US embassy cable - 05AMMAN2849

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002849 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
PLEASE PASS TO NEA/FO AND NEA/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, PGOV, JO 
SUBJECT: JORDAN AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 60749 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (C)  As requested reftel, post offers its assessment of 
how best to advance the global war on terrorism (GWOT) from 
Jordan.  The Jordanian government understands very clearly 
that it and the U.S. have enemies in common, and the GOJ 
places a very high priority on CT cooperation with us.  We 
would be hard pressed to identify a bilateral CT relationship 
of higher quality, and with greater global reach, than the 
one with Jordan.  The GOJ has been effective in tracking 
suspected terrorists, disrupting plots, and prosecuting 
perpetrators.  In most cases, terrorist plots discovered in 
Jordan since 1999 have targeted American and/or Israeli 
interests. 
 
2.  (S/NF)  The Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate 
(GID) has primary responsibility for monitoring, tracking, 
and disrupting terrorist plots both inside Jordan and abroad. 
 Other security agencies with counterterrorism 
responsibilities include the Department of Military 
Intelligence (DMI), which takes the lead on border security 
(to include the ongoing development of a broadened border 
security and an integrated Command, Control and Surveillance 
system), and the Public Security Directorate (PSD), Jordan's 
national police force.  Most of Jordan's security apparatus 
is efficient and comprised of respected institutions.  Its 
cadre of officers are well-trained and experienced.  We enjoy 
a close working relationship with each organization, 
including regular information exchange, ongoing training, and 
joint operations.  While Jordan's CT infrastructure is 
efficient and among the best in the region, we have 
highlighted below three areas that we believe will make it 
even stronger.  This message does not address substantial CT 
components covered in the Administration's supplemental 
assistance request for Jordan. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  RMAS Space Issues:  The RMAS liaison relationship 
with GID accounts for the lion's share of the USG 
counterterrorism work done in Jordan.  As productive as this 
relationship is, significantly more could be done.  The chief 
constraint on expansion, however, is the lack of office space 
at Embassy Amman.  RMAS would like to add considerably more 
permanent positions to its office here, and COM would in 
principle support this expansion, but there is no space for 
additional staff from any agency here.  Post is engaged in 
productive discussions with OBO toward seeking funds from 
Congress to add new permanent office space here.  If space 
could be added expeditiously, in post's assessment it would 
be an important contribution to the GWOT. 
 
4.  (S/NF)  Additional Training:  We believe additional 
training for the PSD would help boost the force's CT 
capabilities.  Diplomatic Security's Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance Programs (DS/ATA) have sponsored numerous training 
courses for PSD over the last several years.  The majority of 
these courses have been geared towards operational level and 
mid-level officials, while fewer have been offered to 
senior-level police and security elements.  We suggest that 
the Department consider offering additional courses geared to 
the executive and policy-making level officials within the 
PSD.  For example, the "Combating Transnational Terrorism" 
course would be beneficial for Jordan's law enforcement 
executives.  The "Financial Underpinnings of Terrorism - 
Senior Seminar" course would benefit Jordan's senior judicial 
and law enforcement officials, high level legislative 
policy-makers, and finance ministry and central bank 
officials.  Experienced investigators, prosecutors, and 
magistrates would benefit from the "Financial Underpinnings 
of Terrorism" standard course.  These financial crimes 
courses would also go far to assist Jordan in developing an 
effective financial intelligence unit (FIU), currently in the 
works with assistance from USAID.  These courses would also 
broaden Jordan's financial crimes investigative capabilities. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  Expanding Range of Tools to Combat Terrorist 
Financing:  The GOJ has made strides to improve its ability 
to monitor terrorist financing activities in the last 
year.  It introduced a draft anti-money laundering law to 
Parliament earlier this year which, once approved and signed 
into law, will strengthen the GOJ's legal tools enabling 
better GOJ monitoring and prosecution of those involved in 
terrorist financing activities.  As noted above, USAID has 
drafted an action plan to provide technical assistance to the 
creation of an FIU in Jordan's Central Bank; the mission has 
contacted FinCENT about 
providing training under this aegis.  Once the anti-money 
laundering law is passed, we would recommend consideration of 
additional training for prosecutors-general at the Ministry 
of Justice, who will have responsibility for freezing 
laundered money and prosecuting AML/CFT cases, as well as for 
judges who will be involved in adjudicating 
cases under the new law. 
 
6.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
 
Please visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at 
http://www.state.sgov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through 
the Department of State's SIPRNET home page. 
HALE