US embassy cable - 05NEWDELHI2608

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002608 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, IN, Counter-Terrorism 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT: MISSION INDIA INPUT 
 
REF: A. STATE 60749 
     B. STATE 60710 
     C. CAMP-ZELIKOW MARCH 18 MEMO 
     D. NEW DELHI 2089 
     E. 04 NEW DELHI 6445 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary: Mission welcomes the opportunity to share 
its views on ways to expand our GWOT efforts and cooperation 
with New Delhi as solicited in Refs A and B.  We agree with 
the overall thrust of the Bureau's approach (Ref C), but 
suggest additional focus on: 
 
-- Continued pressing of Islamabad to dismantle its 
Kashmir-oriented terrorist infrastructure; 
 
-- Continued engagement with New Delhi on developments in 
Bangladesh and Nepal; 
 
-- Adding terrorist groups active in the Northeast to the OTO 
List; 
 
-- Anti-terrorist finance initiatives; and 
 
-- Generating the resources to support this strategy.  End 
Summary. 
 
Keep Focus on Kashmir 
--------------------- 
 
2.  (C) Although cross-LOC infiltration fell considerably in 
2004 and Indo-Pak rapprochement continues, eliminating 
Kashmir-oriented terrorism remains integral to our CT 
strategy in India because it is the area of operations (AOR) 
for two FTOs with Al-Qaeda affiliations, LeT and JeM, which 
continue to operate in India with safe havens and support by 
Pakistan.  Our engagement on this issue is critical to US 
leverage over New Delhi in the event of any future 
spectacular terrorist attack and resulting military crisis. 
While Kashmiri support for terrorist groups has fallen 
sharply, anti-India sentiment and continuing human rights 
abuses by Indian security forces keep the region a potential 
breeding ground for terrorist sympathizers and requires more 
attention, as the "cause" that the small population of 
Islamic extremists in India seeks to exploit.  The potential 
for terrorist attacks will remain until the GOP uproots 
terrorist infrastructure (finances, training facilities, 
material support) located on Pakistani territory. 
 
Expand Dialogue on Bangladesh/Northeast India CT Nexus 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
3.  (C) The terror threat in Northeast India primarily 
emanates from the ethnic insurgencies in Assam, Nagaland, 
etc., of which the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) -- 
which we recommended this year to be added to the US OTO list 
-- is the most active.  Although the GOI has been leery of US 
offers of CT assistance in this region (Ref E), we urge 
increased attention to the cross-border dimension involving 
Bangladesh-based extremists.  The GOI has been more willing 
to engage us on the Bangladeshi dimensions of terrorism in 
its Northeast, such as cross-border infiltration, external 
funding, and arms transfers, which opens a door for us, and 
has implications for CT issues with Bangladesh more broadly. 
It is also important to continue adding indigenous groups 
such as ULFA and others to the US terrorism lists.  In 
addition to increasing our understanding of terrorist issues 
in the border regions of the Northeast/West Bengal and 
Bangladesh, heightened focus there will demonstrate that 
Washington has the will to act against terrorism even when US 
interests are not directly or immediately threatened. 
 
Anti-Terrorist Finance Assistance 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.  (C) The Mission is pressing the GOI to ramp up its 
anti-terrorist finance efforts.  The USG also needs an 
integrated approach to helping the GOI assess its anti-money 
laundering training and commodity needs, as well as funding 
training, commodity procurement, and professional exchanges 
between US Treasury Department's Financial Crimes 
Intelligence Network (FinCen) and India's nascent Financial 
Intelligence Unit (FIU).  The Mission's DHS Office of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has already 
established contacts with the FIU,s investigative staffers. 
In April, ICE will sponsor a visit to Washington for two of 
India,s FIU staffers to meet with relevant US law 
enforcement officers. 
 
5.  (C) On a related issue, the GOI has requested USG 
cooperation to deal with high-quality counterfeit rupees. 
The next step is a visit to Washington this spring by a team 
of GOI experts for in-depth discussions, for which the US 
Treasury Department's Office of South Asia and Southeast Asia 
has the action (Ref D).  Building cooperation on 
anti-counterfeiting would be added dimension in bilateral 
cooperation in anti-terrorist financing. 
 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
6.  (C) We would offer the following additional suggestions 
with resource implications: 
 
-- Increased travel funding to increase our "on the ground" 
outreach and information collection, especially in the 
northeast; 
 
-- Increased staffing, to include two new Information 
Officers to allow Consulates Mumbai and Chennai to increase 
their media outreach and programming, as well as a full-time 
Calcutta POL/ECON Officer to reach out more effectively to 
local law enforcement. 
 
-- Dramatically increased funding for the International 
Visitor program to allow the Mission to send more madrassah 
educators, Muslim journalists and politicians, and other key 
opinion shapers to the US to give them a broader and deeper 
understanding of US policy on terrorism, regional security, 
and related issues. 
 
-- Support for the INL/New Delhi funding request for the FY 
2007 counternarcotics budget proposal to finance a joint 
DEA/FBI/DHS money laundering assessment and cooperation 
development project. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
7.  (C) The GOI is strongly committed to prosecuting the 
GWOT, although Mission needs to ratchet up our bilateral 
interaction to overcome pockets of lingering suspicions of US 
intentions and to prod slow GOI bureaucracies to make our 
cooperation more effective.  The proposals outlined here, 
coupled with those outlined in Ref C, should significantly 
advance our CT goals in India.  For the Indian government, 
the priority target in the GWOT will continue to be the 
Pakistani support for terrorism in J&K, and to retain 
credibility here the US must be perceived as engaged in 
meeting this threat. 
MULFORD