US embassy cable - 05OTTAWA1007

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 001007 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2013 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, CVIS, CA, IR, CBW, Arms Control 
SUBJECT: (C) IRANIAN SCIENTIST OF CBW CONCERN IN CANADA 
 
REF: STATE 270366 
 
Classified By: POL M/C Brian Flora.  Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Polmiloff met April 5 with Foreign Affairs Canada 
Acting Director for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Marina 
Laker, at the latter's request, to discuss Iranian national 
Mehdi Arbabi Ghahroudi, currently in Canada on a one-year 
work permit that will expire 04 July 2005.  In addition to 
her verbal summary, Laker handed over a classified non-paper, 
the text of which is included at para 4. 
 
2. (S) Laker prefaced her comments by noting that the U.S. 
and Canada have enjoyed an excellent information-exchange 
relationship with regard to Iranian proliferation activities. 
 Not only have there been regular exchanges between 
intelligence services, she said, our governments collaborate 
closely in the context of CBW and nuclear non-proliferation 
regimes.  Laker stated that because of its diplomatic 
presence in Tehran, the GOC has been in a position to 
contribute value-added information on Iran.  Moreover, 
Canadian government monitoring of Iran and Iranians 
(including visa applicants) in general had intensified 
following the torture and murder by Iranian secret police of 
a Canadian journalist in 2003.  For these reasons, the GOC 
found the second-to-last bullet in the USG demarche somewhat 
"odd" as it suggested a lack of understanding of the depth of 
Canada's commitment to halting CBW proliferators. 
 
3. (S) In the case of Dr. Mehdi Arbadi Ghanhroudi, Laker said 
the Canadian government had no/no evidence to support that 
the National Research Centre for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology (NRCGEB) in Iran was involved in BW related 
activities, or that an individual affiliated with NRCGEB was 
involved in such activities.  The Canadian government had 
determined that Arbadi Ghanhroudi's line of research at 
Canada's NRC-IBS did not have BW applications.  Finally, 
Arbadi Ghanhroudi's application for a work permit and his 
credentials were thoroughly vetted by Canadian authorities 
prior to issuance of the one-year work permit. 
 
4, (C) TEXT OF Canadian non-paper: 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
SIPDIS 
 
-- The Canadian government was made aware of the United 
States' concern with Dr. Mehdi Arbadi Ghanhroudi (an Iranian 
scientist) in relation to his past affiliation with the 
National Research Centre for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology (NRCGEB) in Iran, in November 2004. 
 
-- The Canadian government issued Dr. Ghanhroudi a work 
permit valid until 2005/07/04. 
 
-- He is currently working at the National Research Council 
Institute for Biological Sciences (NRC-IBS), where he is 
conducting research on the Campylobacter antibody project. 
The Campylobacter bacterium is very fragile and hence 
unsuited to biological warfare applications. 
 
-- Dr. Ghanhroudi received recommendations for this position 
from his PhD supervisor at the VUB University in Brussels, 
Belgium as well as from the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases in Bethesda, Maryland. 
 
-- Dr. Ghanhroudi was initially offered a position at the 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in 
Bethesda, Maryland. 
 
-- The Canadian government has no intelligence information 
indicating that the NRCGEB is involved in BW related 
activities. 
 
-- The Canadian government maintains that there is no reason 
to suspect an individual affiliated with the NRCGEB as being 
involved in BW activities. 
 
-- Canada's visa application and vetting process is very 
thorough and fully responds to the Canadian government's 
non-proliferation commitments and obligations, including our 
legally binding obligations under domestic and international 
law. 
 
-- The government follows the highest standards for visa 
screening.  It was noted at the 2003 Australia Group annual 
plenary that, in some cases, Canada's visa screening 
procedures and practices were implemented some years before 
many Australia Group partners. 
 
-- The Canadian government will not pursue this matter 
further unless new security information is forthcoming. 
 
-- Canada welcomes, and would in fact recommend, a 
strengthened exchange between our intelligence agencies in 
order to deal with these types of issues. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
DICKSON