US embassy cable - 05PARIS2305

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002305 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: PREL, SY, LE, FR 
SUBJECT: SENIOR FRENCH OFFICIALS DISCUSS LEBANON NEXT STEPS 
WITH NEA DAS CARPENTER 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 1106 
     B. PARIS 2263 
     C. PARIS 2243 
 
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 
1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary and comment:  Presidential Middle East 
Advisor Dominique Boche stressed strong French support for 
holding Lebanon's elections on time and expressed concern 
over Syrian/loyalist delay tactics during discussions with 
visiting NEA DAS Carpenter April 5.  The MFA issued a tough 
statement April 5 reaffirming that elections must take place 
in May, cautioning against an election delay, and calling for 
formation of a new government.  Boche voiced pessimism on 
Syrian intentions, concluding that Damascus was seeking a 
good report from Larsen on its troop withdrawal while it 
would continue to manipulate Lebanon from outside and seek to 
delay elections until September or October, at which point it 
would seek to regain control.  Boche assailed the GOL 
decision to revise the draft electoral law towards bigger 
constituencies as a direct blow to the Maronite Patriarch. 
Boche expressed hope that the opposition could secure 
Hizballah's support for holding elections, describing this as 
perhaps the only way to overcome Syrian/loyalist delay 
tactics.  Boche agreed with Carpenter that UNSYG Rep Larsen 
should continue to press on elections and agreed that UNSCR 
1559's call for free and fair elections provides him a 
continuing mandate.  He reported that Larsen will be received 
in Paris April 6.  On potential assistance to a 
post-elections GOL, Boche cautioned against applying an 
Iraq-style reconstruction model but conceded that some type 
of international donor conference was likely.  Carpenter 
heard a different and less helpful emphasis from MFA 
A/S-equivalent for NEA Thibault, who questioned the legal 
basis for insisting that elections take place on time and 
described elections as not being an element of UNSCR 1559. 
Thibault also suggested that once Syria had withdrawn from 
Lebanon, the U.S. and France would be under pressure to 
recognize the Syrian gesture.  The disconnect between Boche's 
firm resolve and Thibault's caution is typical of the nuance 
we have long observed between the Elysee and MFA on the 
Syria/Lebanon dossier, which remains firmly in Elysee 
control.  End summary and comment. 
 
2. (C) NEA DAS Scott Carpenter visited Paris April 5 and met 
separately with MFA A/S-equivalent for North Africa/Middle 
East Jean-Francois Thibault and Presidential Middle East 
Advisor Dominique Boche.  Carpenter briefed Boche and 
Thibault on his just completed five-day visit to Beirut, 
during which he met with the full spectrum of opposition 
leaders and found them more united than before.  The 
opposition had the momentum of the Lebanese street behind 
them, was showing new flexibility on government formation, 
and delivering a clear message on the need for elections by 
the end of May.  The opposition strategy on the electoral law 
was to debate the recently revised draft electoral law in 
Parliament and press Speaker Nabih Berri to call for a vote; 
if the revised law did not pass, the opposition would accept 
elections on the basis of the electoral law from the 2000 
election.  Carpenter confirmed that the opposition was 
confident that it could win under either electoral law, the 
revised or year 2000 version.  Carpenter stressed that 
elections remained the opposition's overriding concern, and 
they wanted high-level statements from the U.S., France and 
others, to make clear that elections must take place by the 
end of May.  The U.S. believed that we could not waver in 
insisting on elections by May. 
 
 
ELYSEE SUPPORT FOR ELECTIONS ON TIME, CONCERNS ON SYRIAN 
INTENTIONS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Presidential Middle East Advisor Dominique Boche 
responded enthusiastically to Carpenter's presentation, and 
affirmed that the GoF, like the U.S., was pressing hard for 
holding elections on time.  He cited an MFA statement issued 
earlier that day which reiterated that elections must take 
place in May, that a delay in the electoral process would run 
contrary to the will of the Lebanese people, and that 
Lebanese political forces should find the means to form a 
government, for which the first task would be launching the 
electoral process.  The MFA statement also condemned the 
recent series of attacks in Lebanon and called for punishment 
of the perpetrators. 
 
4. (C) Boche reiterated that the GoF was not very optimistic 
on the current situation in Lebanon, specifically Syrian 
intentions and prospects for an elections delay.  He 
described the Syrians and loyalists as "trying to manipulate 
us" and seeking to postpone Lebanon's elections until 
September or October, at which point they anticipated less 
international scrutiny and greater factional divisions within 
Lebanon, which they could exploit to show that Lebanon could 
not live alone without Syrian control.  Boche observed that 
Syria appeared focused on overcoming the immediate obstacle 
of Larsen's April report, and that it would seek to get its 
troops out in time to receive a good report.  After the troop 
withdrawal, he anticipated that the SARG would continue to 
cause problems and manipulate Lebanon from the outside, while 
postponing formation of a government and elections towards 
creation of a new situation in September or October, at which 
point Syria would seek to regain control of Lebanon.  Boche 
also cited Syrian efforts to agitate Palestinian camps in 
Lebanon, which he described as a longtime zone of Syrian 
control and beyond the reach of PA President Mahmoud Abbas or 
other outside moderating influences. 
 
5. (C) Boche described the GoF as very upset by the GOL 
decision to further revise the election law and move towards 
bigger constituencies, which he described as a direct blow to 
Maronite Patriarch Sfeir.  Carpenter pointed out that the 
opposition's pragmatic flexibility on the election law 
removed a potential factor delaying the election.  Boche 
expressed hope that the opposition could convince Hizballah 
to engage on the election, which he viewed as perhaps the 
only way to overcome SARG/loyalist delay tactics.  Although 
the U.S. and France needed to keep pushing for elections on 
time, Boche said he did not believe we have the ability to 
impose deadline.  Boche agreed with Carpenter's assessment 
that Hizballah had been destabilized a bit by the March 14 
opposition demonstration, and that Nasrallah realized he had 
made mistake by adopting an excessively pro-Syrian stance 
during the March 8 Hizballah gathering.  In Boche's view, 
Hizballah now faced a dilemma in how to maintain its 
political standing without Syria's presence, and it might be 
tempted to work in the same direction with the opposition on 
the elections.  Carpenter observed that Jumblatt was already 
pursuing such a strategy in seeking to reach out to 
Hizballah, much to the loyalists' chagrin. 
 
6. (C) Carpenter raised his April 4 meeting in Beirut with 
UNSYG Special Envoy Larsen, noting Larsen had told him that 
his mission would be to push for elections on time. 
Carpenter observed to Boche that MFA North/Africa Director 
Thibault (see paras 8-9 below), in an earlier discussion that 
day, had questioned whether elections were part of UNSCR 1559 
or Larsen's mandate.  Carpenter reiterated the USG view that 
UNSCR 1559 did provide a basis for insisting on free and fair 
elections, a point with which Boche fully concurred.  Boche 
explained Thibault's caution by noting that Larsen had come 
under attack from Algeria and others for exceeding his 
mandate, and that Larsen therefore needed to be careful and 
prepared to face criticism of going beyond UNSCR 1559.  Boche 
cited difficult, ongoing UNSC discussions on the draft UNSCR 
on the commission of inquiry, and the numerous proposed 
amendments, as an example of the obstacles we faced in 
maintaining international pressure on the GOL and SARG. 
Boche agreed with Carpenter that such criticism of Larsen or 
accusations of interference were no reason for the U.S. or 
France to stop pushing on the elections issue. 
 
7. (C) Before closing the discussion, Boche expressed 
interest in U.S. thinking on the "day after" Syrian 
withdrawal and successful elections in Lebanon.  Carpenter 
confirmed that European Commission Deputy Director Christian 
Leffler had invited NEA PDAS Liz Cheney to Brussels to 
discuss a post-election action plan and potential package of 
ideas for the new government, should it be in place. Boche, 
revisiting points made last week to visiting NEA Ambassador 
Satterfield (ref c), stressed that we should not seek to 
apply an Iraq-style reconstruction model in Lebanon, 
stressing Lebanon's strong democratic tradition and the need 
to wait for the new Lebanese government to request what it 
needs.  Boche conceded that some type of international 
conference, at Lebanese request, was likely to take place 
after elections, but again rejected the idea of any type of 
"international supervision," in the Iraq model.  Carpenter 
reassured Boche that no one in the USG was anticipating an 
Iraq-style intervention in Lebanon.  While it was important 
to let a new Lebanese government articulate its needs, there 
was a useful purpose in seeking to anticipate and plan for 
what these needs might be.  Carpenter also conceded that 
perhaps more planning was needed for the contingency that 
elections did not take place. 
 
THIBAULT: 1559 DOES NOT ADDRESS ELECTIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
8.  (C) In response to Carpenter's emphasis on elections, 
Thibault stressed caution on Lebanon's current political 
situation, which he viewed as "very dangerous" due to Syrian 
and loyalist election delay tactics, coupled with efforts to 
sow fear and uncertainty via terrorist acts.  Thibault 
asserted that once the Syrian withdrawal was complete, UNSCR 
1559 would have essentially achieved most of what was 
feasible; disarming Hizballah or the Palestinian camps was 
another issue, which was impossible to implement now.  In 
Thibault's view, this was why the draft UNSCR on the 
international commission of inquiry was so important, since 
it would give the international community cover to maintain 
pressure and focus on Lebanese authorities even after a 
Syrian withdrawal.  Thibault added that we should seek to 
avoid a situation in which France and the U.S. were accused 
of internal interference in Lebanon, especially among Arab 
governments who were less supportive of 1559. Carpenter, for 
his part, stressed that elections were paramount, within the 
framework of 1559, and that it was in the essential interest 
of the Lebanese people and the international community that 
these elections take place on time. 
 
9. (C)  Carpenter also raised with Thibault his April 4 
meeting with Larsen, and expressed concern that Syrian 
President Bashar al-Asad was looking for a reward for Syrian 
withdrawal.  With elections still up in the air,  the 
international commission of inquiry yet to deploy and no 
accountability yet for Hariri's assassination, it was much 
too early for any carrots for Syria, withdrawal or not. 
Thibault responded, somewhat unhelpfully, that if the Syrians 
did fully withdraw, there would be enormous pressure on the 
U.S. and France to recognize the change.  Carpenter responded 
that there remained pressing issues beyond the withdrawal, 
namely the elections and the international investigations. 
Thibault backed down a bit, but explained that the GoF was 
most comfortable when it had an international framework in 
which to act; UNSCR 1559 gave it that framework in the 
context of withdrawal, but, in Thibault's view, it did not 
address the parliamentary elections.  Thibault also voiced 
concern over internal weaknesses within Lebanon, including 
factionalization and the long tradition of its political 
class in extracting political and economic benefits from 
Syrian domination.   He summed up that our joint efforts on 
Lebanon had worked "remarkably" up to now thanks to the 
extraordinary level of U.S.-French cooperation.  The 
situation now, however, was becoming more complex with Syrian 
withdrawal, and we had a looser UN framework in which to 
operate. 
 
10. (C) On potential post-election international assistance 
to Lebanon, Thibault asserted that assisting the army would 
be a key issue.  The GoF had in place a modest bilateral 
assistance program to the Lebanese army, which could be 
expanded.  Thibault stressed the need to avoid too much of an 
"imported mechanism" in assisting the Lebanese army, and said 
we should look to fellow Arab governments first.  He 
counseled looking at the Lebanese army with a sense of 
realism, and accepting that it would not be a major military 
power, but would need to be capable of keeping order and 
curbing factionalism. 
 
11. (C) Comment: Though neither Boche nor Thibault was 
optimistic about Lebanon's current situation or Syrian delay 
tactics, we were struck by their differing messages on the 
elections issue, with Thibault appearing out of step with GoF 
policy and his own minister, who in a meeting that same day 
with our Ambassador, stressed the urgent need for elections 
on schedule (ref b).  We view the Thibault-Boche disconnect 
as symptomatic of the longstanding nuance we have observed 
between the working-level MFA and Elysee on Syria/Lebanon, 
with the MFA typically counseling caution and pointing out 
the worst-case scenarios, while the Elysee stresses resolve 
in pressing forward.  Fortunately for us and for Lebanon, the 
policy lead on this issue remains firmly in the hands of the 
Elysee.  End comment. 
LEACH