US embassy cable - 05SANAA875

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000875 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ 
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015 
TAGS: AMGT, ASEC, PREL, PTER, EAC 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 04/05/2005 
 
REF: SANAA 0863 
 
Classified By: Classified by RSO Timothy Laas for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
1.    (S/NF) Ambassador Thomas Krajeski convened an EAC 
meeting on April 5, 2005, to discuss the possible threat and 
review security measures taken by the Embassy and community. 
The RSO briefed the EAC about another grenade attack in 
central Sanaa (see paragraph 5), earlier in the day, against 
a military truck, near the Ministry of Defense.  The 
Ambassador followed the EAC with a Town Hall Meeting for the 
community reported SEPTEL.  Key offices and personnel 
represented at the meeting included:  DCM, DAT, LEGATT, POLE, 
RMAS, OMC, and RSO. End Summary. 
 
2.    (S/NF) RMAS informed the EAC that no new information 
had been received regarding the threat noted in EAC report 
REFTEL.  No other attendee had further information regarding 
the threat. 
 
3.    (S/NF) EAC members reviewed on going security measures 
and the Ambassador noted good compliance among Embassy 
sections in varying arrival times to work.  Additionally, the 
EAC discussed the fact that several TDY visits seen as 
&non-essential8 had been delayed pending better 
understanding of the threat.  EAC review of Emergency Action 
Plans determined that tripwires remained constant and had not 
escalated beyond the category identified by the EAC in 
REFTEL. The EAC noted that one tripwire did apply from the 
&Authorized Departure8 category as follows:  &Credible, 
specific, and non-counterable information of a terrorist 
threat or planned attack against Americans or other western 
citizens or interests, to include international schools.8 
 
4.    (S/NF)  The RSO advised EAC members that the following 
actions had been taken to ensure best security practices were 
applied in light of the threat: 
 
-  RSO met with Sanaa International School,s Director.  SIS 
according to the review has 8 American children in attendance 
(none from the U.S. Embassy) and approximately 40 other 
western nationalities among a student body of about 140 
students.  RSO advised the EAC that he found campus security 
well run, with a ram-resistant drop bar and armed sentries on 
the perimeter.  SIS,s Director briefed RSO that he would 
implement a &move safe8 plan for students arriving to 
school in coming days.  RSO also reviewed architectural plans 
with the School Director for an upcoming Phase II 
Soft-Target, upgrade designed to prevent intruders as well as 
to provide vehicular standoff and a public access center for 
screening staff and visitors. 
 
- SD residential coverage was adjusted to cover Embassy 
&leadership8 positions as well as the Embassy Employee 
Shuttle, while continuing spot coverage of other employee 
residences and the route from the Sheraton to the Embassy. 
Persons currently covered included the DCM, USAID Director, 
COS, DATT, FPD, and an OMC staff officer. 
 
- RSO advised the EAC of a review of the Yemen American 
Language Institute perimeter security and access control. 
RSO informed the EAC that YALI has a good public screening 
activity with the newly upgraded Public Access Center, but 
the perimeter security is lacking.  (RSO COMMENT:  ROYG 
officials have prevented finalization of perimeter upgrades 
due to an ongoing land dispute between the YALI owner and a 
property across the street.)  RSO recommended consideration 
by the EAC that YALI operations be suspended until ROYG 
allows placement of ram-resistant barriers and drop-bars to 
prevent a vehicle from forcing itself on YALI.  The EAC took 
no action on the proposal. 
 
- RSO informed the EAC that he had received a call from the 
Sheraton Hotel manager in Aden, who informed him that they 
had received a dramatic increase in perimeter security 
improvements from the Minister of Interior who placed 
ram-resistant barriers and sentries on the approaches to the 
hotel.  Additionally, the EAC was advised the hotel manager 
informed the RSO that a 20-meter standoff would be 
implemented on the hotels perimeter.  RSO noted guests' 
independent observations that perimeter control had improved 
dramatically with use of drop bars and vehicle inspections. 
(RSO COMMENT:  One ARSO is in Aden as of this report to 
review security with the hotel owner and manager.) 
- EAC members were informed that the RSO reviewed the 
Ambassador,s close protection detail and ordered the 
increased use of &ghost motorcades8, suspension of 
non-essential COM travel, and a dramatic change in routes 
completely avoiding usual choke-points and rush hours. 
 
- The EAC was advised of a house-by-house review by MOI on 4 
April 2004, in response to RSO request for marked police 
units or gun trucks on the streets line of sight of Embassy 
residences either in a roving or fixed fashion.  EAC was 
informed that a high-level delegation of MOI officers 
conducting the review promised to increase surveillance of 
routes to and from the Embassy and in front of residences and 
increased the number of sentries to the residential perimeter 
from two to six. 
 
- EAC was informed that Embassy Employee Shuttle schedules 
were being reviewed and where necessary modified to ensure 
change in travel times and routes. 
 
 
5.  (S/NF) EAC discussed conflicting information regarding 
the attack against a military vehicle near Babal Yemen, on 29 
March 2005.  The DCM advised the EAC that the MOI had 
informed him that it was an internal military dispute that 
lead to the attack; however other sources have reported a 
connection with the fighting going on in Saada.  The RSO 
informed the EAC about another similar grenade incident that 
occurred earlier in the day near downtown Sanaa at about 1200 
noon, 5 April 2005, near the Ministry of Defense.  RSO 
sources reported that a man dressed in clothing typical of 
the Believing Youth Movement was seen throwing a grenade 
through the open window of a military pick-up on a street 
named Al-Qaida.  The grenade was said to have been thrown 
back out of the window by the intended victims, who then gave 
chase to the attacker.  During the chase the assailant threw 
another grenade that destroyed a truck and may have killed 
one pursuer.  The chase ended when the man described as 
having five grenades on his person, threatened to throw a 
third grenade, which broke off the chase. 
 
6.  (U) The meeting ended with no further recommendations. 
Khoury