US embassy cable - 05TELAVIV2135

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002135 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR A/S WELCH FROM AMBASSADOR KURTZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, IS, COUNTERTERRORISM, GOI EXTERNAL, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: FIGHTING TERROR AND BUILDING 
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
REF: A) STATE 60749 B) JERUSALEM 1392 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY:  Counterterrorism is central to Israel's 
national security priorities and is a key component of 
Embassy Tel Aviv's Mission Program Plan.  It also plays a key 
role in the progress -- or lack thereof -- of the peace 
process.  A main requirement for moving this agenda forward 
is funding for the programming and operating costs of General 
Ward's security coordination mission to reform the 
Palestinian security services.  Other areas to consider are 
expansion of counterterrorism training programs for both 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority, reconsideration of 
whether the USG should fund the $1.5 million required to 
exchange fingerprint data with Israeli security services, and 
the status of public diplomacy and security projects in the 
budget supplemental.  On a broader policy level, we face a 
difficult decision on whether to deal with Hamas as part of 
the governing structure of Palestinian society.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) One of our major foreign policy objectives, and the 
reason for General Ward's security coordination mission here, 
is to strengthen the counterterrorism capacity of the 
Palestinian Authority.  As also noted by ConGen Jerusalem 
(reftel B), a better organized, equipped and motivated PA 
security force would be in a position to prevent terrorist 
attacks, deny extremist groups support in Gaza and the West 
Bank, and facilitate the secure environment the Palestinians 
need to build strong, democratic institutions and Israel 
needs to take further risks in the peace process.  We need to 
ensure that Ward's mission has a fully funded program budget 
to reinforce the USG's weight at the table of donors and 
convince the PA leadership they must dismantle the terror 
networks.  To date, neither the State Department nor the 
General controls any program funding, and post has not 
received sufficient resources to support the mission's 
day-to-day expenses.  Full funding for operating costs 
(estimated at $2.3 million for the first six months of the 
mission) and programming is vital if we are to see real 
counterterrorism improvements from the PA. 
 
3. (C) Counterterrorism training is an area where we have 
done well, but could do more.  Training those who uncover and 
prosecute terrorism financing, both Israelis and 
Palestinians, could help bank employees and government 
officials better implement laws already on the books.  With 
Palestinians, a key training priority would be terrorism 
finance.  For more general law enforcement training in 
pursuit of USG goals, we should examine whether existing 
funding from the successful ATA (Antiterrorism Assistance) 
Program could be used to train Palestinian personnel.  In 
other fields, we recommend replicating successful programs, 
whether it be extending to other countries the research and 
development cooperation established by the U.S.-Israeli 
Technical Support Working Group or emulating the effective 
model of Jordanian counterterrorism along its border with 
Israel by providing training to Egyptian border police in the 
Sinai. 
 
4. (C) In evaluating our counterterrorism programs, we may 
also want to reexamine projects that have been previously 
rejected or put on hold.  One of these, which would cost the 
GOI $1.5 million to implement, is a program to exchange 
terrorists' fingerprints.  Despite support for the project 
from the Minister of Internal Security, the Israelis have 
consistently told us that they do not have the funding to 
make the system upgrades required for an exchange to take 
place.  If our law enforcement community deems access to the 
GOI's database of 20,000 fingerprints of known or suspected 
terrorists to be a high priority, we may wish to consider USG 
funding for the project. 
 
5. (C) The elimination of the public diplomacy portion and 
the reduction of the security portion of the budget 
supplemental to $3 million will significantly impinge upon 
our ability to implement counterterrorism programs.  The PD 
and security requests were carefully thought-out initiatives 
with goals we will no longer be able to achieve without the 
funding.  The PA is already experiencing significant 
difficulties in reining in terrorists.  If they fail in the 
security field, our reform efforts in other areas will be in 
serious danger. 
 
6. (S) In addition to decisions on specific programs, there 
is a broader policy issue that will directly impact the 
effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts.  Over the next 
two to three months, we must address how we would respond 
should Hamas win a substantial number of seats in the 
upcoming legislative elections, and how we will deal on the 
local assistance level with municipal councils that contain 
Hamas members or even Hamas majorities.  The questions USAID 
currently faces in distributing assistance to town councils 
that have elected Hamas members will be magnified many fold 
following the elections in June. 
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KURTZER