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| Identifier: | 05NEWDELHI2601 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 05NEWDELHI2601 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy New Delhi |
| Created: | 2005-04-06 13:03:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET |
| Tags: | ETTC PARM PREL IR IN CBW GOI |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 002601 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015 TAGS: ETTC, PARM, PREL, IR, IN, CBW, GOI SUBJECT: INDIAN INVESTIGATION OF SABERO ORGANICS, LTD. REF: NEW DELHI 6773 Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 1. (S) On March 25, MEA Under Secretary, Disarmament and International Security Affairs (DISA), Nutan Kapoor gave PolMilOff a nonpaper outlining the status of the GOI investigation of Sabero Organics' export of a CWC Schedule 3 chemical to Iran. Text of nonpaper follows in para 3. 2. (S) Because of US concerns (Reftel), the GOI discussed the matter with Sabero and the firm has since declined another request from the Iranian end-user, according to Kapoor. She requested the USG provide further "persuasive information" about the end-user that can be deployed if the case goes to court. 3. (S) Begin text of GOI nonpaper: Reference nonpaper handed over to USG in October 2004 in response to information conveyed by USG regarding the export of a CWC Schedule 3 chemical Tri Methyl Phosphite (TMP) to Iran by an Indian firm "Sabero Organics Gujarat Limited." Due to the continuing concerns expressed by the USG, the GOI has advised the Indian firm to refrain from further exports of TMP to the Iranian end-user "Raja Shimi Industrial Manufacturing," pending completion of GOI investigations. The firm has declined a further request made by the Iranian entity. While GOI investigations are ongoing, the USG is requested to provide further persuasive information about the Iranian end-user, the risk of diversion of the chemical to Iran's CW program, and details about Iran's CW program. End text of GOI nonpaper. MULFORD
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