US embassy cable - 05KUWAIT1400

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001400 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
FOR NEA/FO, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2015 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, PGOV, KU, TERRORISM 
SUBJECT: GWOT ASSESSMENT:  KUWAIT 
 
REF: A. STATE 60749 
     B. KUWAIT 1159 
     C. KUWAIT 1104 
     D. KUWAIT 730 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Summary:  Counterterrorism remains at the top of 
our bilateral agenda and post has experienced increased 
cooperation from the Government of Kuwait (GOK) in the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) since January when a series of security 
incidents revealed to the GOK a home-grown threat.  There is 
better information-sharing, the GOK is generally responsive 
to action requests, and the Government has taken steps to 
strengthen domestic laws, better train and equip security 
personnel, and come into compliance with international CT 
agreements.  Nevertheless, there is still much to be done and 
the U.S. can make a positive and lasting contribution, 
especially in the areas of terrorist financing and training. 
The Ambassador chairs monthly meetings of the post's 
Counterterrorism Working Group (group members include the DCM 
and section heads from POL, ECON, RMAS, RSO, CONS, DIALO, and 
OMC-K) to asses terrorism threats to U.S. interests in 
Kuwait, evaluate the GOK's progress on CT measures, and to 
identify areas for U.S. influence (refs b and d).  The CWG 
recommends a refined CT strategy for Kuwait address terrorist 
financing, increased training, and public diplomacy.  End 
Summary. 
 
Terrorist Financing 
------------------- 
 
2.  (C)  The GOK recently signed the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and 
agreement is pending parliamentary ratification.  Despite 
this positive step, there remain holes in the system:  there 
is no means to track cash flows out of the country and the 
Central Bank's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) cannot share 
information with other FIUs without prior approval from the 
Public Prosecutor for each instance.  Kuwait needs, and post 
has requested, the Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG) 
provide expert assistance to the GOK for devising appropriate 
to criminalize terrorism-related finance, thereby further 
strengthening current money laundering legislation. 
 
3.  (C)  In addition to the need for strengthened 
legislation, there is a real need to enhance the judicial 
branch's counterterrorism capacity.  GOK officials readily 
admit that expertise in financial crimes investigations 
within both the Public Prosecutor,s Office and the judiciary 
is quite thin and officials do not know what to look for when 
presented with a suspicious transaction report.  During an 
April 2004 visit by Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) Director William Fox, Public Prosecutor Riyadh 
Al-Hajeri responded eagerly to FinCEN,s offer of technical 
assistance (ref c) which post strongly believes should be 
on-site training in Kuwait.  Training should be preceded by 
an OPDAT team visit for an in-depth needs assessment of the 
judicial system's ability to combat money laundering and 
terrorist finance operations. 
 
Specialized Training 
-------------------- 
 
4.  (C)  Kuwait lost several security officers in the January 
and February raids on terror cells and has since placed an 
emphasis on the need for better training.  Hundreds of 
Kuwaitis have participated in the Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
(ATA) courses and post has requested, at GOK expense, 
security operations center training for mid-level managers. 
Kuwaitis also participate in CENTCOM consequence management 
training and post has invited Kuwaitis to take part in the 
mid-April "NESA Center Seminar on Combating Terrorism in the 
New International Security Environment."  Kuwait recognizes 
U.S. expertise in raining and post recommends increased 
funding for training opportunities, especially in financial 
crime investigation, computer crimes, crime scene 
investigation, and CT analysis.  Refresher courses should 
also be offered so that skills do not erode.  Post further 
recommends the establishment of an International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) for the Gulf states. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  DIA is considering allocating resources for 
increased engagement with Kuwaiti Military Intelligence 
through the new Force Protection Directorate.  The 
Directorate has a special need for organizational 
development, equipment recommendations, staffing, and 
training.  This is a unique opportunity to influence the GOK 
tactical approach to CT and the U.S. should take advantage of 
it.  RMAS is also providing training and seeking 
opportunities to expand it. 
 
High-Level and Public Engagement 
-------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  The Ambassador regularly raises GWOT issues with 
Kuwaiti leadership, but visits by senior USG officials would 
reinforce to decision-makers that CT is a U.S. priority.  If 
still offered, the International Counterterrorism Policy 
Workshop, would provide a useful forum to discuss CT 
strategies and responses, bringing together representatives 
from different ministries.  Although the National Security 
Bureau was recently tasked to coordinate GOK CT efforts, a 
stovepipe structure persists and hampers real progress.  Not 
only would the presence of a U.S. interagency team send a 
strong message about the importance of intra-government 
cooperation, but also signal to GOK leaders, who claim an 
imbalance in the relationship, that the U.S. considers Kuwait 
an important partner in the GWOT. 
 
7.  (C)  Post also recommends a continued aggressive public 
diplomacy campaign.  Kuwaiti officials have often said that 
public relations is our biggest weakness in the GWOT. 
Newspapers and satellite stations repeatedly ran pictures of 
Iraqis reportedly injured by U.S. and coalition forces , but 
there were few, if any, images of insurgent arms caches or 
torture chambers.  Kuwaitis wanted to see these pictures. 
Post has excellent relations with the local media and could 
easily place op-eds and photos on the destructiveness of 
terrorists and their actions.  This is an effective and 
low-cost approach.  We also need to do everything possible to 
make sure that we respond quickly and transparently to 
allegations related to treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo 
and elsewhere. 
 
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LEBARON