the 
US has provided anti-money laundering training in Sri Lanka 
and the GSL is in the final stages of proposing 
comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation.  Once 
passed, we expect to begin cooperative efforts between 
FINCEN and Sri Lanka's newly constituted Financial 
Intelligence Unit, which will likely be housed in the 
Central Bank.  We need to make sure that Sri Lanka 
continues to be included in USG terrorism financing 
initiatives, information-sharing and training 
opportunities. 
 
Maldives 
-------- 
 
9.  (S)  While Maldives is of little global significance, 
it is nonetheless that rare commodity in the GWOT:  a 
moderate Muslim country that is well-disposed to and seeks 
greater cooperation with the United States.  We include 
relevant Maldivian officials in law enforcement and 
military training opportunities.  We have also raised with 
Maldivian officials the possibility of terrorists 
transiting Male' international airport, which would be easy 
to do (although there is no credible information to date). 
The GoRM, which we are encouraging towards greater openness 
and democracy, is fearful of Muslim extremism and eager to 
cooperate with us on that issue on a global basis.  It is 
important to note that during the long process of 
negotiating the recent return home of the Maldivian held at 
Guantanamo, the Maldivians made clear that they took very 
seriously the possibility of one of their nationals being 
involved in global terrorist efforts against the United 
States. 
 
10.  (S) In the same vein, any ATA funds made available by 
Washington should cover programming/training for Maldives 
as well as Sri Lanka.  For example, one ATA couse each year 
in Airport security Management, Document Fraud Examination 
or Maritime Security would greatly increase our CT 
cooperation with Maldives.  We should also ensure that 
Maldives is included in any public diplomacy/outreach 
efforts aimed at young Muslim populations.  On the 
terrorist financing front, Maldives is working with the IMF 
to develop an anti-money laundering effort, and therefore 
has not shown keen interest in U.S. Treasury training in 
this area, although it would consider training that is 
coordinated with, and complementary to, the IMF program. 
Nonetheless, we need to continue to include Maldives in all 
of our terrorist finance initiatives. 
 
LUNSTEAD